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institutions, Soviet citizens may, in individual cases, make sketches or take photographs provided that they have first obtained the permission of the administration of these institutions and organizations.

Citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States may not sketch or take photographs:

a. Of military objects, installations, technology and armaments. b. Of fuel storage depots.

c. Of seaports, hydroelectric, thermoelectric or nuclear power installations, bridges, railroad junctions, terminals, and tunnels. d. Of industrial establishments except those engaged solely in civilian production.

e. Of scientific research institutions, offices and laboratories.

f. Of radio, television, telephone and telegraph stations or facilities. g. From airplanes on flights over territory of the United States.

Citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States may not purchase or otherwise procure the following except where they appear in or are appendices to newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, atlases and books commercially available to the general public:

a. Aerial photographs, mosaics and photomaps.

b. Maps and charts of scale of or larger than 1:250,000.

c. Navigational and hydrographic maps and charts.

d. Panoramic photographs or detailed development plans of industrial cities.

The foregoing regulations are comparable to present Soviet regulations restricting photography and sketching by United States citizens in the Soviet Union which presumably have been instituted for reasons of security.' If the Soviet Union should hereafter conclude that the international situation were such that security requirements enabled it to liberalize its regulations restricting photography and sketching by United States citizens in the Soviet Union and to make available to them materials of the types noted above, this Government would in turn be disposed to reconsider its own security requirements in the same spirit.

14. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY: Statement by the Secretary of State Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 25, 1955 (Excerpt)2

This program of mutual security continues to be an essential part of our overall policy of seeking to bring those rulers who now follow

1 For the text of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's circular of Feb. 11, 1954, regulating the photographing and sketching activities of American citizens and other foreigners, see ibid., p. 199.

2 Ibid., June 6, 1955, pp. 913-914.

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the line of international communism to see the futility of the policy of attempting world conquest. Also we hope that there may come policies designed better to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the subject peoples. The recent events in Europe to which I first alluded suggest that the time may be nearing when those who have been seeking the conquest of freedom will in fact adopt more tolerable policies.

I do not want to imply that I think we have achieved our goals. There are still bad spots as well as good spots. Also, it may be that the international Communists consider that any new policies which they now adopt are part of the classic design which Lenin said means that "we might have to go in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others," and which Stalin said involves "maneuvering the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong.' Nevertheless, I do feel a certain sense of encouragement because today the tactics of the international Communists suggest that they realize that the free world is in fact "strong" and that they do have to give up some of the courses they once selected.

FOUR SOVIET REVERSALS

"2

I have referred to the events of recent days. These have been marked by a striking reversal of many of the policies of the Soviet rulers. They reversed their position with reference to the Austrian State Treaty. The consequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from this advanced position in the heart of Europe will be the first time in Europe that the Red forces will have gone homeward since they took their forward positions 10 years ago.

Then there is the pilgrimage of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade. For 7 years, since the Yugoslav Government seceded from the Soviet bloc, it has been consistently reviled and threatened. Its party was excommunicated by the Soviet Communist Party as guilty of flagrant heresy. Now the heads of the Soviet state, who have never yet in time of peace left their home country, go to Belgrade to make their peace.* . Independence is rewarded, and heresy is condoned. This is bound to have a profound effect throughout the Soviet zone.

On the subject of disarmament, the Soviet Union has recently altered its position. Its present position contains much which is

1 "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (H. Doc. No. 619, 80th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 51.

2 "The reserves must be handled in such a way as to safeguard an orderly retreat should the enemy be very powerful, should a withdrawal be inevitable, should it be obviously undesirable to accept the enemy's offer of battle, should retreat be the only way whereby (in the circumstances) the vanguard can escape destruction and keep the reserves at its disposal. The object of such strategy is to gain time, to scatter the forces of the enemy while consolidating our own for a future advance" ("The Foundations of Leninism"; ibid., p. 106). Treaty of May 15, 1955; supra, pp. 643-675.

The Soviet leaders visited Belgrade, May 27-June 2, 1955.

See Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.

not clear or not acceptable to the United States, but at least the Soviet Union now recognizes as valid certain basic propositions which up until now it has consistently rejected. For example, the Soviet Union now no longer insists that any reduction of land armaments should be on a percentage basis which would perpetuate, and indeed accentuate, its present superiority in that particular field.

Finally, the Soviet leaders, after having said that consummation of the Paris accords would be a serious impediment to further talks, now seem ready for such talks-Pravda's complaint being that we do not seem to be willing to talk long enough.

