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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-eighth day of April

[SEAL]

in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventysixth.

The Defense Capacity and Economic Viability of Sovereign Japan, 1953-1955

50. REPELLING VIOLATIONS OF JAPANESE TERRITORIAL AIR BY FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT: Note From the American Embassy at Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, January 16, 19531

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's Note 2 concerning violations of Japan's territorial air over Hokkaido by foreign military planes.

The United States Government has noted that the Japanese Government considers such trespasses to constitute a grave menace to the security of Japan. It has further noted the request of the Japanese Government that the United States authorities take effective and appropriate measures to repel similar violations of Japan's territorial air should they occur in the future.

In accordance with the request of the Japanese Government the United States Government has instructed the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, with all practicable assistance from the Japanese Government, to take all possible measures necessary and proper under terms of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan dated September 8, 1951, to repel all such violations of Japan's territorial air.

51. AMERICAN RIGHTS IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS: Note From the Secretary of State to the Japanese Prime Minister,3 August 8, 1953 4

5

The Government of the United States desires to relinquish its rights under article 3 of the peace treaty over the Amami Oshima group in favor of the resumption by Japan of authority over these

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1953, pp. 134–135.

2 Note of Jan. 13, 1953; ibid., p. 134.

3 Shigeru Yoshida.

Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 208.
Supra, pp. 425–440.

islands as soon as necessary arrangements can be concluded with the Government of Japan.

With respect to the other islands included under article 3 of the Japanese peace treaty, it will be necessary during the present international tensions in the Far East for the United States to maintain the degree of control and authority now exercised. The United States will thus be able to carry out more effectively its responsibilities under the security treaty between the United States and Japan to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the area. Meanwhile, the United States will make increased efforts to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of these islands.

52. THE MILITARY SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF JAPAN: Joint Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and the Personal Representative 2 of the Japanese Prime Minister, October 30, 1953 3

1

Mr. Hayato Ikeda, the personal representative of th Prime Minister of Japan, and his party had a series of conferences with Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and other officials of the United States Government during the past four weeks.

The talks covered various interrelated problems of mutual interest such as Japan's defense buildup, United States assistance, settlement for United States postwar economic aid (GARIOA), foreign investment, and trade with Communist China. The informal exchange of views on these subjects was most profitable and lays the ground work for further cooperation between the two countries. The discussions were exploratory and no agreements were entered into. Certain general understandings are set forth below.

The conferees agreed on the necessity of increasing Japan's selfdefense forces in order to protect her from possible aggression, and to reduce the United States burden related to the defense of Japan. It was, however, noted that under present circumstances there are constitutional, economic, budgetary and other limitations which will not allow the immediate building of Japan's self-defense forces to a point sufficient for Japan's defense. With due regard to these limitations, continued effort on the part of Japan will be made to expedite the build-up. Subject to necessary Congressional authorization, the United States conferees offered to assist Japan ia developing the Japanese forces by supplying major items of military equipment for the land, sea and air forces which Japan raises.

Questions relating to Japanese defense forces and United States military assistance will be discussed further in Tokyo in the near

1 Walter S. Robertson.

2 Hayato Ikeda.

3 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1953, pp. 637–638.

future by representatives of the two governments with a view to reaching a definite understanding.

The conferees agreed that a reduction in Japan's contribution to the support of United States forces should be considered from time to time in the light of the development of Japan's own forces. It was also agreed that the withdrawal of the United States forces from Japan would be effected as the Japanese forces develop the capability to defend their country.

The conferees considered that $50 million is a reasonable target amount for commodities to be supplied to Japan under Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act. It is contemplated that the local currency proceeds of the sale of such agricultural products will be used to help develop the defense production and the industrial potential of Japan through offshore procurement and investment. Necessary arrangements will be executed to cover the requirements of Section 550 and the related defense support activities.

The conferees recognized that pending a political settlement in Korea it is important to maintain a high level of controls over trade with Communist China. However, the implications of these controls for Japanese trade are such that the United States and Japan will continue current consultations on the items to be controlled.

The United States conferees attached great importance to an early settlement for GARIOA aid. It was agreed to hold a meeting in Tokyo in the near future between representatives of the United States and Japan with a view to reaching an agreement on the settlement.

As to foreign investment in Japan, the investment guaranty program under the Mutual Security Act and the Contact Clearing House Service, as well as the services of the United States Department of Commerce, were suggested as helpful measures to be taken on the side of the United States, while willingness on the part of Japan to liberalize Japanese laws and regulations pertaining to foreign investments was expressed by the Japanese conferees in order to create a better climate for foreign investment.

The Japanese conferees expressed their belief that vigorous efforts on the part of Japan to resist inflation are most important in order to strengthen Japan's economic position and to promote further economic cooperation between the United States and Japan.

