coupled with the Eden Plan for the reunification of Germany—are shared by the United States, together with the United Kingdom, and France.

I merely wish, first of all, to confirm that fact, and to say that we associate ourselves, Mr. Chairman, with what you have said in exposition of these joint proposals.1

I would like now to address myself to some of the observations that were made by Mr. Molotov,2 and, in the first instance, to the condemnation of what Mr. Molotov called "military blocs" but which are in reality collective security associations.

I realize that there is a difference of opinion between our governments with reference to these matters, and probably it will not be possible to resolve all those differences at this time, but I could not pass without comment the condemnation of these collective defense organizations.

Why, indeed, should it be that nations should not join together to help each other against what they consider to be a common danger, or in pursuance of what they consider to be a sense of common destiny. Individuals do that. It is considered the appropriate way to get security. And the Charter of the United Nations, to which we have all subscribed, defines that as an inherent right of nations.

Why should it be that something which we have all agreed is an inherent right of nations-that is, the right not only of an individual, but the right of collective self-defense-why is it that that now comes in for such bitter condemnation, when it is something which, I say, we have all agreed is an inherent right.

It is suggested that these collective defense associations are a cause of increased military expenditures, and in support of that these figures are given showing that in the case of some of our countries our military budgets went up very sharply between the year 1948 and the year 1954. But it should not be forgotten that some things happened during that period other than the formation of collective security associations. There were the events which took place in Czechoslovakia; there was the blockade of Berlin; there was the attack upon the Republic of Korea. Anyone who examines history realistically must see that it was such events as these that led to the increase of military budgets, and not the creation of collective security associations.

Indeed, I think it is demonstrable that the military budgets of each of the Western Powers would have gone up much more sharply than they did were it not for the fact that because of collective security we thought that we could help each other out and, therefore, did not need, in each individual nation, as large a military budget as would have been felt necessary had we stood alone.

Mr. Molotov has said, and said with some reason, that security pacts of themselves do not necessarily provide adequate security and I think he put the question: How do we get security? Well, I think that the way to get security is to try to end some of the injustices which

1 See Mr. Macmillan's statement of Oct. 28, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 33-37.

2 Statement of Oct. 28, 1955; ibid., pp. 38-44.

prevail in the world and which sometimes drive people into acts of violence which otherwise they would not commit. One of those injustices, and one the responsibility for which we here are charged with, is the continued division of Germany. Because it was recognized that that was a dangerous situation, a wrong situation, a situation which created insecurity, we were charged here to deal with the two problems inseparably or closely linked; that is, the problem of reunification of Germany and European Security. It is stated in that order in the directive.1

And it is further said in the directive that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace; in other words, that the reunification of Germany is one of the problems, a settlement of which will serve to consolidate

peace.

We have come here with proposals to deal with each of these two problems, the solution of which would serve the interests of consolidating peace. We have put on the table yesterday, through President Pinay, the proposal for the unification of Germany, which reflects in essence the Eden Plan which was put forward at our Berlin Conference, and the new proposals to give security assurance in connection with the reunification of Germany.2

The Eden Plan is, as I say, one with which we are all familiar; and it is reintroduced now, substantially in its initial form, because it is based upon principles which are basic and sound and which reflect the directive that we should seek a "settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people."

The suggested treaty of assurance on the reunification of Germany is new and it represents an honest, sincere, painstaking effort to carry out the directive in that respect and to meet what we recognize to be the legitimate preoccupations of the Soviet Union and, indeed, of all of us, as against the possibility that Germany might again become a militaristic state. The proposals include all of the features which we were instructed to consider; provisions for an obligation not to resort to force, that is one; provision to deny assistance to an aggressor, that is another; limitation, control and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments, that is another; the establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of forces will be subject to mutual agreement. All of those aspects which we were instructed to consider are realistically incorporated in the outline of a treaty which has been submitted by the three Western Powers. And in addition to the features which we were instructed to consider the proposal contains under the paragraph numbered 8 a suggested agreement to react against aggression which involves undertakings of the utmost gravity and which for the United States would constitute an extremely serious and far-reaching commitment having

1 The title of this portion of the directive reads, "European Security and Germany"; see supra, doc. 123.

? See supra.

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regard to our traditional attitude toward these matters and to our geographical separation from the European continent. It is, however, something that I believe the United States would be prepared to do as a part of a contribution to bring about the increased security for all which would come with the reunification of Germany.

I was very glad to hear Mr. Molotov say that he would study these proposals more carefully, because it is quite obvious that his initial reaction is based upon an inadequate understanding of the document. As I understood Mr. Molotov, his basic objections to the proposal, as he understood the proposal, were in essence two: One to the effect that the proposal required Germany to become a party to NATO and the other was that the sanctions of the treaty were mere "consultations."

Dealing with the first point, let me say that there is nothing whatsoever in the treaty proposal which conflicts with the provision of the Eden Plan that the all-German Government shall have authority to assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Let me make it perfectly clear and emphatic: There is nothing whatsoever in the treaty proposal which requires Germany to become a member of NATO. It is recognized that a reunified Germany will be free to accept or to reject existing obligations with reference either to NATO, to Brussels,1 or to Warsaw. That is a complete freedom, and nothing in our proposals is in any way contrary to that.

