網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

the Soviet proposals in this respect, as indeed every proposal that the Soviet Union has made, are predicated upon the continued division of Germany.

As President Eisenhower said again and again last July, "European security and the reunification of Germany are inseparable." It is not possible to have European security without the reunification of Germany.

I recall that Mr. Molotov, speaking on October 31, 1939, after the outbreak of the Second World War, referred to the relations between Germany and the other Western European States during the preceding two decades, and to what he called the "German efforts to break the fetters of the Versailles Treaty." "This it is", he said, "that in the long run led to the present war in Europe.'

[ocr errors]

The Versailles Treaty did impose certain fetters upon Germany. But nothing that the Versailles Treaty did compares with the cruelty and injustice of dividing the German people by the separation from Germany of the Soviet Zone comprising 17,000,000 Germans. The anguish of this is demonstrated by the fact that 2,704,680 Germans at the cost of great sacrifice and risks, fled from the Soviet Zone into West Germany. During the last month of October there were 32,874 refugees.

The situation, thus dramatized, cannot be indefinitely perpetuated without grave risk.

Yet, it is to perpetuate this very risk that the Soviet Union finds itself compelled to reject the far-reaching and solid security proposals which I referred to. Surely, better statesmanship than that can be found.

We urge upon the Soviet Government that it should not perpetuate the injustice of a divided Germany with the menace which it carries to European security. Can we not learn from the lesson of Versailles? We make that plea, and we shall go on making it, in the hope, and, indeed, in the expectation that before it is too late wisdom will prevail.

II.

I turn now to the effect of the Soviet action upon international relations generally. I recall that Chairman Bulganin, in his opening statement at the July conference, said that the purpose was "to achieve a relaxation of international tension and bring about a feeling of confidence between nations." 2 In his final speech he said what took place in Geneva "has its positive significance for the relaxation

1 Soviet Peace Policy: Four Speeches by V. Molotov (London, 1941), p. 32. According to this version, Mr. Molotov said: "Relations between Germany and Western European bourgeois States have been determined primarily by Germany's efforts to break the fetters of the Versailles Treaty whose authors were Great Britain and France with the active participation of the U. S. A. This it was which in the long run led to the present war in Europe.'

2 Statement of July 18, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 35-43 (where the English translation of this portion of Mr. Bulganin's remarks differs slightly from that cited by Mr. Dulles).

of tension in the relation[s] between states[,] for the re-establishment of the necessary confidence between them."i

The Heads of Government had to reconcile many differences before they reached the final agreement which is embodied in the Directive which they gave us. But it was, after much debate, finally agreed that there was a "close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security." Furthermore, the Heads of Government reaffirmed their common responsibility "for the reunification of Germany." They "agreed" upon "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections, to be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security".

The United States Government believed that at the very least this solemn agreement meant that when the Foreign Ministers met there would be a serious discussion both of European security and of the reunification of Germany.

There has been such a discussion with reference to European security; indeed, it produced a considerable measure of agreement on the component elements needed for security. That fact has been noted with satisfaction by both the Western powers and by the Soviet Delegation.

It was, I think, demonstrated that there could be put around a united Germany a dependable framework of European security.

But when we turned to consider the reunification of Germany, the Soviet Delegation refused to consider it at all despite the explicit words in the Directive under which we are operating. The Soviet Delegation refused to consider the proposals of the Western powerstheir serious and detailed proposals for German reunification. The Soviet Delegation refused to make any proposals of its own on the subject of German reunification. The Soviet proposal for an "allGerman Council" did not even purport to charge that Council with any responsibility to reunify Germany; indeed, it was calculated to perpetuate the division of Germany.

The Government of the United States believes that the refusal of the Government of the Soviet Union even to discuss seriously the reunification of Germany involves a grave breach of the agreement of the Heads of Government. The effect of this is bound to affect adversely the overall relations of the Soviet Union with other countries, including the United States.

I would be less than frank if I did not say that so far as the United States is concerned, what has happened here has largely shattered such confidence as was born at the Summit Conference at Geneva. There can, of course, be peace and a limited degree of working relations as between nations which have no confidence that agreements between them-even though made at the highest level-will be honored. However, relations under those conditions are bound to be difficult and restricted.

Let me illustrate what I say by referring to what remains to be discussed at this Conference. We are directed to go on to discuss 1 Statement of July 23, 1955; ibid., pp. 77-80.

here the problem of disarmament and the development of contacts between the East and the West. But I am bound to say that I fear that these discussions will profit us little when we feel that we cannot make agreements between us which are dependable.

