127. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
OCTOBER 29, 1955 1

Mr. Chairman, we can all ask questions. I have asked several. One question I have asked is as to whether we can proceed in our discussion of security on the assumption that the Soviet Union will promptly agree to the reunification of Germany. That is, from my standpoint, as important a question to ask and to have answered as any that I can think of.

2

I would say that certainly the purpose which we all have here is to find security for all. As far as the United States is concernedand I can not in this respect speak for my colleagues or anybody but myself I can only refer to what President Eisenhower said when he was here in July when he said-and he said it on two separate days to make it perfectly clear: "European security and the reunification of Germany are inseparable". Those were his words. And it is the view of the United States that it is not possible to achieve security in. Europe upon the premise of a divided Germany. Now, that may not be the view of others, but that is certainly the point of view which we bring to this conference, and until we know whether or not we are to proceed on the premise that Germany will be unified or on the premise that Germany is to be divided it is extremely difficult for us to answer hypothetical questions about a security treaty because a security treaty which is predicated upon a unified Germany is one thing. If Germany is not to be unified, then the problems are of a totally different order, and it is not possible to answer questions until we know what the basic foundation is as far as Germany is concerned.

That is all.

128. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

NOVEMBER 2, 1955 3

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have the opportunity to comment on the presentation which has just been made by the head of the Soviet Delegation. I shall, of course, look forward to the opportunity to study closely his remarks when I have the exact transcript, but I can make some preliminary observations at this time.

As I recall, Mr. Molotov first commented on our security proposals and made objections on two grounds, principally, the first being, as I recall, that, and I quote now my notes of the English translation,

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 74-75.

Statements of July 20, 1955 (supra, doc. 119) and July 21, 1955 (The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955; Department of State publication 6046; 1955, p. 53, n. 7).

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 99-101.

Ibid., pp. 89-99.

Supra, doc. 124.

"that the treaty enters into force only simultaneously with the entry of Germany into NATO".

The second point, as I understand it, was that the security proposals which we had submitted did not operate for the benefit of the neighbors of Germany who had in the past been the victims of German aggression.

I was very glad that his objections are of a kind which can readily

be met.

The proposal as submitted by the three Western Powers provides that "the treaty would enter into force only in conjunction with the reunification of Germany." So it is not accurate to say that it only comes into force when Germany enters into NATO. That provision must be read in connection with the provision in the Eden Plan, which is annexed, which provides that the all-German government may either accept or reject membership in NATO. It is quite true that our proposal says that "the provisions would come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed." That agreement we will seek from the Soviet Government at an appropriate time.

With respect to the second point, it is certainly the intent and I think certainly the effect of the proposals that we submitted, that they should benefit all of the countries here in Europe which have been subject to German aggression. For example, Article 8 says "an armed attack against any party which is not a NATO member," and obviously the limitation of forces and the special measures within a treaty area which would embrace parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia would give a very great measure of security to those countries.

I think it can be confidently said, as I said before Mr. Molotov spoke this last time, that the progress that we have made makes it apparent that we can reach agreement on security provided we can reach agreement on the reunification of Germany. Having listened here to all the observations which Mr. Molotov has made and having seen his own proposals, I am confident that it is possible to find agreement upon a security treaty which will meet all the legitimate security preoccupations of the Soviet Union and of the other countries who have in the past suffered from German aggression. That is, I know, an optimistic statement, but I hope it is not a crime to be optimistic. So, after having made this good progress in the area of security, we turn to the problem of reunification of Germany. Mr. Molotov discussed the question of who is responsible for the present division of Germany, and, as I understood it, he put the responsibility on those who had created first Bizonia and then Trizonia. Well, Germany was originally divided into four parts, and I am not sure that it is fair to put the responsibility for the continued division of Germany upon those who first reduced the four parts to three, and then reduced the three parts to two. If the Soviet Union will join with us to bring

1 Statement of Nov. 2, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 85-87. 2 i. e., the fusion, for economic purposes, of the American and British zones of occupation in Germany, Jan. 1, 1947 (see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 528-541), and the merger of all three Western zones under the Allied High Commission, Apr. 8, 1949 (ibid., pp. 588-590).

about now the reduction of the two to one, then we will no longer have to argue about who is responsible for division.

But really the important thing is not who is responsible for the division of Germany, but who is responsible to put Germany together again, and as to that, the decision has been made: "The Heads of Government recognizing their common responsibility for the reunification of Germany" that is our Directive; and, whoever was responsible for the past, we now have a common responsibility for the future. I confess that I was at first discouraged by the Soviet proposals about Germany because they seemed to me not only to be impractical but they seemed to me to be a very clear departure from our Directive but I did not remain discouraged long because I thought to myself that the first proposals which the Soviet Union had made about security were very discouraging, and their second proposals came much closer and showed a real approach to those of the Western Powers. So I hope that the Soviet Delegation, after we have had a discussion on this question of the reunification of Germany, may see its way to coming forward with proposals which meet more clearly the Directive, and which by so doing also meet more responsively the submission which we have made in this respect.

Our Directive calls for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections. Now Mr. Molotov has pointed out that, if you have free elections, somebody is going to win and somebody is going to lose. That is, however, inherent, as I see it, in the nature of free elections. Presumably that fact was taken into account by the Heads of Government when they nevertheless directed us to bring about the reunification of Germany by free elections. I do not wish to go into & debate about the merits or demerits of the social structure which has been created in East Germany. It is not really important what I think about it. The important thing is: What do the Germans think about it, because they are the ones who are going to have to live by their choice.

