How are we dealing with this Soviet strategy for Asia? Again here, as in our discussion of the thrust against Europe, I will not go into great detail about the steps we are taking. These details are familiar to you, and what I want to try to bring out is the pattern of our efforts. The objective of these efforts is to thwart the Soviet attempt to dominate Asia. It is our purpose to help the people of Asia protect their freedom and independence.

One of the major lines of effort in this program is the writing of a peace treaty for Japan. The careful and able work of Ambassador John Foster Dulles has laid the basis for a Japanese peace treaty which will enable Japan to become an equal, peaceful, and selfsustaining member of the world community. It will also put the people of Japan in the best position to contribute to the independence of their country, which, as we have seen, is important to our security as well as to theirs.

The people of Japan have earned our confidence by their steady and responsible course during these difficult months since the attack was launched against Korea, and we look forward to the establishment of permanent bonds of friendship between Japan and all other free nations.

In order that a power vacuum will not be created by a peace settlement with Japan, we are making cooperative arrangements, on the basis of mutual agreement, to insure the independence and the continued security of Japan.2

This agreement is to be one of a series recently announced by the President, which are intended as initial steps toward building the basis for security in the Pacific.

Conditions in the Pacific area are substantially different from those which prevail in Europe, and the establishment of security arrangements similar to those in the North Atlantic area are not now feasible. We wish to help the peoples of the Pacific area in their efforts in any way we can, and the present and proposed security arrangements between ourselves and Japan and with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, to which the President referred, will, we hope, further strengthen the structure of peace in the Pacific.

Our economic and military aid programs are another essential part of this total effort to maintain peace in the Far East.

By demonstrating our friendship for the peoples of Asia and by helping them to achieve and protect their freedom and to make progress against the poverty and misery which oppresses them, we are, at the same time, helping to throw up a bulwark against the Soviet imperialist design, and we thereby strengthen our own security. Our friendship for the people of China, who are now suffering the tragedy of life behind the iron curtain, has not diminished. The structure of peace which we and our allies are building will never be 1 See Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425-440.

? See Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 885-886.

3 Statement of Apr. 18, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 30, 1951, p. 699.

*See Treaty of Aug. 30, 1951; supra, pp. 873-875. See Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 878-880.

complete until all the peoples who are now under the domination of the Kremlin are able to participate freely and independently.

The Soviets are constantly probing for points throughout Asia at which penetration may be possible. Efforts to penetrate by economic and political means of subversion have now been supplemented by the use of armed invasion and war.

Our military and economic aid programs have been adapted to meet the further threat posed by this Communist use of force.

Supplementing the important aid programs which we had been developing in the Far East, additional military aid has been directed to those areas especially threatened by this military development.

This includes additional aid to Formosa, the Philippines, and Indochina. As the President declared following the Communist attack on Korea, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces in these circumstances would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces in that area.1 The Seventh Fleet was ordered then to prevent any attack on Formosa. To supplement the defense of Formosa and insure that Formosa will not fall into hostile hands, we are providing increased military aid.

The aid programs in the Far East meet not only such immediate security requirements as these but also give powerful support to our national security interest by helping the people of Asia lay the basis for stable and developing societies. It is important for us to appreciate that our humanitarian instincts and our own national security interests are both served by these programs.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH IN KOREA

Now, we come to the most direct military aspect of our efforts to deal with the Soviet thrust in Asia. This relates to what we and the other members of the United Nations are doing to stop the aggression in Korea.

What I have already said should make it clear why it is important to our security that this attack in Korea be stopped in its tracks. We have seen that this attack is part of a design to gain control over all Asia. This attack is also intended to weaken the position of the United Nations, the United States, and others who stand in the way of Soviet ambitions.

There are several other points which have emerged from our survey, and which bear on this conflict in Korea. One is that this is not the only Soviet thrust we must bear in mind. The Soviets are using satellite troops for this aggression, keeping their own forces in reserve. It would further their strategy if we were to expend our major strength against the forces and the territory of their satellites or if we were to neglect other vital interests in meeting this thrust.

We have also seen that we need time to push ahead with our program of building strength, and we need to build that strength together with our allies.

These are factors which cannot be ignored in thinking about what it is we are doing in Korea.

1 Statement of June 27, 1950; infra, pp. 2539-2540.

Our objectives in Korea are very clear, and there should be no misunderstanding about them.

In the simplest terms, we are trying to accomplish three things in Korea:

1. We are trying to stop this act of aggression.

2. We are trying to keep this conflict from spreading, to the extent that it is in our power to do so.

3. We are trying to restore peace and security to the area.

These have been our purposes from the beginning, and these have been the agreed purposes of the United Nations. The United Nations has never contemplated the use of force to accomplish its political objective in Korea, which is the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic country.