It was gratifying for all the conferees to learn that while they were in conference the $40 million loans for Japanese thermal electric projects were signed by the International Bank and Japanese representatives, and that the $60 million cotton credit to Japan was announced by the Export-Import Bank of Washington.3

1 Infra, pp. 3085-3086.

Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1953, p. 878.
Ibid., May 11, 1953, pp. 681-682.

53. RESTORATION OF JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AMAMI OSHIMA ISLANDS (RYUKYU GROUP): Statement by the Secretary of State, December 24, 1953 1

1. By arrangements concluded today in Tokyo,2 the Government. of the United States has relinquished in favor of Japan its rights under article III of the Japanese peace treaty over the Amami Oshima group of the Ryukyu Islands.

2. Questions have been raised regarding the intentions of the United States with respect to the remaining islands specified in article III of the peace treaty.3

3. The United States Government believes that it is essential to the success of the cooperative effort of the free nations of Asia and of the world in the direction of peace and security, that the United States continue to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands and in the other islands specified in article III of the peace treaty so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.

4. The United States earnestly hopes that progress can be made in reducing tensions, and we will spare no effort toward that end. But, until conditions of genuine stability and confidence are created, the need of the free nations to preserve an armed vigilance will remain imperative. It would be an abdication of responsibility to the common effort of these free nations, including Japan, for the United States to adopt any other course than here set out, since the remaining Ryukyuan and other islands specified in article III of the peace treaty constitute an essential link in the strategic defense of the whole Pacific area. Accordingly, the United States intends to remain as custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future. However, in exercising its treaty rights, the United States will not only do all in its power to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus, but it will continue to safeguard economic and cultural intercourse throughout the Archipelago.

54. THE NEED FOR A STRONG JAPAN: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, February 6, 1954 (Excerpt) 5

We gave strong encouragement during the Occupation to Japan's recovery from the war, advancing about $2 billion to that end. We moved to break up those overconcentrations, or monopolies, of power-economic, political, and military-that had deprived the 1 Department of State, Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 17.

2 TIAS 2895; 4 UST, pt. 2, p. 2912.

3 For the text of article III of the Japanese peace treaty, see supra, pp. 426–427. 4 Walter S. Robertson.

5 Made before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1954, pp. 229–233.

Japanese people of their rights and opportunities in the years before the war and had led Japan to disaster. It is a conviction of the American people that a stable and progressive society is one in which economic and political power is widely dispersed. This is, of course, one of our outstanding points of difference with the Marxists, whose practice-whatever their theory-is to concentrate ever more power in ever fewer hands for the benefit of an ever smaller number of people.

If I may further condense the statement of our objective in the Occupation, I should say that it was to promote the creation of a strong Japan, in the true and best sense of the word. Unfortunately, a cardinal element of strength was left out of our concept. We and our allies, including those who had been occupied by the Japanese Army, did that which had come to be normal after total war: We totally disarmed the enemy. In addition, Japan with our encouragement renounced military forces in its Constitution. It was not that we wished to leave Japan helpless in the face of deadly danger. On the contrary. We failed to recognize that there was such a danger or to realize what kind of world we were living in and were to live in. We put our faith in the partnership of the United Nations, which had been forged in a war against aggression. We did not discriminate against Japanese safety; we impartially rushed to disarm ourselves as well.

The Japanese are now entirely in command of their country. Our relations with them are those of collaboration between friends and equals. The American troops in Japan are there for the same reason and on the same basis as those in Western Europe-in recognition that the problem of defense against aggression today transcends nationality and does not permit any of us the luxury of living unto himself. As far as we are concerned, nothing in our relations with Japan today reflects the relationship of winner or loser, occupier or occupied. I trust that the great majority of Japanese feel this statement is true.

Today, our hopes for Japan are the same as those of the Occupation. We should like to see a strong Japan, and a Japan whose strength includes adequate defense forces. This is, of course, our policy with respect to all free peoples. I think we have proved that we should like to see all the free peoples grow in strength. But our hopes for Japan have a special meaning and urgency. For in all the expanse of Asia, from the Urals and the Persian Gulf on the west to the Pacific on the east, Japan is alone in being an exporter of the industrial revolution, of its science, its technology, its skills, its machines, its manufactured goods. The other Asian countries are, without exception, net importers of those things.

Whenever we speak in this vein we can count on hearing the cry, "the United States wants to use Japan in its fight with the Communists." I think we should hit this facile slander on two sides. First, we should take every opportunity to make clear that the conflict

1 See The Constitution of Japan, Effective May 3, 1947 (Department of State publication 2836; 1947).

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