57. INAPPROPRIATENESS

OF UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 814 (IX), December 17, 1954 1

The General Assembly,

Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus,

Decides not to consider further the item entitled "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus".?

Kashmir

58. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE, 1947-1952 (Excerpt) 3

When India and Pakistan attained independence and dominion status on August 15, 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of about 560 such states whose status was left undetermined. Under the Indian Independence Act, these states could decide whether to join India or Pakistan. For most of these states, geographical proximity to one of the dominions, as well as preponderance of either Hindu or Moslem population, made the decision relatively easy.

1U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), p. 5. In support of the draft resolution in Committee I on Dec. 14, Ambassador Lodge stated that "prolonged consideration" of the Cyprus question in the United Nations "would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations" (Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 31-32). For background discussion of this issue, see United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954 (Department of State publication 5769; 1955), pp. 58-62.

2 The United States opposed the inscription of the Cyprus matter (item 58) on the agenda of the General Assembly in September 1955, both in the General Committee and in the Assembly. Ambassador Lodge stated in the General Committee on Sept. 21, among other things, that "the primary purpose of the United Nations is to encourage in every possible way the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We do not believe that the inscription of the Cyprus item... at this time will contribute toward that end" (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 3, 1955, pp. 545-546). The General Committee decided at its 102d meeting, on Sept. 21, not to recommend the inclusion of item 58 in the agenda, and the General Assembly upheld the recommendation at its 521st plenary meeting on Sept. 23, 1955.

3 Article by Frank D. Collins, Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952, pp. 663-667.

Since Kashmir lies between India and Pakistan and has a mixed population, it became the scene of armed conflict soon after partition. În January 1948 the dispute was brought before the Security Council and in this month the Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).1 A year later UNCIP succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both India and Pakistan to a cease-fire and to the general principles under which a truce (i.e., a plan for the withdrawal of the armed forces from the area) and a plebiscite under U.N. auspices might be carried out. This agreement was formalized in the "UNCIP resolution" of January 5, 1949.2 On March 21, 1949, the U.N. Secretary-General named Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administrator of the projected plebiscite to be held under the terms of the January 5 resolution.

5

During 1949 and 1950 UNCIP,3 Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton 4 of Canada, acting under special temporary authorization of the Security Council, and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, designated as successor to UNCIP, tried unsuccessfully to bring about a settlement. In January 1951 efforts of the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers failed to break the impasse on demilitarization. When the Security Council met on February 21, 1951, the United States joined the United Kingdom in submitting a joint draft resolution. The resolution provided for the appointment of another U.N. representative to succeed Sir Owen Dixon and instructed him to effect demilitarization on the basis of the proposals made by Sir Owen, with appropriate modifications, and to present to India and Pakistan detailed plans for carrying out a plebiscite. The representative was directed to report to the Security Council 3 months after undertaking negotiations with the governments on the subcontinent.

To accomplish this task the draft resolution authorized the new representative to take into account such possibilities as (1) the provision of U.N. Forces to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite; (2) the assignment to the loser in the plebiscite of local areas, contiguous to its frontier, in which the vote had been overwhelmingly in the loser's favor; (3) different degrees of supervision as might be appropriate in different areas. Finally, the resolution called upon both India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all unresolved points which remained after their discussions with the U.N. representative and which the latter designated as points of difference.

Both parties objected to certain parts of the resolution. Pakistan objected to the clause concerning boundary adjustments because it could mean a partial partition and was, in Pakistan's view, a contravention of the January 5, 1949, agreement. India took exception

1 U.N. Security Council Resolution of Jan. 20, 1948 (S/INF/2, July 18, 1949, pp. 21-23).

2 U.N. doc. S/1196, Jan. 10, 1949, pp. 4-6.

U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948 (S/1100); ibid., Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949 (S/1196); ibid., Special Supplement No. 7 (S/1430/Rev. 1).

4 Ibid., Fifth Year, Supplement for January-May 1950 (S/1453).

See also U.N. Security Council Resolution, Mar. 14, 1950; S/INF/4, Feb. 1, 1951, pp. 11-12.

5 Ibid., Supplement for September-December 1950 (S/1791).

to a number of aspects of the resolution, particularly the provisions for arbitration and for the possible entry of U.N. troops. As a result of the objections by both sides, the United States and the United Kingdom presented on March 21 a revised resolution which directed the U.N. representative to effect demilitarization on the basis of the January 5, 1949 resolution to which both parties had agreed. This new draft, however, retained in its preamble the original reference to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and also included the arbitration provision. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India rejected it. The Security Council approved the resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1) on March 30, 1951,' by a vote of 8 to 0 with three abstentions (India, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia).

On April 30 the Council appointed Dr. [Frank P.] Graham, former U.S. Senator from North Carolina, as U.N. representative for India and Pakistan. Thus began the most recent phase of the Kashmir negotiations. These negotiations fall into four periods, at the end of each of which Dr. Graham reported to the Security Council.