A great deal has already been accomplished by the steadiness with which we have held to these purposes, and above all by the heroic devotion of our men in Korea and their fellow soldiers from other countries. We should not, in the course of the present debate, lose sight of these accomplishments:

First, this act of aggression has not succeeded according to the Soviet plan, and whatever other actions were planned have been interfered with;

Second, the defense against this aggression has served to arouse free men all over the world and has stimulated them to speed up their efforts to build a strong defense system;

Third, new vitality has pulsed through the whole idea of collective security against aggression;

And fourth, this device of satellite aggression has been thoroughly exposed, and its usefulness in other situations has been reduced.

We knew last June, and we know today, that it was right and necessary to stand firm against this attack. If we had not, the whole spirit of resistance against the Soviet grab for power would have been weakened, perhaps fatally.

Now, people are saying: this may be true, but how can the conflict in Korea be brought to an end?

There are two ways in which this situation in Korea may develop. One is that the fighting may spread despite our efforts to limit it. Further acts of the aggressors could touch off world war. If this happens, the responsibility for it will rest squarely on the Kremlin and its agents in Peiping.

The other is that the fighting may be brought to an end in Korea. The best way to do this is for us to continue firm in our determination to meet and repel the enemy until it becomes clear to him that his aggression cannot pay. There must be an end to the fighting, there must be concrete measures against the renewal of the attack, and there must be an abandonment by the enemy of his attempt to conquer the Republic of Korea.

If we remain firm and steady on the course we are following in Korea, if we don't flinch or get rattled, we shall have the best chance of bringing this action to a successful conclusion.

The other day at Paris, Mr. Gromyko was playing back to us some of the arguments he has been overhearing from this side of the Atlantic about Korea. He raised the question whether or not we are going to hold to our course in Korea with firm determination.

Well, we are. But his intervention serves to remind us that, in thinking about this action in Korea, we have to keep always in mind the total world picture, and the whole threat we face.

The ingredients of peace in the world must include: the resoluteness with which we hold to our course in Korea; the speed with which we build up our strength elsewhere in the world; the closeness of our common defense arrangements with our allies.

As I said at the outset, the strength and the power you are helping to build are essential to our security and to world peace. But equally important is the strength of character and the steadiness of the American people.

To win through to a period of peace in the world will require wisdom and courage and common sense from all of us.

4. AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE: Message From the President of the United States to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Transmitting a Congressional Resolution, July 7, 1951 2

I have the honor of transmitting to you a resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States with a request that its contents be made known by your government to the people of the Soviet Union.

This resolution expresses the friendship and good will of the American people for all the peoples of the earth and it also reemphasizes the profound desire of the American Government to do everything in its power to bring about a just and lasting peace.

As Chief Executive of the United States, I give this resolution my sincere approval. I add to it a message of my own to the Soviet people in the earnest hope that these expressions may help form a better understanding of the aims and purposes of the United States.

The unhappy results of the last few years demonstrate that formal diplomatic negotiations among nations will be largely barren while barriers exist to the friendly exchange of ideas and information among peoples. The best hope for a peaceful world lies in the yearning for peace and brotherhood which lies deep in the heart of every human being. But peoples who are denied the normal means of communication will not be able to attain that mutual understanding which must

1 N. M. Shvernik.

2 Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, p. 87. For the texts of the letter from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., dated Aug. 6, 1951, transmitting the Presidium's friendship resolution of this date, and of President Truman's message of Aug. 20, 1951, transmitting to the U.S. Congress the Soviet communication, see ibid., Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 294–297, and Sept. 3, 1951, pp. 379–381.

form the basis for trust and friendship. We shall never be able to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international boundaries.

The peoples of both our countries know from personal experience the horror and misery of war. They abhor the thought of future conflict which they know would be waged by means of the most hideous weapons in the history of mankind. As leaders of their respective governments, it is our sacred duty to pursue every honorable means which will bring to fruition their common longing for peace. Peace is safest in the hands of the people and we can best achieve the goal by doing all we can to place it there.

I believe that if we can acquaint the Soviet people with the peace aims of the American people and government, there will be no war. I feel sure that you will wish to have carried to the Soviet people the text of this resolution adopted by the American Congress.

(Enclosure)

Senate Concurrent Resolution 11 (82d Congress, 1st session), June 26, 1951 1

Whereas the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been, a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas the deepest wish of our Nation is to join with all other nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence; and Whereas, in proof of this, the United States has offered to share all that is good in atomic energy asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom; and

Whereas the Congress reaffirms its policy as expressed in law "to continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter and agreements to achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion";2 and Whereas this Nation has likewise given of its substance and resources to help those peoples ravaged by war and poverty; and Whereas terrible danger to all free peoples compels the United States to undertake a vast program of armaments expenditures; and Whereas we rearm only with reluctance and would prefer to devote our energies to peaceful pursuits: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States reaffirms the historic and

165 Stat. B69-B70.

See the section entitled "Findings and Declaration of Policy" of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 13561357.

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