The

4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist and support the states willing to join in the defense of the Middle East and to develop the capacity of each to play its proper role in the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression. It will not interfere in problems and disputes arising within the area. establishment of the Middle East Command in no way affects existing arrangements relating to such matters, notably the armistice agreements and the United States-United Kingdom-French Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.2

1

5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East States on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training. Requests for arms and equipment made by states in the area willing to join in its defense to sponsoring states in a position to assist in this connection will be filled by them to the extent possible following the coordination of such requests through the Middle East Command.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will command forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for the operations of all forces within the area (or to be introduced into the area) in time of war or international emergency. However, the placing of forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East in peacetime is not a prerequisite for joining in the common effort for the defense of the Middle East. Movement of those troops placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East to or within the territories of states joining in the defense of the Middle East will be made only with the agreement of the state or states concerned and in full accord with their national independence and sovereignty.

7. While details have yet to be formulated, the sponsoring states intend that the Middle East Command should be an integrated allied command, not a national command. The responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will be to insure the effectiveness of the corporate defense enterprise represented by the command. All states joining in this enterprise will be individually associated with the command on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization which will be located at Middle East Command Headquarters and will be the link between the command and the countries ready to join in the defense of this area.

8. Any facilities granted to the Middle East Command by states joining in the defense of the Middle East will be the subject of specific agreements.

9. The broad mission of the Middle East Command and its cooperative character make it necessary that all States, whether territorially or not part of the area, act in the best interests of the cooperative defense of the area; the Middle East Command naturally will not further the national interest of any particular state.

10. A continuing objective of the Middle East Command is to reduce such deficiencies as exist at present in the organization and

1 Supra, pp. 698-724.

2 Infra, p. 2237.

capacity for defense in a vitally important area so that the peacetime role of the states of the area in Middle East defense will progressively increase, thus permitting the peacetime role of states not territorially part of the Middle East to be decreased proportionately.

11. The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do not regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command will be organized as unchangeable; they believe that the Middle East Command through mutual understanding should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the Middle East area as a whole.

7. REPLY TO SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MIDDLE EAST COMMAND: Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 18, 19511

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of November 242 concerning the proposed establishment of the Middle East Command.

It is apparent that the Soviet Union has placed a completely erroneous interpretation upon the Middle East Command and has chosen to ignore the clearly-stated purposes and principles upon. which the Middle East Command will be founded.

The allegation of the Soviet Union that the Middle East Command is aggressive in intent is utterly without foundation. On the contrary, the statement of principles published by the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States on November 103 make it abundantly clear that the Middle East Command is designed (1) to create a voluntary cooperative defense organization to provide for the security of the Middle East area as a whole in the event that that area should become a target of outside aggression, and (2) to assist the states in the area to preserve and strengthen their independence and freedom so that their economic well-being and social institutions can develop in an atmosphere unclouded by fear for their security.

The Middle East Command proposals and principles are based upon the inherent right of self-defense set forth in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Such self-defense is facilitated by cooperative measures like the Middle East Command. The need for these cooperative measures arises from the concern over present tensions in the world situation which have been created by the Soviet Union's aggressive actions. Soviet efforts externally and internally at subversion against the states of the Middle East do not contribute to lessening these tensions.

The United States notes with surprise the assertion by the U. S. S. R.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 31, 1951, pp. 1055–1056.

that the idea that any threat exists to the Middle East states is "absolutely groundless." The United States Government reminds the Soviet Government that on November 25, 1940, a proposal of U. S. S. R. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov to German Ambassador Schulenburg to reach agreement with the Nazi Government of Germany on the delimitation of the spheres of influence between the Axis Powers and the U. S. S. R. provided, among other things, that the U. S. S. R. be enabled to establish "a base for land and naval forces" within range of the Turkish Straits and that "the area south of Batum and of Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." In light of the Soviet attitude toward the Middle East area since the end of World War II, the United States Government can only assume that the aims set forth by Mr. Molotov in 1940 remain the policy of the Soviet Government.

1

With respect to the Soviet allegation that the sponsors of the Middle East Command intend to convert the Middle East into a place d'armes, with a view to occupying the states in the area and interfering with their internal affairs, the principles submitted to the Middle East states on November 10 make it clear that (a) the Middle East Command will not interfere in matters arising within the area; (b) that movement of Middle East Command forces to or within the territories of the Middle East states will be made only with the agreement of the state or states concerned in full accord with their national independence and sovereignty; and (c) that facilities granted to the Middle East Command will likewise be the subject of specific agree

ments.

