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The standards of conduct of our own representatives are known from more than a century and a half of American diplomatic experience. These standards are such that all countries which have accepted our representatives in a spirit of respect and confidence over periods of many decades have certainly remained none the worse for it. The independence of those countries has not been undermined; their peoples have not been corrupted; their economies have not been scathed by sabotage.

When we now find our representatives treated as criminals, when we see great official propaganda machines reiterating that they are sinister people and that contact with them is pregnant with dangerwe cannot believe that such insinuations are advanced in good faith, and we cannot be blind to the obvious implications of such an attitude.

DISTORTION OF MOTIVES OF OTHERS

In general, the Soviet leaders could refrain, I think, from systematically distorting to their own peoples the picture of the world outside their borders, and of our country, in particular.

We are not suggesting that they become propagandists for any country or system other than their own. But the Soviet leaders know and the world knows with what genuine disappointment and concern the people of this country were brought to the realization that the wartime collaboration between the major Allies was not to be the beginning of [a] happier and freer era in the association between the peoples of the Soviet Union and other peoples.

What are we now to conclude from the morbid fancies which their propaganda exudes of a capitalist encirclement, of a United States craftily and systematically plotting another world war? They know, and the world knows, how foreign is the concept of aggressive war to our philosophy and our political system. They know that we are not asking to be the objects of any insincere and effusive demonstrations of sentimental friendship. But we feel that the Soviet leaders could at least permit access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries so that other views might be presented to the Russian people.

These are some of the things which we feel that the Soviet leaders could do, which would permit the rational and peaceful development of the coexistence of their system and ours. They are not things that go to the depths of the moral conflict. They are not things that promise the Kingdom of Heaven. They have been formulated by us, not as moralists but as servants of government, anxious to get on with the practical problems that lie before us, and to get on with them in a manner consistent with mankind's deep longing for a respite from fear and uncertainty.

Nor have they been formulated as a one-sided bargain. A will to achieve binding, peaceful settlements would be required of all participants. All would have to produce unmistakable evidence of their good faith. All would have to accept agreements in the observance of which all nations could have real confidence.

GREATER SECURITY THROUGH COOPERATION

The United States is ready, as it has been and always will be, to cooperate in genuine efforts to find peaceful settlements. Our attitude is not inflexible, our opinions are not frozen, our positions are not and will not be obstacles to peace. But it takes more than one to cooperate. If the Soviet Union could join in doing these things I have outlined, we could all face the future with greater security. We could look forward to more than the eventual reduction of some of the present tensions. We could anticipate a return to a more normal and relaxed diplomatic atmosphere and to progress in the transaction of some of the international business which needs so urgently to be done.

I fear, however, that I must warn you not to raise your hopes. No one who has lived through these postwar years can be sanguine about reaching agreements in which reliance can be placed and which will be observed by the Soviet leaders in good faith. We must not, in our yearning for peace, allow ourselves to be betrayed by vague generalities or beguiling proffers of peace which are unsubstantiated by good faith solidly demonstrated in daily behavior. We are always ready to discuss, to negotiate, to agree, but we are understandably loath to play the role of international sucker. We will take the initiative in the future as we have in the past in seeking agreement whenever there is any indication that this course would be a fruitful one. What is required is genuine evidence in conduct, not just in words, of an intention to solve the immediate problems and remove the tensions which divide us. I see no evidence that the Soviet leaders will change their conduct until the progress of the free world convinces them that they cannot profit from a continuation of these tensions.

So our course of action in the world of hard reality which faces us is not one that is easily charted. It is not one which this nation can adopt without consideration of the needs and views of other free nations. It is one which requires all the devotion and resolve and wisdom that can be summoned up. We have had, and continue to have, the assistance and advice of distinguished leaders in all walks of life. We have the benefit of the great public discussion which has been proceeding in the democratic way, by free inquiry and free expres

sion.

It is my purpose in talking with you to point a direction and to define the choices which confront us. We need to stand before the world with our own purpose and position clear.

We want peace, but not at any price. We are ready to negotiate, but not at the expense of rousing false hopes which would be dashed by new failures. We are equally determined to support all real efforts for peaceful settlements and to resist aggression.

TASK FOR TOTAL DIPLOMACY

The times call for a total diplomacy equal to the task of defense against Soviet expansion and to the task of building the kind of world in which our way of life can flourish. We must continue to press

ahead with the building of a free world which is strong in its faith and in its material progress. The alternative is to allow the free nations to succumb, one by one, to the erosive and encroaching processes of Soviet expansion.

We must not slacken, rather we must reinvigorate, the kind of democratic efforts which are represented by the European Recovery Program,' the North Atlantic 2 and Rio Pacts, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the Point 4 Program for developing the world's new workshops and assistance in creating the conditions necessary to a growing, many-sided exchange of the world's products.

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We must champion an international order based on the United Nations and on the abiding principles of freedom and justice, or accept an international society increasingly torn by destructive rivalries.

We must recognize that our ability to achieve our purposes cannot rest alone on a desire for peace but that it must be supported by the strength to meet whatever tasks Providence may have in store for us.

