force; the denial of assistance to an aggressor; the limitation, control, and inspection of armed forces and armaments; and the establishment of a zone between the East and the West in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement.

The Directive then goes on to say that "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections, shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security".

1

The three Western powers, in an effort faithfully to carry out the Directive, submitted on October 28 [27] a proposal which did take account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security. Our proposal ties the two together and comprises, on the one hand, a proposal with reference to security on the assumption that Germany will be reunified as our Heads of Government agreed; and, on the other hand, a concrete proposal for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections, as our Directive specifies.

The Soviet Union on October 28 submitted a proposal for European security, which almost wholly ignored the specifications of our Directive as to security features which we were instructed to consider. Furthermore, it ignored the instruction to take account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security. This Soviet security proposal did not recognize any link at all between security and the reunification of Germany; on the contrary, it assumed the division, and, apparently, the indefinite division of Germany. Subsequently, on the 31st of October, the Soviet Union made new security proposals, which, although they still disregard the link with German reunification, did more fully meet the specifications of the Directive as to the scope and nature of security. Because of that, these new proposals approached those which had been made on October 28 [27] by the Western powers in conformity with the Directive.

3

In a statement which I made at our fifth session on November 2, I made a comparative analysis of the Western security proposals and the new proposals of the Soviet Union, and pointed out, item by item, the extent to which, by conforming to the Directive, they coincided with each other.

Of course, there remains the fundamental and critical difference that our security proposal presupposed a united Germany, while the Soviet proposal presupposed a divided Germany. Nevertheless, the proposals did indicate a possibility of significant progress once the Soviet Delegation complies, as we still assume it will, with the Directive with respect to the reunification of Germany, and the Directive

as to the close link between the reunification of Germany and European security.

I do not minimize the serious problems which will, no doubt, arise as we undertake the task of converting our security proposals, now presented in general terms, into concrete treaty clauses. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that, subject to the fundamental and critical difference which I have referred to, there is a very considerable measure of agreement in principle as to how to get security in Europe.

Mr. Molotov has asked a good many questions about our security proposals, questions which we have answered even though Mr. Molotov does go on asking them again. Perhaps his confusion comes from the fact that it is indeed difficult to have a complete meeting of minds until we know we are both proceeding from the same premise; namely, the reunification of Germany.

So, that is where we stand on European security.

With respect to the reunification of Germany, the Soviet Delegation still continues to be totally unresponsive to the specific directions under which we are operating. The only proposal of the Soviet Union is a proposal which says that, and I quote from it: "The German people are deprived of the possibility of living in a united state", and which, accordingly, calls for a consultative council to be formed by representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.1

The Soviet Union has not submitted any proposal for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections and so far declines to consider the proposal which the Western powers have made in this respect. So that is where we stand with respect to German reunification. I find it hard to believe that this rigid and unresponsive position of the Soviet Union is final.

The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it so ardently argues, that there is no close link between the reunification of Germany and European security. But the four Heads of Government agreed, last July, that there is a close link between European security and the reunification of Germany, and they instructed us to take that into

account.

The Soviet Delegation may now believe that, as its proposal says, the Germans do not now have "the possibility" of living in a united state. But the four Heads of Government determined, last July, that Germany had that possibility and that Germany should be reunified. The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it so ardently argues, that free elections are bad. But the four Heads of Government agreed, last July, that Germany should be reunified "by means of free elections."

The Soviet Delegation may now believe, as it contends, that Germany should not be made a national state because this would jeopardize alleged social gains in that part of Germany which has been communized by the Soviet Communist party. But the four Heads of Government agreed, last July, that the reunification of Germany

See the Soviet delegation's proposal of Nov. 2, 1955; Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 98-99.

should take place, and take place in conformity with the "national" interests of the German people. There was no precondition that there should be preserved a sectional system which has been imposed from without and which the German people, once they become again a whole nation, may, if they wish, either accept or repudiate.

It may be tiresome that I repeat, again and again, the refrain of adhering to our Directive. I cannot, however, in good conscience do otherwise. The four Heads of our Governments reached an agreement last July at Geneva which gave rise to new hopes throughout the world.

President Eisenhower, on returning from Geneva, made a radio and television broadcast to the American people 1 in which he referred to these agreements that had been made and he said, "We are profoundly hopeful that these assurances will be faithfully carried out." Then he went on to say, "The acid test should begin next October, because then the next meeting occurs. It will be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Its principal purpose will be to take the conclusions of this conference as the subjects to be discussed there and the general proceedings to be observed in translating those generalities that we talked about into actual, specific agreements."

