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States, which was already paying part of the cost of the war, agreed to bear the greater part of the total cost. We are now paying at the rate of about $800 million a year, plus a very large provision of military equipment.

Despite the gains on these fronts, there has been a growing belief by the French people that France was overextended, in view of its responsibilities in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe. As a result, when I met in Berlin last January and February with the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, the French Government asked that the projected conference on Korea be expanded to discuss also the problem of peace in Indochina.2

Shortly after the Berlin Conference adjourned, the Communists, as was to be expected from them, began to expend their military assets, human and material, in a desperate effort to win some victory which they would exploit for political purposes. They concentrated on a mass assault against one of the French outposts-that of Dien-BienPhu. That assault was pushed with a callous disregard of human life.

Now, Dien-Bien-Phu has fallen. Its defense, of 57 days and nights, will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time. The defenders, composed of French and native forces, inflicted staggering losses on the enemy. The French soldiers showed that they have not lost either the will or the skill to fight even under the most adverse conditions. It shows that Viet-Nam produces soldiers who have the qualities to enable them to defend their country.

An epic battle has ended. But great causes have, before now, been won out of lost battles.

The Chinese Communists have been supplying the forces of Viet Minh rebels with munitions, trucks, anti-aircraft guns, radar, and technical equipment and technical advisers. They have, however, stopped short of open intervention. In this respect, they may have been deterred by the warnings which the United States has given that such intervention would lead to grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.3

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Throughout this period the United States has also followed the second course of trying to develop strength in Southeast Asia through collective measures.

Back in 1951, I negotiated treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. These recognized that this area was one of vital importance to the United States. These treaties also recognized that they were only initial steps toward the development of a more comprehensive system of collective security in the area.

1 See the French-United States communiqué issued Sept. 30, 1953; supra, doc. 26.

2 See the quadripartite Berlin conference communiqué of Feb. 18, 1954; supra. doc. 27.

3 See Secretary Dulles' address of Sept. 2, 1953; supra, doc. 25.

This we have constantly sought. However, it has proved difficult to achieve this result. There were differences of race and culture and differences in the development of national self-government. The countries which had won or were winning their independence from Western colonialism and Japanese imperialism were often more concerned with past dangers from which they were extricating themselves than with the threat of new peril. The memories of the past blinded them to the present perils of Communist imperialism. They were not disposed to make the sacrifices inherent in any collective security system.

However, this situation began to change and by the spring of this year it seemed that there could be a broader program of collective defense.

On March 29, 1954, after consultations with Congressional leaders of both parties, and after having advised our principal allies, I stated: "The imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action."

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This declaration was nothing new, although the circumstances of the moment gave the words a new significance.

President Eisenhower speaking almost a year earlier, in his address of April 16, 1953, had said that "aggression in Korea and in Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action." 2

After having explained our purposes to the American people, we promptly conferred with the representatives of nine free nations having immediate interest in the area, namely, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, France, and the United Kingdom. We informed others whose interests could be affected.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and of France asked me to visit their capitals to develop further our concept. After conferences at London on April 12 and 13 with Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden, we issued a joint U.S.-U.K. communiqué 3 which, after reciting the danger to the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific caused by Communist warfare in Indochina, concluded: "Accordingly we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."

A similar agreement was reached in Paris with Prime Minister Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault.*

The progress thus made was that which the United States had

1 Supra, doc. 28.

2 Supra, pp. 65-71.

3 Communiqué of Apr. 13, 1954; supra, pp. 1704-1705.

Statement of Apr. 14, 1954; supra, doc. 29.

sought. We had never sought any sudden spectacular act such as an ultimatum to Red China. Our goal was to develop a basic unity of constructive purpose. We advanced toward that goal. I feel confident that unity of purpose persists, and that such a tragic event as the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu will harden, not weaken, our purpose to stay united.

The United States and other countries immediately concerned are giving careful consideration to the establishment of a collective defense. Conversations are taking place among them. We must agree as to who will take part in the united defense effort, and what their commitments will be.

It must be recognized that difficulties have been encountered, but this was expected. The complexity of the problem is great. As I have pointed out, the complications were such that it was not possible even to get started until recent months. Under all the circumstances, I believe that good progress is being made. I feel confident that the outcome will be such that Communist aggression will not be able to gain in Southeast Asia the results it seeks.

This may involve serious commitments by us all. But free peoples will never remain free unless they are willing to fight for their vital interests. Furthermore, vital interests can no longer be protected merely by local defense. The key to successful defense and to the deterring of attack is association for mutual defense. That is what the United States seeks in Southeast Asia.

CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

The question remains as to what we should do about the current hostilities in Viet-Nam.