No one can be confident as to the meaning of these four reversals, which have been accumulated within the span of a few weeks. Certainly, one interpretation is that they hope by this show of sweet reasonableness to bring the free nations to a sense of security so that they will abandon measures which have so far enabled them to help each other preserve their freedom. There are, within the free nations, some who are tempted by this prospect. For the most part, they look to the United States to see how we interpret the recent Soviet gestures. If we seem to regard them as demonstrating a basic change of Soviet attitude and as indicating that the danger is over, they will hastily follow in that way. In that event much of the solidarity and strength which has been built over past years would quickly disintegrate.

The United States eagerly welcomes, and will fully and in good faith explore, all new possibilities of insuring a just and durable peace. That is the goal to which our Nation is dedicated, and we shall not let pass any opportunities to advance toward it. We welcome recent Soviet deeds which suggest a greater degree of tolerance and a greater acceptance of freedom and independence. However, it would be a great mistake to judge that the danger was now past or to act in such a manner that others might think we judged it past. There could be no worse moment to depart from the policies which the program represents and which have brought us where we are.

We can hope that a new day is coming; but too often men have been lured to their doom by mistaking a false dawn for the real dawn. We must not make that mistake.

1 See supra, pp. 1885-1886.

B. AIRPLANE INCIDENTS

April 8, 1950 Incident (Baltic Area)

15. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER,2 APRIL 18, 1950 8

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 11, 1950, has the honor to state that the only American military aircraft which was in the air in the Baltic area on April 8, 1950, was a United States Navy Privateer airplane which disappeared on that date and no trace of its crew has since been found.

The United States Navy airplane carried ten persons. It was wholly unarmed. It left Wiesbaden at 10:31 a. m. Greenwich time for a flight over the Baltic Sea and two and one-half hours later reported by radio crossing the coast line of the British Zone of Germany. All American military aircraft operate under strict instructions to avoid flying over any foreign territory in the absence of express permission for such a flight from the appropriate foreign government. The investigation conducted by the United States Government has convinced it that the United States Navy airplane in question complied strictly with these instructions and did not fly over any Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory or territorial waters adjacent thereto.

In

In the Ministry's communication under reference the Soviet Government acknowledges that one of its fighter aircraft fired upon an American plane on April 8, 1950, at 5:30 p. m. Moscow time. view of the fact that the only American military airplane which was in the air in the Baltic area on that date was the unarmed United States Navy airplane mentioned above and that this airplane was at no time after it crossed the coast line of Germany over any foreign territory or territorial waters, it must be concluded that Soviet military aircraft fired upon an unarmed American plane over the open sea, following which the American airplane was lost.

The Ambassador of the United States has been instructed to protest in the most solemn manner against this violation of international law and of the most elementary rules of peaceful conduct between nations. The United States Government demands that the Soviet Government institute a prompt and thorough investigation of this matter in order that the facts set forth above may be confirmed to its satisfaction.

1 Adm. Alan G. Kirk.

2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.

Department of State Bulletin, May 1, 1950, pp. 667–668. ▲ Ibid., p. 668.

The United States Government further demands that the most strict and categorical instructions be issued to the Soviet Air Force that there be no repetition, under whatever pretext, of incidents of this kind which are so clearly calculated to magnify the difficulties of maintaining peaceful and correct international relationships.

The United States Government confidently expects that, when its investigation is completed, the Soviet Government will express its regret for the unlawful and provocative behavior of its aviators, will see to it that those responsible for this action are promptly and severely punished, and will, in accordance with established custom among peace-loving nations, pay appropriate indemnity for the unprovoked destruction of American lives and property.

16. NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, MAY 5, 19501

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to the Ministry's note of April 212 regarding the lost American airplane has the honor to communicate the following:

The Government of the United States of America notes that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continues to refer to an American airplane of the B-29 type, which allegedly penetrated Soviet territory on April 8, despite the fact that it has been made clear that the only American military airplane in the Baltic area on April 8 was a United States Navy airplane of the Privateer type. The United States Government reiterates that this United States Navy airplane was unarmed and was at no time over Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory or territorial waters. It is thus apparent that the Soviet Government's account of this incident is not factual. The reply of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States Government's communication of April 183 makes it obvious that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continues to base its position on the erroneous account which it put forward shortly after the incident occurred and that it has failed to carry out the careful investigation suggested by the Government of the United States which would enable it to correct these errors.

The United States Government categorically denies that the American airplane violated Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory and rejects as wholly without foundation the protest contained in the last paragraph of the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 21. In these circumstances, the Government of the United States has no alternative but to conclude that the Government of the Union of

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1950, pp. 753-754.

2 Ibid., p. 754.

3 Supra.

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