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that our task here is to carry out faithfully the assurances that were given last July and to translate those assurances into actual, specific agreements. That is why we have joined with Britain and France in making specific proposals with reference to European security, which took into account the close link between that security and the reunification of Germany. That is why we submitted concrete proposals for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.

We are, as President Eisenhower said, facing the acid test. I hope that we shall pass it. Certainly if we fail it will not be because of any unwillingness on the part of the three Western delegations to see that the assurances of last July will, in fact, be faithfully carried

out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

131. PROPOSAL BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS, NOVEMBER 4, 1955 2

Reunification of Germany by Free Elections

On the joint initiative of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the U.S. submit the following proposal as the first step in order to carry out

1 Address of July 25, 1955; supra, pp. 111-114.

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 136-137. The American delegation submitted this proposal on behalf of the three delegations.

415900-57-vol. 2-18

the reunification of Germany in freedom in accordance with the Plan presented by the Three Powers on October 28 [27]: 1

Draft Decision of the Conference

In conformity with the common responsibility of their governments for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany and in compliance with the Directive of their Heads of Government that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security, the Foreign Ministers of France, the U.K., the USSR, and the U.S. have agreed as follows:

1. Free and secret elections shall be held throughout Germany during September 1956, for the selection of representatives for an allGerman National Assembly to draft a constitution and to form a government thereunder for a reunified Germany.

2. Each of the Four Powers will designate a representative to a Commission to prepare, in consultation with German experts, the electoral law for such elections, including effective provisions for safeguards and supervision to insure the freedom of such elections.

3. The Commission shall undertake its functions promptly and shall submit its report to the Four Powers by January 1956.

132. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
NOVEMBER 9, 1955 2

3

Yesterday, Mr. Molotov, just returned from Moscow, made a statement on behalf of the Soviet Union. It had such grave implications that I asked that we should suspend our meeting until today so as to be able to give his statement deliberate thought. I am now in a position to express the views of my Government.

My first observation is that the Soviet position if persisted in will perpetuate conditions which put in jeopardy the peace of Europe. My second observation is that it strikes a crippling blow at the possibility of developing relations of confidence with the Soviet Union. I ask your permission, Mr. Chairman, to deal with these two points in order.

I.

The Soviet Union says in the most categorical manner that the security of Europe is best assured by a continued division of Germany at least until Germany can be unified under conditions which would Sovietize the whole of Germany. Mr. Molotov extolled the governmental regime which the Soviet has established in the German zone, the so-called "German Democratic Republic", and said it has "a great 1 Supra, doc. 124.

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 154-159. 3 Ibid., pp. 145-152.

future ahead of it because it is moving along the main road of progress and because it has strong and loyal friends." It is, he said, "impossible to accept" a reunification of Germany which might jeopardize that "great future" for this Sovietized segment of Germany.

But, Mr. Chairman, the Directive which brought us here, and which ought to guide us here, did not ask us to judge of the relative merits of social systems as between that of the Federal Republic of Germany and that of the so-called "German Democratic Republic". It told us to reunite Germany in the "national interest". Thus, the German people themselves will determine under what system they want to live. The problem which our Heads of Government did direct us to study was how to assure European security and German reunification, two problems which the four Heads of Government agreed were closely linked.

It is, I think, a fair interpretation of our Directive that the four Heads of Government recognized that European security would be endangered if there was not a reunification of Germany. Certainly that is the view of the United States Government.

As President Eisenhower pointed out in his address, which opened the Geneva Conference last July, the division of Germany prolonged for over ten years "does a grievous wrong to a people which is entitled, like any other, to pursue together a common destiny. While that division continues, it creates a basic source of instability in Europe. Our talk of peace has little meaning if[,] at the same time, we perpetuate conditions which endanger the peace." 2

And because our Directive specifically requires us to take account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, the Western powers[,] loyally complying with the Directive, proposed a security system based upon a reunified Germany. The proposals which we made embody greater assurances than have ever before been contrived to preserve the peace. There would be not only solemn undertakings to abstain from aggression, to withhold help to an aggressor, and, in effect, to guarantee against aggression, but there would be physical and material safeguards, consisting of a level of forces to be agreed upon and actual inspections to ensure that these levels were maintained. There would be ample and dependable safeguards, in which the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would take part, against re-creation of a menacing military force. There would be novel and effective provisions to ensure against any possibility of surprise attack.

These provisions, based on a reunified Germany, would give Europe & security which it has not known for hundreds of years. Indeed, the merit of the proposals we made was so obvious that the Soviet Union itself, after studying them, introduced supplementary security proposals of its own which were closely modeled on ours. However,

See supra, doc. 124.

See the Soviet delegation's "Draft Treaty on Security in Europe" submitted to the conference, Oct. 31, 1955; The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp.