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with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base.

The United States of America and the United Kingdom are taking all steps to exclude a settlement of the question of the status of Kashmir by means of a free and unconstrained declaration by the people of Kashmir themselves. When in October 1950 it became known that the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" had adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United States of America and the United Kingdom immediately interfered in the matter so as not to allow the people of Kashmir to decide their own future and determine the affiliations of their country independently. They hastened to foist upon the Security Council a resolution in which it was stated that the convening of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of Kashmir. . . .

The U.S.S.R. representative concluded by proposing the following solution:

The U.S.S.R. Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people.

Both the U.S. and U.K. representatives challenged the Soviet charges. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the U.K. representative, stated:

I should merely like to say that the really extraordinary fantasies apparently entertained by our Soviet friend and colleague in regard to the Kashmir dispute are typical, as I think, of the whole Soviet approach to international problems. Whatever the dispute before us, the first thing to do is, it seems, to discover how and why it is part of an anti-Soviet plot designed merely to advance the cause of the ruling circles of the United States and of the United Kingdom with the object of clamping down an Anglo-American domination or dictatorship on a suffering world. Any attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute by applying principles of reason must, unless, of course, it is concurred in by the Soviet Government, be viewed in the light of those general principles; and it is by such a process of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the Kashmir dispute has been invented and subsequently carefully fostered by the diabolical AngloAmericans for the one end of turning Kashmir into an Anglo-American armed camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union.

No doubt there are people who can be persuaded to believe this, just as there are people who could believe that, for instance, a United Nations mission to Antarctica to study the habit of penguins could only be an indirect slander on totalitarianism or on a Marxist society. It is possible to believe that; and people, indeed, can always be found who will believe anything. But when it comes to accusing our friend, Mr. Graham, of being the secret agent of the Pentagonwell, that should, I think, cause even the most ingenuous to sit up and think and think.

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Surely the Kashmir dispute is capable of being considered with some degree of objectivity, and surely the dictates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently fostered by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabling the two great nations involved to agree on a settlement which will be satisfactory to both and which will, or which may, relieve even the Soviet Union of the nightmares which now seem to surround its contemplation of this long-standing dispute. .

The U.S. representative, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, associated himself with the remarks of the U.K. representative and further observed:

The attacks on Mr. Graham do not merit a reply and do not require a denial. The dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir is one which my government earnestly hopes to see settled in accordance with United Nations principles and in accordance with agreements already reached between the parties. I think it would serve no useful purpose to continue the debate at this time. The business before the Security Council, as the representative of the United Kingdom has already said, is to give the most careful and respectful consideration to the report which has just been given to us by the representative of the Council. My Government will give it the attention which it deserves.

At the meeting of the Security Council on January 30 Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, spoke in part as follows:

At the meeting of the Security Council held on January 17, 1952, a representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to certain press reports relating to the granting of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state clearly and with authority that these reports relied upon by him for his statement are utterly false and without any foundation whatsoever. We have neither been asked for, nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the U.S. or any other power.

Throughout this controversy, India, Pakistan, and the Security Council have been agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This fundamental principle is embodied in the preamble to the Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948,1 and in clause I of the Commission's Resolution of January 5, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/PV 571.)

Sir Gladwyn then stated his Government's view that Dr. Graham should pay a further visit to the subcontinent to attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference. Ambassador Gross supported this suggestion, as did the majority of the Security Council members.

The following day, the Indian representative, Mr. Motilal Setalvad, expressed India's willingness to continue the discussions under Dr. Graham's direction and stated:

I have already declared that India is anxious to settle the Kashmir dispute quickly and peacefully. This is so not only because India is anxious that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have an opportunity, without further delay, to determine freely their own future, but also because we most earnestly desire to prepare the way for firm and lasting friendship with our neighbor, Pakistan. It is no less to our interest than to the interest of Pakistan, and to the interest of the world, that these two countries which have so much in common should live side by side in complete amity, each fully sovereign but both fully and wholeheartedly in cooperation in the pursuit of the common task of peace and progress. This is no language of convention but the free expression of a deep and sincere sentiment. It seems to be the sense of the Council that the negotiations should be continued under the auspices of the U.N. representative to find a settlement of the differences that still divide India and Pakistan over certain parts of Mr. Graham's plan. India has no objection to this course and would cooperate in finding a settlement in the spirit that I have just described. (U.N. doc. S/PV 572.)

The President of the Security Council, Jean Chauvel, speaking as the representative of France, stated that "it was the sense" of the

1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 783-786.

Security Council that the U.N. representative, acting under the resolutions of March 30, 1951,1 and November 10, 1951,2 was authorized without any new decision by the Council to continue his efforts to fulfill his mission and submit his report, which the Council hoped would be final within 2 months. The Soviet representative objected to this decision and indicated that "if such a proposal or conclusion is submitted to a vote the delegation of the Soviet Union will abstain." THIRD REPORT, DECEMBER 1951-APRIL 1952

Following this Security Council debate and some discussions in Paris with the parties, Dr. Graham departed for New Delhi, where he arrived on February 29 and remained until March 25. His third report was submitted to the Security Council on April 22, 1952.3

At New Delhi Dr. Graham continued his previous procedure of separate negotiations with the parties, having concluded that a meeting with representatives of the two Governments was inadvisable before sufficient preliminary agreement had been reached to insure positive results from a joint conference. This round of negotiations had two purposes: To assist the parties in removing the obstacles still blocking agreement on the proposals submitted to them and to obtain, if possible, further withdrawals of troops from the state of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.

