2322 Kashmir, and to the utter difficulties-economic difficulties growing out of the differences in devaluation, settlement of monetary plans back and forth, et cetera. another, and they have assured the world, that as stubborn as these We know that they have assured one difficulties may be and difficult as they may be of solution, they are not going to resort to war to solve them. We are glad to hear those assurances and the whole world is glad to hear it, but we know also that the problems are in such a situation and in such an area that they are most inflammable, and we believe that in addition to these most desirable assurances there should be some accommodation of wills to bring about a result as soon as possible. In India and in Pakistan we are willing to be of such help as we can be. Again, the responsibility is not ours. Again we can only be helpful friends. Again the responsibility lies with people who have won their freedom and who are very proud of it. THE NEW DAY FOR ASIA So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them. 2. REVIEW OF THE POSITION AS OF 1955: Address by the Secretary of State, February 16, 1955 (Excerpts)1 FAR EAST SECURITY TREATIES In the Far East the United States has responded to the desire of others that we join with them to assure their security. During the last 4 years, the United States has become party to security treaties with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China on Formosa, the Philip 1 Made before the Foreign Policy Association, New York; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 328-331. pines, Australia and New Zealand. Also we have joined the eightpower Manila Pact for the security of Southeast Asia.2 The total of these treaties is a mutual security system which, starting from the Aleutian Islands in the North, runs in a great are to the South Pacific. This constitutes a defensive bulwark for freedom in that part of the world. What has thus been done by many nations is important. Also important is the manner in which the United States has played its part, particularly during recent days. When the Congress convened last January, it was organized by the Democratic Party. So when the Manila Pact and the China treaty were submitted, they were submitted by a Republican President to a Democrat-controlled body. The same was true of President Eisenhower's request for Congressional authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the Formosa area.3 Nevertheless, the two treaties were ratified and the Congressional authority was granted. This was done promptly and with virtual unanimity." These events demonstrate a national unity and capacity of action which is needed in the world today. Too often representative processes lead to such partisanship and such consequent delays that hostile forces are encouraged to believe that democracies are inherently ineffective. The Government of the United States has shown the contrary. Partisanship was wholly subordinated to the national good, so that action of great importance could be taken with deliberation, but with decisiveness. For this the nation can be grateful to the leadership and to the general membership of both parties in the Congress. I know that they would expect me to pay special tribute to Walter F. George, who, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, carried the heaviest aggregate burden of responsibility in relation to the three acts to which I refer. We can all take pride, as Americans, in this demonstration of national unity and capacity. Because of it, free men throughout the world can face the future with better hope and new confidence. MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH CHINA Let me turn now to deal with some of the substantive problems which arise out of the two Far Eastern treaties to which I have referred the China treaty and the Manila Pact. The United States is firmly committed to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. These islands became part of the Japanese Empire See, respectively, the treaties of Oct. 1, 1953 (supra, pp. 897-898), Sept. 8, 1951 (supra, pp. 885-886), Dec. 2, 1954 (supra, 945-947), Aug. 30, 1951 (supra, pp. 873-875), and Sept. 1, 1951 (supra, pp. 878-880). 2 Treaty and protocol of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912-916. See infra, pp. 2483-2486. 4 For Congressional action on the Manila Pact, the security treaty with China, and the Formosa (Taiwan) resolution, see supra, pp. 929-945 and 957-965, and infra, pp. 2486-2487. in 1895. They continued as such for half a century, until they were relinquished by Japan as a result of her defeat in war 2-a defeat principally wrought by the efforts and sacrifices of the United States. These islands form an important part of the Western Pacific defense system which I have described. The people of the islands eagerly seek our help. Thus Formosa and the Pescadores have been properly a matter of concern to the United States. In 1945 our long-time ally, the Republic of China, was entrusted with authority over these islands. In 1950, when the aggression against Korea occurred, President Truman ordered our Pacific fleet to defend Formosa against possible Chinese Communist attack. Now, that determination has been converted into our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. It is important to note that the treaty, except as it relates to United States territories, covers only the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores, and an armed attack directed against those islands. The Congressional authority is to secure and protect Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, and to make secure and to protect "related positions and territories" as the President judges "this would be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. The President did not use our armed forces to help the Chinese Nationalists to hold the Tachen Islands and Yushan and Pishan," lying some 200 miles north of Formosa. These islands were virtually unrelated to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We helped the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate these islands and regroup their forces, so as to avoid a bloody and wasteful battle which would have inflamed public emotions. Thus, Nationalist China and the United States have made an important contribution to the cause of peace. It has been suggested that Nationalist China should go further and surrender to the Chinese Communists the coastal positions which the Communists need to stage their announced attack on Formosa. doubtful that this would serve either the cause of peace or the cause of freedom. The Chinese Communists have been the initiators of violence in this area. They have already formally declared their intention to take Formosa by force. If the Chinese Nationalists now oblige by making it easier for the Chinese Communists to conquer Formosa, will they be less apt to do so? I doubt it. The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese 1 Treaty of Apr. 17, 1895; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 87, pp. 795–805. See instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 625-626. 3 See General Order No. 1, Sept. 2, 1945; The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, vol. II, p. 442. * See President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950; infra, pp. 2539-2540. 5 See statement of Feb. 5, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, pp. 2490-2491. Communists. However, Foreign Minister Chou says they will use all their force to take Formosa and they treat the coastal islands as means to that end. When the Nationalists voluntarily evacuated the Tachen islands, the Chinese Communists' comment was: "The liberation of these islands has created favorable conditions for our People's Liberation Army in the liberation of Formosa." Thus the Chinese Communists have linked the coastal positions to the defense of Formosa. That is the fact which, as President Eisenhower said in his message to Congress about Formosa, "compels us to take into account closely related localities." Accordingly, we shall be alert to subsequent Chinese Communist actions, rejecting for ourselves any initiative of warlike deeds. It is hardly to be expected that the Chinese Communists will renounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their efforts to realize their goals by force? Such renunciation of force is one of the basic principles of the United Nations, and the United States had hoped, and still hopes, that the United Nations may be able to effect a cessation of the present hostilities. President Eisenhower, in his message to Congress dealing with this matter, made clear that the United States would welcome action by the United Nations which might bring an end to the active hostilities in the area. The Government of New Zealand has brought this situation before the Security Council,2 and the United States, in the interest of peace, went to the length of voting to invite the Chinese Communists to come to the Security Council to discuss the matter.3 In 1950, the Chinese Communists had accepted a Security Council invitation in relation to Korea. However, this time the Chinese Communists contemptuously rejected the invitation.5 We sincerely hope that this decision of the Chinese Communists is not irrevocable and that they will abide by the principles of the United Nations rather than challenge by force the defensive obligations of this country. In any event, we believe that their attitude toward the United Nations Security Council has not ended the responsibility of that body which, by the Charter, has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It should not, moreover, be carelessly assumed that peace and security will be promoted merely by the non-Communist nations indefinitely granting one-sided concessions to the Communist nations. President Eisenhower's message to Congress of Jan. 24, 1955; infra, pp. 2483-2486. 2 See letter of Jan. 28, 1955, from the Representative of New Zealand to the President of the Security Council; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955. p. 253. 3 See Ambassador Lodge's statement in the Security Council on Jan. 31, 1955; infra, pp. 2487-2489. United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178; 1951), pp. 40-41. See the cablegram of Jan. 31, 1955, from the U.N. Secretary-General to the Chinese Communist Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (infra, p. 2490) and the Chinese reply of Feb. 3, 1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254-255). A great danger in Asia is the fear of many non-Communist peoples that the United States has no real intention of standing firmly behind them. Already that fear has mounted to the danger point. We accepted in Korea an armistice which the Chinese Communists boisterously misrepresent as a "victory" for them. We acquiesced in an Indochina armistice which reflected the defeat of the French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu. We aided the Tachen evacuation. The reasons were compelling; nevertheless the result added a few square miles to the Communist domain. If the non-Communist Asians ever come to feel that their Western Allies are disposed to retreat whenever communism threatens the peace, then the entire area could quickly become indefensible. As the situation now exists, neither the cause of freedom, nor United States security, nor world peace and security would be promoted by undermining the faith of the free Asian peoples in our strength and in our willingness to use that strength to restrain those who violently menace liberty. The American people have, through the Congress, made their own resolution clear. That is a verdict which the Government accepts as sound and which it will soberly execute. SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA Let me turn now to Southeast Asia. In a few hours I shall be going to Bangkok to attend the first meeting of the Council created under the Manila Pact for the security of Southeast Asia.2 We shall at Bangkok deal with the problem of organizing the Treaty Council. Also we shall begin to deal with the three substantive problems assigned to the Council, namely, military security, security against subversion directed from without, and economic welfare. I cannot anticipate what the decisions will be, but I am confident that our gathering will show the advantages of cooperation between the East and the West. Some Asians retain a fear, derived from past colonial relationships, that close ties with the Western powers will lead to their being dominated by the Western powers. It is essential that that fear should be dispelled. An important step in that direction was taken at Manila when, at the inspiration of President Magsaysay, the eight powers there signed the Pacific Charter. Thereby we dedicated ourselves to promoting selfgovernment and to securing independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. Also, we agreed to cooperate in the economic, social, and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress, and social well-being. However, words alone are not enough. It is necessary to infuse these words with the breath of life. That, I hope, will be done at Bangkok. Those who gather there will meet as equals. We shall, I think, find 1 Armistice agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 2 The Council met from Feb. 23 to Feb. 25, 1955. muniqué, see infra, doc. 7. 750-788. 3 See declaration of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 916–917. For the text of the com |