In Korea we showed that we were prepared under proper conditions to resort to military action, if necessary, to protect our vital interests and the principles upon which stable peace must rest.

In Korea, we, along with others, joined in the defense of an independent government, which was already resisting an armed assault. We did so at the request of the Republic of Korea and under a United Nations mandate. The Korean people were inspired by a deep sense of patriotism and eager to develop a power of their own. The issues were clarified before the world by decisions of the United Nations. Under these circumstances, we and our allies fought until the enemy sued for an armistice.

In Indochina, the situation is far more complex. The present conditions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States to participate with its armed forces.

The situation may perhaps be clarified as a result of the Geneva Conference. The French have stated their desire for an armistice on honorable terms and under proper safeguards. If they can conclude a settlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples of Viet-Nam, this would be a real contribution to the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. But we would be gravely concerned if an armistice or cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would provide a road to a Communist takeover and further aggression. If this occurs, or if

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955

hostilities continue, then the need will be even more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defense of the area.

In making commitments which might involve the use of armed force, the Congress is a full partner. Only the Congress can declare war. President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that he would not take military action in Indochina without the support of Congress.1 Furthermore, he has made clear that he would not seek that unless, in his opinion, there would be an adequate collective effort based on genuine mutuality of purpose in defending vital interests.

A great effort is being made by Communist propaganda to portray it as something evil if Asia joins with the nations of the Americas and Europe to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to secure their liberty. These Communist nations have, in this connection, adopted the slogan "Asia for the Asians."

The Japanese war lords adopted a similar slogan when they sought to subject Asia to their despotic rule. The similar theme of "Europe for the Europeans" was adopted by Mr. Molotov at the Berlin Conference when he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrangements which would send the United States back home.

Great despotic powers have always known that they could impose their will and gain their conquests if the free nations stand apart and none helps the other.

It should be observed that the Soviet Communist aggression in Europe took place only against countries which had no collective security arrangements. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been no successful aggression in Europe.

Of course, it is of the utmost importance that the United States participation in creating collective security in Asia should be on a basis which recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asian peoples. We have a material and industrial strength which they lack and which is an essential ingredient of security. Also they have cultural and spiritual values of their own which make them our equals by every moral standard.

The United States, as the first colony of modern history to win independence for itself, instinctively shares the aspirations for liberty of all dependent and colonial peoples. We want to help, not hinder, the spread of liberty.

We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism and we find even more intolerable the new imperialist colonialism of communism.

That is the spirit that animates us. If we remain true to that spirit, we can face the future with confidence that we shall be in harmony with those moral forces which ultimately prevail.

1 At his press conference on Mar. 10, 1954, President Eisenhower said: "There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it" (New York Times, Mar. 11, 1954).

32. CONDITIONS FOR UNITED STATES DIRECT INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, May 25, 1954 (Excerpt) 1

1

At his news conference on May 25, a correspondent recalled to Secretary Dulles his report to the Nation following his return from Geneva 2 in which he set forth the conditions under which the United States intervened in Korea. Mr. Dulles was asked to relate those conditions to the Indochina situation. Mr. Dulles made the following reply:

I pointed out, I think, the existence of certain conditions in the case of Korea, and I went on to say that the situation in Indochina was different and more complex.

I think that broadly speaking the attitude of the United States toward this situation has been made clear by statements which the President has made and which I have made. I think it is fair to say that the United States attitude in this matter has been one of the few stable aspects in an otherwise changing and fluid situation.

The position of the United States toward collective security in Southeast Asia has been known basically for quite a long while. In fact, it really goes back to the time when I went out to the Far East in, I think, January of 1951 on a mission to try to create a collective security pact in that area. That effort failed at that time in the sense that we were not able to put together a collective security arrangement of any large proportions, and we ended with a series of separate pactsone with Japan, one with Australia and New Zealand, and another with the Philippines. But there was not a regional security pact created at that time.

Then I think I pointed out that, in his great address of April 16 of last year, President Eisenhower made a statement which did not attract at the time the attention it deserved perhaps because of other aspects of his speech where he referred to Korea and Southeast Asia and said there should be united action for the defense of Southeast Asia.3

I repeated that statement in my March 29 speech after having previously discussed it with congressional leaders and with our principal allies.

The general conditions under which the United States is prepared to participate in collective defense there or elsewhere, for tha matter, are quite well known. We are willing to participate in collective defense basically upon the terms that are laid down by the Vandenberg Resolution of June 1948, which laid down basic conditions under which the United States would be prepared to participate on the basis of mutuality and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. We are not prepared to go in for a defense of colonialism. We are

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, pp. 862-864.

2 See Secretary Dulles' address of May 7, 1954; supra.

3 Supra, pp. 65-71.

S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 11, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 197.

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