He reported that the Government of India maintained its position concerning the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, i. e., 21,000 regular Indian army forces plus 6,000 state militia, on the Indian side and, on the Pakistan side, a force of 4,000 men normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir. The Indian Government, Dr. Graham stated, considered that the questions of a definite period for demilitarization and of a date for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator could be settled without difficulty, provided agreement was reached on the scope of demilitarization and the number of forces to remain at the end of the demilitarization period.

Pakistan, Dr. Graham stated, accepted the four remaining points of his 12-point demilitarization proposals, i. e., 5, 6, 7, and 10, with certain qualifications regarding the character of the forces to be demilitarized. In his view the demilitarization of the state had reached a stage at which further reductions of troops were directly related to the preparation of a plebiscite. Accordingly, he deemed it necessary that the Plebiscite Administrator-designate should be associated with him in his studies and the consideration of common problems. Dr. Graham recommended that both parties should undertake to reduce the forces under their control in the state and that the U.N. representative's negotiations with the two Governments should be continued with a view to

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(a) resolving the remaining difficulties on the 12 proposals submitted to the parties, with special reference to the number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) the general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.

FOURTH REPORT, MAY-SEPTEMBER 1952

Dr. Graham, in a letter dated May 29, 1952, informed the President of the Security Council that, in agreement with the Governments of India and Pakistan, the negotiations on the question of the state of Jammu and Kashmir had been renewed and that at the appropriate moment he would report to the Council on the outcome of that phase of negotiations.

His fourth report, submitted on September 16, detailed the recent round of negotiations held at New York and Geneva. He had first attempted to bridge the remaining differences between the parties. by proposing bracketed figures of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on Pakistan's side and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side to break the deadlock on the number of troops. As he was unable to obtain agreement on this suggestion, he submitted another draft proposal on September 2 which fixed the figures at 6,000 and 18,000 excluding Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side and the state militia on the Indian side. Pakistan accepted this proposal, with certain reservations; India did not.

Concluding that he could not obtain agreement on fixed figures, Dr. Graham decided it might be possible for the two Governments to agree on certain principles which could serve as criteria for fixing the number of forces in a conference of civil and military representatives of both sides. Instead of including a fixed troop quantum, his new proposal, presented on September 4, provided that the minimum number of forces to be maintained on each side of the cease-fire line be defined as those "required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite." In the case of India, the proposal added the phrase "with due regard to the security of the state" and expanded the term "forces" to include “Indian forces and state armed forces."

Dr. Graham reported the following reaction of the parties to this proposal: India, although it believed that the proposal contained "the germs of a settlement," indicated it could not accept any equation of its responsibilities with those of the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and insisted that the defense of the entire state is the concern of India. Pakistan objected to certain clauses in the proposals which it suggested should be eliminated to avoid the recurrence of political controversies.

Dr. Graham stated that it was evident after 2 weeks of discussion at Geneva that agreement could not be reached on any of the revised drafts he presented. He attributed the differences in the positions of the parties to their differing concepts of their status in the state and stressed the importance of the induction into office of the Plebiscite

1 U.N. doc. S/2783, Sept. 19, 1952.

Administrator, a matter which he termed "the heart of the integrated program for demilitarization and a plebiscite." He concluded by expressing the view that to reach an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either:

(a) to establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; or

(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.

59. FIFTH REPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN, MARCH 27, 1953 (Excerpts) 2

1. In previous reports and statements to the Security Council the United Nations Representative has reviewed the background, the content and the steps in the acceptance of the twelve proposals for a plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, first submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951.

2. This report should be read in connexion with the first (S/2375, and Corr. 1), second (S/2448), third (S/2611) and fourth (S/2783) reports of the United Nations Representative.

3. We shall in this report not review again the twelve proposals as a whole but shall concentrate on proposal seven. Differences over proposal seven continue on two issues (1) the number and (2) the character of the forces to be left on the two sides of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. In his efforts to assist the two Governments to reach an agreement the United Nations Representative has made six suggestions for the negotiation of the parties, including the latest exploratory suggestions made in Geneva. In reviewing these suggestions and the present situation the report will be in five parts.

4. Part I will review the suggestions regarding proposal seven; Part II will point out the values of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office at an early fixed time; Part III refers to assurances and elucidations regarding the 13 August 19483 and 5 January 1949 resolutions; Part IV will summarize the negotiations since the meeting of the Security Council on 23 December 1952; and

1 Dr. Frank P. Graham,

2 U.N. doc. S/2967, Mar. 27, 1953.

3 United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 (Department of State publication 3437; 1949), pp. 250-252.

U.N. doc. S/1196, Jan. 10, 1949, pp. 4-6.

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