FIRST REPORT, JULY-OCTOBER 1951

3

On October 15 Dr. Graham submitted his first report to the Security Council. When he arrived on the subcontinent in July, he reported, he found an atmosphere of hostility. The press in both India and Pakistan had begun a barrage of charges and countercharges which had given rise to considerable tension. Dr. Graham decided to adopt the procedure of separate, informal conversations with officials of the two governments. On September 7 he submitted a 12-point draft proposal on demilitarization to the governments and requested their comments. He was able to obtain the agreement of the parties to four of the 12 points. (It should be mentioned that both parties had previously committed themselves to these four points under the January 5, 1949 agreement.) In addition to reaffirming their determination not to resort to force, to avoid warlike statements, and to observe the cease-fire the parties reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The points of difference under the remaining eight proposals, according to Dr. Graham, centered around the period of demilitarization, the withdrawal of troops, the size of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, and the question of whether a date should be set for the formal induction of the Plebiscite Administrator. Dr. Graham reported that because of the situation prevailing on the subcontinent, he had not been able to effect demilitarization within the prescribed time limit. He added, however, that agreement was still possible, and suggested that the Security Council consider instructing him to implement its decision by continuing the negotiations with the two governments, such negotiations to be

1 U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 4-6.

2 U.N. doc. S/2375, Oct. 15, 1951.

a Ibid., annex 2, pp. 41-43.

carried out at the seat of the Council. Dr. Graham suggested that he be instructed to report to the Security Council again within 6 weeks from the time negotiations were resumed.

1

On October 18 Dr. Graham made a statement to the Security Council explaining his report and paying high tribute to the late Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been assassinated 2 days earlier at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Later in the month the Security Council moved to Paris, where discussions were resumed on November 10. At this meeting the United States joined the United Kingdom in sponsoring a resolution which noted with approval the basis for a program of demilitarization put forward by Dr. Graham, and instructed him to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitarization plan. In addition, the resolution instructed Dr. Graham to report to the Security Council within 6 weeks, giving his views on the problems confided to him. The resolution was approved by a vote of 9 to 0 with two abstentions (India and U. S. S. R.).2

SECOND REPORT, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1951

On December 18 Dr. Graham reported the results of his 6-week negotiations at Paris.3 He stated that his procedure had been, first, to try to reach an agreement between the parties on his 12-point proposals of September 7, 1951. Failing this, he hoped to obtain each party's plans for demilitarization under the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, in order to establish the points of difference in interpretation and execution of those resolutions that must be resolved before such demilitarization could be carried out. Under the first point of that procedure Dr. Graham had endeavored to narrow the differences to two fundamental issues:

(1) the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period;

(2) the date on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

On December 7 Dr. Graham presented to the parties a statement and questionnaires relating to these issues. Informal conversations were held separately with the two delegations by Gen. Jacob Devers, U.N. military adviser to Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham reported that the disparity between the number and character of the forces which each party proposed should be left at the end of the demilitarization period had been so wide that agreement on the whole plan could not be reached at that stage. In addition, agreement on the important question concerning the date of induction of the Plebiscite Administrator could not be obtained. The Indian Government had insisted

1 For excerpts from this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 5, 1951, pp. 740-745.

2 U.N. doc. S/INF/6, Mar. 4, 1952, pp. 7-8.

3 U.N. doc. S/2448, Dec. 19, 1951, pp. 8-14.

4 United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Department of State publication 3437; 1949), pp. 250-252; see also pp. 78-79.

that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the state permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out a plebiscite. The Pakistan Government had attached much importance to the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator to office "as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible."

Dr. Graham pointed out that agreement had been obtained on 4 more of his 12 demilitarization proposals of September 7, 1951, and suggested some revisions of the 4 remaining points, i. e., proposals 5, 6, 7, and 10. Of these the most significant was his revision of proposal 7 on troop numbers; he suggested that "... there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on January 1, 1949."

The Security Council resumed its hearings on January 17, 1952. On that date Dr. Graham formally submitted his report and after discussing his negotiations made a strong plea to India and Pakistan to arrive at a settlement of this long standing dispute. He stated his view that agreement on proposals 7 and 10 (troop numbers and date of appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator) would be the linchpin binding all 12 proposals together in an effectively integrated program and would prepare the way for the plebiscite. "The plebiscite," Dr. Graham stated, "would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own selfdetermination through a free, secure, and impartial plebiscite." (U.N. doc. S/PV 570.) He remarked further:

The people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite would signal through the darkness of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by ballots, not through the conflict of armies but through cooperation of peoples, is the enduring way for people to determine their own destiny and way of life On the subcontinent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have met in one of the great junctures of human history, for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world.

Immediately following the introductory statement by Dr. Graham, Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. representative, indicated he would like to speak briefly. His statement came after the Soviet Union had maintained a virtual silence for 4 years in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. After noting that the United States and the United Kingdom had been particularly active in the Council's consideration of the Kashmir issue, Mr. Malik stated:

What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to understand that the explanation of this is chiefly and above all that these plans in connection with Kashmir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, because they are not based on the effort to achieve a real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it "assistance through the United Nations." Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection