Southeast Asia. United States officials stated that General de Lattre's presentation of the situation in that area had been invaluable to them and had demonstrated that United States and French policies in the Associated States were not at variance.

In the course of the discussions with the Department of Defense, the military-aid program for Indochina was reexamined, with the result that considerable improvement will be made in the rate of deliveries of many items of equipment. General de Lattre has been advised that the question of additional aid for the French and Vietnamese forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program is under study by the United States Government.

21. THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952 1

1

Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conversations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security, the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in these talks.

The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as well as local and general resources require that the free countries concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however, recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limitations imposed by their global obligations as well as by the requirements in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.

that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in the common effort and that the United States for its part will, therefore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations, would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.

Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

22. SUPPORT BY NATO OF THE FRENCH UNION DEFENSE EFFORTS IN INDOCHINA: Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17, 1952 2

The North Atlantic Council

Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

1 Agreements of Mar. 8, 1949 (Viet-Nam), July 19, 1949 (Laos), and Nov. 8, 1949 (Cambodia); La documentation francaise, Mar. 14, 1950. The text of the agreement with Viet-Nam is also printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50 (London, 1953), pp. 596-608.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

HAVING BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.

[For the text of the Franco-American communiqué of March 28, 1953, see supra, pp. 1672-1675.]

23. UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF LAOS AGAINST THE VIET MINH INVASION: Statement by the Department of State, April 17, 1953 1

The Royal Government of Laos has issued a statement drawing attention to the attack upon the territory of the Kingdom by Viet Minh troops and stating the determination of the Government, the army, and the people of Laos with the aid of French Union troops to resist this aggression.2

The Government of the United States is following developments with the closest attention. It expresses its sympathy with the people of Laos in their present emergency and its fervent wishes to them, to their troops, and to those of the French Union in their efforts to resist and turn back the invaders. The United States will continue to provide and will study ways and means of making more effective its assistance to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in the struggle to destroy Communist aggression in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

24. UNITED STATES EMERGENCY AID TO LAOS AND THAILAND IN THE FACE OF VIET MINH AGGRESSION: Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, May 9, 1953 3

3

In view of the recent, rapid sequence of events in the Far East, I believe it would be appropriate to summarize for you our actions. concerning developments in Laos and Thailand.

Communist Viet Minh forces began their movement toward the Royal Capital City of Luang Prabang in Laos on April 12.

Following an appeal from the Government of Laos on April 13 to

2 The statement of the Government of Laos was issued, Apr. 13, 1953.

* Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1953, p. 708.

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the free world to condemn the aggression, the United States issued a statement of support and sympathy.'

The urgent need for cargo aircraft to aid French and Lao forces in meeting this aggression was discussed by me with French officials during our stay in Paris for the recent NATO meeting.2

Within 24 hours it was agreed at the highest level that such aircraft, if available, should be dispatched to Indochina. Within another 24 hours the aircraft were located with the Far East Command. Within another 24 hours civilian operators were located to fly the planes, because the French did not have crews accustomed to handle these planes and we did not desire that our military personnel should fly into the combat zone. The plan was actually put into operation within a few hours after our return from Paris, and the aircraft arrived at Hanoï on May 5 and were made operational immediately. Three days prior to the arrival of the aircraft in Hanoi, we announced on May 23 that we were maintaining close contact with the Governments of Laos and of France regarding the special requirements of the situation and that the Mutual Security Administration Mission in Laos had made arrangements to help ease the refugee problem by making available certain funds and supplies.

The Ambassador from Thailand, Pote Sarasin, came to my office at 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday of this week, May 5, to discuss the problems confronting his country as a result of the Viet Minh invasion of Laos.

The Ambassador expressed his country's urgent need for small arms ammunition and for various military items urgently required by the Thai Navy, Army, and Air Force, which requests had simultaneously been made through the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group and our Embassy at Bangkok. Within 24 hours of the Ambassador's request certain amounts of such ammunition were in the air on their way to Bangkok from the Pacific area, and action was taken to expedite delivery of the other military items.

These two instances illustrate a capacity for decision and performance and of cooperative teamwork between the Departments of State and Defense, which should, I believe, be gratifying to the American people. Also, they should be impressive to others, whether they be friends or aggressors.

25. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, September 2, 1953 (Excerpt) 5

We do not make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolated affair. The Korean war forms one part of the worldwide effort of

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1953, p. 641.

2 See the NATO Council communiqué of Apr. 25, 1953; supra, pp. 1631-1633. See Secretary Dulles' statement of that date; Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1953, p. 678.

See ibid., May 18, 1953, p. 709.

5 Made before the American Legion, St. Louis; ibid., Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 341–342.

communism to conquer freedom. More immediately it is part of that effort in Asia.

A single Chinese-Communist aggressive front extends from Korea on the north to Indochina in the south. The armistice in Korea, even if it leads to a political settlement in Korea, does not end United States concern in the western Pacific area. As President Eisenhower said in his April 16 speech,' a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released Communist forces for attack elsewhere.

In Indochina a desperate struggle is in its eighth year. The outcome affects our own vital interests in the western Pacific, and we are already contributing largely in material and money to the combined efforts of the French and of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Čambodia.

We Americans have too little appreciated the magnitude of the effort and sacrifices which France has made in defense of an area which is no longer a French colony but where complete independence is now in the making. This independence program is along lines. which the United States has encouraged and justifies increased United States aid, provided that will assure an effort there that is vigorous and decisive.

Communist China has been and now is training, equipping, and supplying the Communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly in the interest of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation. We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development.

26. ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September 30, 1953 2

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

1 Supra, pp. 65–71.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486-487.