We must not make the mistake, in other words, of using Soviet conduct as a standard for our own. Our efforts cannot be merely reactions to the latest moves by the Kremlin. The bipartisan line of American foreign policy has been and must continue to be the constructive task of building, in cooperation with others, the kind of world in which freedom and justice can flourish. We must not be turned aside from this task by the diversionary thrusts of the Soviet Union. And if it is necessary, as it sometimes is, to deal with such a thrust or the threat of one, the effort should be understood as one which, though essential, is outside the main stream of our policy.

Progress is to be gained in the doing of the constructive tasks which give practical affirmation to the principles by which we live.

The success of our efforts rests, finally, on our faith in ourselves and in the values for which this Republic stands. We will need courage and steadfastness and the cool heads and steady nerves of a citizenry which has always faced the future "with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right,

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1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1268-1327.

2 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949; supra, pp. 812-815.

Treaty of Sept. 2, 1947; supra, pp. 789-796.

See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1356-1364.

5 See ibid., pp. 1366-1372.

President Lincoln's second inaugural address, Mar. 4, 1865; James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1897), vol. VI, pp. 277–278.

2. SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS: Department of State Memorandum, June 1950 1

The instability of peace the world over is due, in large measure, to deliberate Soviet policy and actions and to the wholesale Soviet violation of basic agreements. Because of the U.S.S.R.'s record in ignoring its international pledges, the faith of the world in Soviet signatures had been badly shattered. Whether it be the Yalta agreement or a treaty of friendship, the U.S.S.R. has chosen to ignore its sworn commitments whenever it has found such action advantageous for its own purposes.

As it ruthlessly pursues its expansionist objectives in the postwar world, the Soviet Union is building up a reputation as an irresponsible international marauder. Before the court of world opinion, it stands indicted for disregarding its international treaties and agreements, openly flouting protocols and promises, and encouraging violations of basic human rights by other treaty signatories. Because of its policy of refusal to work in concert with other nations, its preference for abrupt and unauthorized unilateral action, and its apparent determination to impose its will upon the world, the value of agreements with the Soviet Union has been nullified. From Yalta to the present, the broken pledges of the U.S.S.R. have marked international relations. A review of this record is worthwhile.

EUROPE

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The uncertain peace of postwar Europe is primarily due to the fact that the Russians have deliberately undermined the foundations upon which peace was to be built. The Soviet Union has violated the Yalta agreement of February 1945, the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 [Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference of August 1, 1945], and the peace treaties so far concluded with the ex-German satellites. Soviet violation of Allied armistice agreements, refusal to act in concert with the other Allies on control commissions, and even the ignoring of the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers can be added to those. The fact that the framework of peace has never been completed, that Austria still pleads for a treaty, and that the settlement of the German question still plagues Europe is also due to Soviet intransigence and the unreliability of its word.

1Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, pp. 8-12. This memorandum brought up to date the document submitted by the Department of State to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 2, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 920-933.

2 See Protocol of Proceedings, ibid., pp. 27-34.

Ibid., pp. 34-50.

Treaties of Feb. 10, 1947, with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; 61 Stat., pt. 2, pp. 1757-2229.

Armistice agreements of Sept. 12, 1944, with Rumania (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 487 ff.); Oct. 28, 1944, with Bulgaria (ibid., pp. 482 ff.); and Jan. 20, 1945, with Hungary (ibid., pp. 494 ff.).

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THE YALTA AGREEMENT

When the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945, the three Governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., agreed to assist liberated people to form "interim government authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." According to James F. Byrnes, former Secretary of State, Stalin accepted the Yalta agreement without serious discussion and in an atmosphere of genial camaraderie.' Yet, Soviet action has consistently undermined and made meaningless this fundamental declaration.

THE POTSDAM DECISIONS AND THE CONTROL COUNCIL

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The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 [Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference of August 1, 1945] aimed at the ultimate creation of a unified, democratic Germany. To achieve this aim, the powers represented at the conference committed themselves to the destruction of German militarism, the wiping out of nazism, the punishment of war criminals, the decentralization of the political structure of Germany, and the dissolution of concentrations of economic power. A new democratic German government was to be developed under the supervision of an Allied Control Council (Acc), and the four Allied zone commanders were to enjoy absolute sovereignty in their respective zones unless their powers were preempted by Acc legislation. Besides dealing with Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed at Potsdam, among other things, to consult with each other with a view to revising the procedures of Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.3

The lack of success of the program formulated at Potsdam can be laid at the door of the Soviet Union. From the inception of the Potsdam protocols, the U. S. S. R. has a record of wholesale violation of the agreement, refusal to abide by decisions of the Control Councils, and a flagrant usurpation of power on the Control Councils in the satellite area.

GERMANY

Moreover, in dealing with Germany, the Soviet Union has readily disregarded promises made at meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM). By a CFм decision reached at Moscow, March 19April 24, 1947, all German prisoners of war were to be repatriated by December 1 [31], 1948. The U.S.S.R. not only did not return all

p. 32.

1 See Speaking Frankly, by James F. Byrnes (New York and London, 1947), 2 See Protocol of Proceedings, Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 36-42.

3 See ibid., p. 45.

Agreement of Apr. 23, 1947; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1949, For other documents on this question, see infra, pp. 2059–2066.

p. 78.

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