the burden of what threatens to become an armaments race if indeed it does not become a war; the political leadership of the area could devote itself to constructive tasks.

PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES

If there is to be a guaranty of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel and the Arab States were fixed by the armistice agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part, at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.

The task of drawing permanent boundaries is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. Surely the overall advantages of the measures here outlined would outweigh vastly any net disadvantages of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety. In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments, I believe it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties. The United States would be willing to help in the search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should desire.

If agreement can be reached on these basic problems of refugees, fear, and boundaries, it should prove possible to find solutions for other questions, largely economic, which presently fan the flames of hostility and resentment.

It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United Nations review of this problem.

I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would be desirable to have a settlement; nor have I tried to outline in detail the form which a settlement of any of the elements might take. I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an immeasurable improvement and that the possibilities do not require any nation taking action which would be against its interests, whether those interests be measured in terms of material strength or in terms of national prestige and honor. I have also, I trust, made clear that the Government of the United States is disposed to enlarge those possibilities by contributions of its own, if this be desired by those concerned.

Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich contributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of this century.

At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good

neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor.

B. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES

Middle East Command Negotiations

4. PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND TURKEY, OCTOBER 13, 19511

DOCUMENT A

POINT I

Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations.

POINT II

The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East against aggression from without can only be secured by the cooperation of all interested powers.

POINT III

The defense of Egypt can only be assured through the effective defense of the Middle East area and the coordination of this defense with that of adjacent areas.

POINT IV

It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing such a Command. Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their interest in the defense of the area and who have agreed in principle.

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 22, 1951, pp. 647-648.

POINT V

Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle East Command on a basis of equality and partnership with other founder members.

POINT VI

If Egypt is prepared to cooperate fully in the Allied Command Organization in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex, His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree to supersession of the 1936 Treaty and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as are not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement between the Egyptian Government and the Governments of other countries also participating as founder members.

POINT VII

As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Allied Middle East Command and the provision to that Command of the necessary strategic defense facilities, such as military and air bases, communications, ports, etc., Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on the same footing as other participating powers.

POINT VIII

In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements Egypt would be invited to accept a position of high authority and responsibility with the Allied Middle East Command and to designate Egyptian officers for integration in the Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff.

POINT IX

Facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Allied Command in a position to do so.

POINT X

The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East Defense Organization and its exact relationship with the N.A. T. O. have yet to be worked out in consultation between all the powers concerned. For this purpose it is proposed that all founding members of the Allied Middle East Command should send military representatives to a meeting to be held in the near future with the object of preparing detailed proposals for submission to the governments concerned.

DOCUMENT B

TECHNICAL ANNEX

[1]

In common with other participating powers who are making similar contributions to the defense of the area.

(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East 1 1 Treaty of Aug. 26, 1936; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 140, pp. 179 ff.

Command Organization such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the Middle East

(b) that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Command all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communication.

[2]

We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the Allied Supreme Commander's Headquarters being located in her territory.

[3]

In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it would be understood

(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of this base in peace and war

(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participating nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would be determined between the participating nations including Egypt from time to time as progress is made in building up the force of the Allied Middle East Command.

[4]

It also would be understood that an air defense organization including both the Egyptian and Allied forces would be set up under the command of an officer with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Government and to the Allied Middle East Command for the protection of Egypt and Allied bases.

5. REJECTION BY EGYPT OF THE JOINT PROPOSALS: Statement by the Secretary of State, October 17, 19511

It is with genuine regret that the U. S. Government received notification on October 15 2 of the rejection by the Egyptian Government of the proposals presented to it on October 13 by the United States, France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. This Government has noted with surprise that the Egyptian Government rejected proposals of such importance without having given them the careful and considered deliberation which they merited. These proposals were formulated by the nations interested in the welfare and security of the Middle East after the most intensive and thorough consideration of

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 29, 1951, pp. 702–703. 2 Not printed.

3 Supra.

the special problems of the area. The invitation to join with the other sovereign nations of the free world in a joint and cooperative effort to make the world safe from aggression was wholly consistent with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.

Vigilance in protecting the liberties we enjoy is the responsibility of every nation of the free world. The spirit of responsibility to others requires that no nation carelessly precipitate events which can have no constructive end but which by their nature create those elements of confusion and weakness which tempt aggression. It is the hope of the U. S. Government that Egypt will carefully reconsider the course of action on which it has embarked and will recognize that its own interest will be served by joining the other nations of the free world in assuring the defense of the Middle East against the common danger.

The U. S. Government must reaffirm its belief that the action of the Egyptian Government with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the agreements of 18992 regarding the Sudan is not in accord with proper respect for international obligations. For its part, the U. S. Government considers the action of the Egyptian Government to be without validity.

It is the sincere hope of the United States that great restraint will be shown in the present situation and that the obligation of all nations towards the preservation of world law and order will be respected.

6. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND: Statement by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, November 10, 1951 3

In proceeding with their announced intention to establish the Middle East Command, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey state that they are guided by the following principles:

1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that peace is indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of the peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent upon the states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area.

2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the cooperation of all interested states.

3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole; the achievement of peace and security in the area through the Middle East Command will bring with it social and economic advancement.

1 Treaty of Aug. 26, 1936; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 140, pp. 179 ff. ? Agreements of Jan. 19, 1899, and July 10, 1899; ibid., vol. 91, pp. 19–22. 3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1951, pp. 817-818.