With respect to the sanctions in the treaty, these are more far-reaching than any which have ever been known before in the course of international relations, covering practically every aspect which is subject to control, not only in terms of engagements, pledges, which are most serious, but also including physical arrangements in the way of inspection, controls, assurances regarding the level of forces, and the like. As I say, they go far beyond anything that history has ever before known, and surely it is not to be said that there is nothing is this proposal except mere "consultations".

So I very much hope that this proposal, which tries so seriously and conscientiously to give real substance to our directive, will receive the careful consideration which I know it deserves. And I am confident that with that consideration the provisional and superficial views that have been expressed here will be revised. Of course, all of this proposal is subject to the reunification of Germany, and at least one of the provisions of the treaty operates, as far as the United States and the other powers here are concerned, only if the reunified Germany joins NATO; that is, Article 8, because Article 8 deals in effect with a guarantee by the NATO members that no one of their own membership will commit aggression. We can give such assurance as regards our own group, but if a reunified Germany joins the Warsaw Treaty, then it would not be for us to give assurances that Germany will not commit aggression.

1 Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, as amended by the protocols of Oct. 23, 1954; supra, pp. 968-971, 972-989.

2 Treaty of May 14, 1955; supra, pp. 1239–1242.

We shall, of course, examine carefully the proposal which the Soviet Delegation has submitted. In looking at it in the few minutes that have been available, I think it will be found that some at least of the provisions of our proposal coincide with the proposals of the Soviet Delegation. There is, however, one basic difference of approach, which is that we have submitted together proposals dealing with what our directive says are the two closely-linked problems; namely, the problem of the reunification of Germany, and the problem of European security.

The proposal of the Soviet Delegation, so far as I can see, is in no way connected with the reunification of Germany, and, therefore, it would be difficult for us to consider it until we see the proposal which the Soviet Delegation says it intends to submit for the reunification of Germany. When we see the two together then we shall be able to appreciate them better than by only seeing the first proposal without the other half; namely, the reunification of Germany.

In conclusion, let me beg the Soviet Delegation to believe that the treaty proposal that has been made here represents a serious and, I would say, indeed, a momentous and historic proposal designed to meet, as fully as human ingenuity can meet it, the problem of permitting the reunification of Germany to occur under conditions which will assure that whichever election Germany makes, in terms of its future associations or lack of associations, there will be assurance to us all against something which we are all entitled to dread and fear; that is, the possibility that Germany might again become a militaristic State.

126. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 29, 1955 2

Mr. Chairman, I feel that we have made considerable progress during the two days of conference which we have so far had-two days of discussion of our proposals-and that the last statement made by Mr. Molotov 3 poses the question, a very proper one at this stage, as to how do we really make progress from now on.

We are not here to engage in polemics, and to show how smart we are, either as lawyers or as diplomats. We are here on a very serious task. And, in that spirit, I would like to say this: I think that the three Western Powers in their proposals have gone very far in presenting the position which their governments hold, on both the subject of the reunification of Germany and on the subject of security, and, while I do not suggest that those proposals are by any means complete, they do, I think, constitute a very full exposition of the point of view of our three governments.

I think that most of the questions which Mr. Molotov has put,

1 Proposal of Oct. 28, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 45-48. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

Statement of Oct, 29, 1955; ibid., pp. 66–72.

Supra, doc. 124.

either yesterday or today, have been answered as adequately as is appropriate to answer them at the present stage of our debate. When we get down to discussing the detailed elaboration of a security treaty, a treaty of assurance, along the lines we have proposed, then it will naturally be appropriate to have further more detailed exchanges of views as to just how certain articles should be drafted.

It seems to me that the important thing at this stage is to know the position of the Soviet Union with reference to the reunification of Germany. It is quite true that our proposals start from the premise that Germany will be reunified and the assurances which we have suggested are assurances which depend basically, not upon Germany's entry into N.A.T.O., but they do depend basically upon the reunification of Germany.

We do not yet know the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the reunification of Germany, and while we know that the head of the Soviet Government agreed in the directive that Germany should be reunified through free elections, we do not know just what proposals the Soviet Union will now make to give effect to that provision of the directive.

Mr. Molotov says that he has a proposal to make in that respect and it seems to me that from the standpoint of making progress it would be very useful if Mr. Molotov could let us see what that proposal is.

There is, I know, a difference of opinion between us as to the relative order of importance of European security and the reunification of Germany but there can be no difference between us on the proposition that there is a close link between the two, because that has already been decided for us by our superiors.

There are, one might say, two sides of a single coin, one side of which is European security and the other side of which is German reunification. We have tried to present our view as to the pattern of both sides of the coin, the pattern of European security, the pattern of German reunification. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned only one side of the coin is as yet visible; that is, the one that has the pattern of European security. I think, in order that we can really proceed in a businesslike way, which I know we all want, that it would be extremely useful if the Soviet Union would show us the other side of its coin, the one that has the pattern of German reunification. Then we can see whether there is a basis of agreement there. Because in our case, it has been made clear, German reunification is the premise of our proposed security treaty.

If we cannot reach agreement about the reunification of Germany, then obviously our security proposals are irrelevant because they are predicated upon the reunification of Germany, and in that case it is academic to attempt to elaborate proposals because the foundation may not exist. But if, as I hope, a foundation exists in our being able to find agreement about the reunification of Germany, then the hypothetical questions which have been put can be developed because we will know on what premise it is permissible to proceed.