The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953,1 by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its NATO forces.

The Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference, 1954

27. PLANS FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA: Quadripartite Communiqué of the Berlin Conference, February 18, 1954 2

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union-Mr. John Foster Dulles, M. Georges Bidault, Mr. Anthony Eden, and M. Vyacheslav Molotov-took place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954. They reached the following agreements:

(A)

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

1 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953 (New York, 1954), pp. 347– 348.

2 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 217-218. See also Secretary Dulles' address of Feb. 24, 1954; supra, pp. 85-90.

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia, PROPOSE that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; 1

1

AGREE that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

(B)

The Governments of the United States of America, of France, of the United Kingdom, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Convinced that the solution of international controversies necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments,

WILL SUBSEQUENTLY HOLD an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations resolution of November 28, 1953.2

The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security, and on the Austrian question. They were unable to reach agreement upon these

matters.

28. VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE EVE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: Address by the Secretary of State, March 29, 1954 3

This provides a timely occasion for outlining the Administration's thinking about two related matters-Indochina and the Chinese Communist regime.

1 See The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (Department of State publication 5609; 1954) and infra, pp. 2695-2701.

2 General Assembly Res. 715 (VIII); infra, pp. 2796-2798.

3 Made before the Overseas Press Club, New York; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539-542.

I

Indochina

Indochina is important for many reasons. First-and always firstare the human values. About 30 million people are seeking for themselves the dignity of self-government. Until a few years ago, they formed merely a French dependency. Now, their three political units-Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia-are exercising a considerable measure of independent political authority within the French Union. Each of the three is now recognized by the United States1 and by more than 30 other nations. They signed the Japanese Peace Treaty 2 with us. Their independence is not yet complete. But the French Government last July declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are actively under way.

3

The United States is watching this development with close attention and great sympathy. We do not forget that we were a colony that won its freedom. We have sponsored in the Philippines a conspicuously successful development of political independence. We feel a sense of kinship with those everywhere who yearn for freedom.

Communist Imperialism

The Communists are attempting to prevent the orderly development of independence and to confuse the issue before the world. The Communists have, in these matters, a regular line which Stalin laid down in 1924.

The scheme is to whip up the spirit of nationalism so that it becomes violent. That is done by professional agitators. Then the violence is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership and the provision of military supplies. In these ways, international Communism gets a strangle-hold on the people and it uses that power to "amalgamate" the peoples into the Soviet orbit.

"Amalgamation" is Lenin's and Stalin's word to describe their

process.

"Amalgamation" is now being attempted in Indochina under the ostensible leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He was indoctrinated in Moscow. He became an associate of the Russian, Borodin,' when the latter was organizing the Chinese Communist Party which was to bring China into the Soviet orbit. Then Ho transferred his activities to Indochina.

Those fighting under the banner of Ho Chi Minh have largely been trained and equipped in Communist China. They are supplied with artillery and ammunition through the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. Captured material shows that much of it was fabricated

1 See statement of Feb. 7, 1950, by the Department of State; supra, doc. 17. 2 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425-440.

Declaration of July 3, 1953; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953 (New York, 1954), pp. 347-348.

Mikhail Markovich Borodin, political adviser to the Kuomintang (1923-1927) and head of Communist government at Hankow (1924–1927).

by the Skoda Munition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia and Siberia and then sent through China into Vietnam. Military supplies for the Communist armies have been pouring into Vietnam at a steadily increasing rate.

Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated 2,000 Communist Chinese. They function with the forces of Ho Chi Minh in key positions-in staff sections of the High Command, at the division level and in specialized units such as signal, engineer, artillery and transportation.

In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationalistic anti-French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved military or political success, it is certain that they would subject the people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from Peiping and Moscow.

The Scope of the Danger

The tragedy would not stop there. If the Communist forces won uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other free peoples in the area.

The propagandists of Red China and Russia make it apparent that the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia is the so-called "rice bowl" which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is rich in many raw materials, such as tin, oil, rubber and iron ore. It offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources of raw materials.

The area has great strategic value. Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and best developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called "offshore island chain", would be strategically endangered.

President Eisenhower appraised the situation last Wednesday when he said that the area is of "transcendent importance"."

The United States Position

The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the gallant struggle being waged in Indochina by French forces and those of the Associated States. Congress has enabled us to provide material aid to the established governments and their peoples. Also, our diplomacy has sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area.

President Eisenhower, in his address of April 16, 1953,3 explained

1 See the treaties of Aug. 30, 1951, and Sept. 1, 1951; supra, pp. 873-875 and 878-880.

2 Statement made at the President's news conference of Mar. 24, 1954; New York Times, Mar. 25, 1954.

Supra, pp. 65-71.

that a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack elsewhere. I said last September that if Red China sent its own army into Indochina, that would result in grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.1

Recent statements have been designed to impress upon potential aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by means of free world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it could gain.2

The Chinese Communists have, in fact, avoided the direct use of their own Red armies in open aggression against Indochina. They have, however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression in that area. Indeed, they promote that aggression by all means short of open invasion.

Under all the circumstances it seems desirable to clarify further the United States position.

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today. The free nations want peace. However, peace is not had merely by wanting it. Peace has to be worked for and planned for. Sometimes it is necessary to take risks to win peace just as it is necessary in war to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression could lead him.

I hope that these statements which I make here tonight will serve the cause of peace.

II

Communist China

Let me now discuss our political relations with Red China, taking first the matter of recognition.

The United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. That is well known. But the reasons seem not so well known. Some think that there are no reasons and that we are actuated purely by emotion. Your Government believes that its position is soberly rational.

Non-Recognition

Let me first recall that diplomatic recognition is a voluntary_act. One country has no right to demand recognition by another. Gen

1 Address of Sept. 2, 1953; supra, doc. 25.

2 e. g., Secretary Dulles' address of Jan. 12, 1954: "The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and means of its own choosing" (supra, p. 80).