Free elections, under the conditions that are foreseen by the proposal of the Western Powers, will permit the Germans who live in East Germany, if they wish, to go all about Germany explaining the merits, if these are merits, of the social system that exists in East Germany, and they will have a full opportunity to explain it to the Germans. It will also give the people in West Germany an opportunity to find out, by personal investigation, by talking with the East Germans, what they think about it. And then, after that period of electioneering has taken place, the people will go to the polls and decide what they want. If they want this system, which to Mr. Molotov seems so good, they will vote to take it; if they don't like it, then they won't take it. But the point I want to make is it is not whether Mr. Molotov likes it, or I like it, that isn't what counts-the essence of free elections is that the Germans themselves will decide if they want it or not. If they do like it, they will take it; if they don't like it, they will get rid of it. And that is the essence of free elections which we are required to bring about.

1 1 Supra, doc. 123.

I am really surprised that Mr. Molotov should assume, as he apparently does, that under conditions of free elections, where the people have the right to see and examine what is going on, they will reject the East German system. If the social and economic conditions which Mr. Molotov would preserve are good then they will survive the test of free elections. I believe that the free system of the West is good enough to survive free elections. Apparently, Mr. Molotov does not believe that the system of the East is good enough to survive free elections. But, however that may be, our Directive says that the Heads of Government have agreed on the reunification of Germany by means of free elections, and I hope very much that the Soviet delegation, in loyal performance of the Directive given us, will again examine the matter and put forward either its own proposal for free elections, or, which would be much better, accept the proposal which the Western Powers have made.

The four-point Soviet proposal,' which has been circulated, makes no provision whatever for free elections in Germany, and I would hope that the Soviet Union, I repeat, would submit a proposal for free elections in Germany, which is what we are directed to do.

129. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 3, 1955 2

Mr. Chairman, I have, as I promised Mr. Molotov yesterday, read very carefully his speech and the proposals which accompanied that speech. About half of the remarks of Mr. Molotov concern themselves with the problem of European security, which we have been discussing now for some days. As I read that portion of Mr. Molotov's remarks, and then read the further speeches that were made around the table by President Pinay,5 Mr. Macmillan, and myself, it seemed to me that the statements made gave a very full reply to the questions which Mr. Molotov put in relation to the matter of European security.

6

I would like to associate myself with the eloquent statement which was made by President Pinay. It was I felt an answer of a statesmanlike character, to the points that had been raised by Mr. Molotov.

I feel, after having read the speech on behalf of the Soviet Delegation and the other speeches that were made, that I can confidently reaffirm what I said yesterday-that there is before us a realizable vision of security in Europe by means of a treaty which would conform to our directive; provided-and, of course, this proviso is of the utmost importance-we can make similar progress with respect to the reunification of Germany.

1 Proposal of Nov. 2, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 98–99. 2 Ibid., pp. 105–112.

3 Supra.

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 89-99.

5 Ibid., pp. 102-105.

• Ibid., pp. 82-85.

Therefore, as I see it, the urgent present task of our conference is to concentrate, as closely as we may, as intensely as we may, as constructively as we may, on dealing with the other half of the whole of our first directive; namely, the problem of Germany, and the reunification of Germany.

The Western powers recognized what our directive' calls the "close link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security." So, in their proposals of last week, six days ago, we submitted not only a proposal in relation to the European security treaty, but, also, as part of our proposal, the amended Eden Plan dealing with the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.2 That proposal, as I say, was submitted six days ago. Yesterday, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal of its own with reference to the German problem, and asked us to comment upon it.

Perhaps it would not be unfair if we felt that it would be useful if the Soviet Union would comment upon our proposal which was submitted six days ago. That proposal was designed to conform carefully to our directive, and I think deserves comment and consideration which, so far, has been lacking.

In the extensive remarks which Mr. Molotov made yesterday on this subject of Germany, he did not comment upon, either by way of criticism or by way of approval, on the plan which we had submitted. We have a saying that "Silence means consent". I recall I suggested that once in the past, but Mr. Molotov said that was not a Russian proverb.

I am, however, willing to oblige by commenting upon the fourpoint proposal which Mr. Molotov submitted yesterday. My first reaction was, and my considered conclusion is, that that proposal is principally noteworthy in its complete failure to comply at all with the directive under which we are operating.

The directive of last July on this subject contains four elements. The first is that Germany shall be reunified; the second is that it shall be reunified by means of free elections; the third is that this shall be done in conformity with the national interests of the German people, and fourthly, in the interests of European security.

I deal first with the fact that it was agreed there shall be a reunification of Germany. I would observe that whereas the proposal of the Western powers contemplated an actual reunification of Germany, and this we hope by next year, the Soviet proposals do not contemplate at all the reunification of Germany.

The various proposals so far submitted by the Soviet Union, which touch on this topic, seem to presuppose not that Germany will be reunified but that Germany will continue to be divided. The fourpoint proposal of the Soviet Delegation, submitted yesterday, contemplates not the reunification of Germany, but the cooperation of two German states. This, apparently, is the Soviet view of the most that can be expected-certainly for the indefinite future.

I do not think that it is improper for us to ask that the Soviet