III.

Mr. Chairman, the peoples of all the world were heartened by the agreement of the Heads of Government reached here last July. But as President Eisenhower said in his closing statement at that Conference, ". . . only history will tell the true worth and real values of our session together. The follow-through from this beginning by our respective Governments will be decisive in the measure of this Conference." And he went on to say, "The work of our Foreign Ministers, as they strive to implement our Directive, will be of great importance, perhaps, even more important [perhaps of even more] than what we have done here.["]1

I greatly fear that what has been done here, or, more accurately, what has not been done here despite the explicit terms of our Directive, will be viewed with grave discouragement and concern throughout the world.

It is not the desire or the intention of the United States, so far as we can control it, to revert to the conditions which existed prior to the meeting of the Heads of Government last July. It is our purpose to continue to strive by all the means in our power for a just and durable peace. But I do deplore the set-back to European security and the damage to the spirit of Geneva which has been inflicted by the Soviet Union.

When the issues are as great as those here at stake, we shall not easily be discouraged. It is still our hope that the Soviet Union, if not now, then soon, may give loyal substance to the agreement of the Heads of Government that Germany shall be reunified by free elections.

When that day comes, European security can be assured, and the spirit of Geneva will have borne a major part of the good fruit which it seemed to offer to the world.

133. DECLARATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, NOVEMBER 16, 1955 2

Tripartite Declaration on Germany and European Security

At Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America tried to reach agreement with the

1 Statement of July 23, 1955; infra, pp. 2013-2014.

2 The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955), pp. 305-306. This declaration was transmitted to the Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic and the Mayor of Berlin.

Soviet Foreign Minister on what the Four Heads of Government in July agreed were the closely linked problems of German Reunification and European Security. To this end they made a proposal for the Reunification of Germany by free elections in 1956 and for a Treaty of Assurance giving the Soviet Union far-reaching safeguards against aggression when Germany was reunified.

Marshal Bulganin in July had agreed that the Reunification of Germany was the common responsibility of the Four Powers and should be carried out by means of Free Elections. The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, despite the Directive of the Heads of Government, made it plain that the Soviet Government refused to agree to the Reunification of Germany since that would lead to the liquidation of the East German regime. He made counterproposals which would have involved the continued division of Germany as well as the eventual dissolution of the Western security system. It is for this reason that the negotiations have failed.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are aware that this result must bring a sense of cruel disappointment to the German people, East and West of the zonal border which now unjustly divides them. However, the three Foreign Ministers believe that the Soviet Government will come to recognize that its own self-interest will be served by ending the injustice of a divided Germany. They believe that the Soviet Government will realize that so long as it persists in withholding unity from the German people, thus perpetuating the division of Europe, there can be no solid security in Europe, nor indeed in the world.

The three Western Powers will themselves not cease their efforts to end the injustice and wrong now being done by dividing the German people and will continue to stand ready to contribute to the security which can be enjoyed by all only when Germany is reunified.

[For the texts of Secretary Dulles' statement of November 16, 1955, and the quadripartite communiqué of the same date, see infra, pp. 2035-2039. The text of Secretary Dulles' address of November 18, 1955, is printed supra, pp. 115–122.]

Part XI

THE SOVIET UNION

A. GENERAL

1. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: Address by the Secretary of State, March 16, 19501

The right and obligation of the Secretary of State to speak to his fellow citizens, or to the representatives of other nations, about our foreign relations is not derived from any claim on his part to special knowledge or wisdom which makes him right and other people wrong, It is derived from the fact that our forefathers by free choice worked out and approved a Constitution. This Constitution, with the amendments and interpretations which have made it a living and growing thing, has survived to this day as an expression of the will of the entire people. A President is duly elected under this Constitution with a heavy and solemn responsibility to direct the foreign relations of the American people. The President has, in accordance with law and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed a man to serve as Secretary of State to assist him in the conduct of our foreign affairs. This right to speak on your behalf results directly from the constitutional processes by which the American people provide a government for themselves in an orderly, clear, and democratic manner.

SOVIET PHILOSOPHY OF IMPERIALISM

A little over 30 years ago, there came into power in one of the great countries of the world a group of people who also claim the right to speak on your behalf. That claim was based not on any constitutional procedure, or on any expression of the will of those whose representatives they professed to be. It was based on a claim which those men made to a monopoly of the knowledge of what was right and what was wrong for human beings. They further profess that their claim is based on a body of thought taken over in large part from the

1 Delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif.; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 27, 1950, pp. 473–478.

« 上一頁繼續 »