The United States and other members of the NATO have frequently been exposed to the purely propagandistic charge from the U. S. S. R. that the NATO is aggressive. That this charge is a complete distortion of the facts is made clear by the terms of the Treaty,2 by the steps taken under it, and by the foreign policies of the members. Being devoted to the cause of peace, the members believe that they can best serve this cause by their just determination to defend themselves against aggression. The United States wishes to make quite clear to the Soviet Union that neither the NATO nor the Middle East Command is aggressive in intent. As is well known to the Soviet Union and to the Governments satellite to it, there has been no aggression whatsoever originating from the countries who are members of these organizations. Furthermore, there will not be any. Therefore, the Soviet reference to "the aggressive Atlantic Bloc" is once again rejected as being without any foundation whatsoever.

The Middle East Command proposals and principles, based on the concept that those states choosing to participate in the Command will do so voluntarily as equal members, have been placed before the

1 See Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Department of State publication 3023; 1948), p. 258.

2 Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocol of Oct. 17, 1951, supra, pp. 812-815 and 853-854.

governments of the sovereign and independent Middle East states for their study and evaluation in the light of their own national interests. The decision as to whether they will elect to participate in the Command and freely accept the benefits and responsibilities of such participation belongs to these states alone and not to the Soviet Government. The recent Soviet threats to these states warning against their participation in the Middle East Command constitute interference in the affairs of these countries. The United States Government believes, as the Soviet Government professes to do, that the peoples of the Middle East have the right to conduct their national policies "free from any kind of external pressure." The Government of the U.S.S.R. bears the responsibility for the present situation, not those states which, either individually or collectively under the Charter of the United Nations, take legitimate measures of self-defense in the interest of their own security and of international peace.

NATO's Eastern Arm-Greece and Turkey

8. PRELIMINARY ASSOCIATION WITH NATO: Note Verbale From the Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador at Washington, September 19, 19501

In connection with the examination of security problems confronting the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council, it was recognized that, in the case of the Mediterranean area, it would be desirable, if the Turkish Government so wished, to make arrangements which would permit Turkey to be associated with such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean.

The Council is keenly aware of the active support which Turkey, as a member of the United Nations, has accorded the principles of the United Nations and of the important role which Turkey is playing in the maintenance of the stability of the eastern Mediterranean

area.

It is the view of the Council that association of the Turkish Government with the appropriate phase of the planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with regard to the defense of the Mediterranean would contribute significantly to the defense of that

area.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 632. A note verbale identic with this one, mutatis mutandis, was sent by the Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador at Washington, Oct. 3, 1950; ibid., p. 633. See also the Turkish note of Oct. 2, 1950 (ibid.), and the Greek note of Oct. 4, 1950 (ibid.). 'See Council's communiqué of Sept. 18, 1950; supra, pp. 1606–1607.

[PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY, OCTOBER 17, 1951]1

9. UNITED STATES USE OF DEFENSE FACILITIES: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, October 12, 1953 2

3

The United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece being parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 and having regard to their respective responsibilities under the aforesaid Treaty to provide for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, and under Article 3 thereof to develop their collective capacity to resist armed attack, have entered into the following Agreement:

Article I

1. The Government of Greece hereby authorizes the Government of the United States of America, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement and to technical arrangements between appropriate authorities of the two Governments, to utilize such roads, railways and areas, and to construct, develop, use and operate such military and supporting facilities in Greece as appropriate authorities of the two Governments shall from time to time agree to be necessary for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO plans. The construction, development, use and operation of such facilities shall be consistent with recommendations, standards and directives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) where applicable.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement and in accordance with technical arrangements to be agreed between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, the Government of the United States of America may bring in, station and house in Greece United States personnel. United States Armed Forces and equipment under their control may enter, exit, circulate within and overfly Greece and its territorial waters subject to any technical arrangements that may be agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. These operations shall be free from all charges, duties and taxes.

3. The priorities, rates of consumption and charges established for the United States Armed Forces for such services as electric power, sewerage, water supply, communication systems, and freight and personnel transportation by rail, will be no less favorable than those established for the Greek Armed Forces.

1 Supra, pp. 853-854.

A similar

2 TIAS 2868; 4 UST 2189. Entered into force on date of signature. agreement with Turkey (TIAS 3243; 6 UST 1031) was signed on Apr. 25, 1955, and entered into force on date of signature.

3 Supra, pp. 812-815.