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The basic problems of Japanese security were discussed. The Foreign Minister indicated that Japan's defense strength has now reached a considerable level and expressed the firm determination that the policy of progressive increase will be continued within the limit of Japan's capacity. He explained the plans for increasing Japan's defense capabilities recently formulated by the Japanese defense authorities. It was agreed that these plans should be studied in the course of the continuing consultations in Tokyo on United States-Japanese defense relationships and should be reviewed from time to time in the light of strategic requirements.

It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on a cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as rapidly as possible, assume primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed that when such conditions are brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality.

With the conclusion of such a treaty as an objective, it was further agreed that consultations would take place in Tokyo between Japanese and United States representatives on defense problems and that in such consultations consideration will be given to the establishment of schedules for the progressive withdrawal of United States ground forces as Japan's own defense capacity increases and taking into account the related situation in Asia.

On the problem of Japan's financial contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan, there was agreement on the desirability of establishing a general formula for progressive reduction over the next several years.

The Foreign Minister emphasized Japan's need to expand its trade with other countries particularly in Asia and expressed appreciation for the help of the United States in assisting Japan to become a full member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.2

Secretary Dulles expressed current thinking about assistance for the economic development of the free nations of Asia pursuant to United States legislation. It was recognized that the measures planned would facilitate Japan's efforts to improve its economic position and attain a higher standard of living. The Secretary stressed the contribution to economic development which could be made by foreign private investment both in Japan and in other countries of the

area.

The Foreign Minister requested the early release of war criminals under United States jurisdiction. The Secretary of State described the complexity of the problem and indicated that the question of the release of the war criminals will be kept under continuous and urgent examination.

It was agreed that no major obstacles remain to settlement for economic assistance rendered to Japan during the occupation and

1 Supra, pp. 885-886.

2 See statement of July 22, 1955, by the Department of State; supra.

that utmost efforts will be made to bring the negotiations in Tokyo on this subject between the two Governments to an early conclusion. Throughout these talks the representatives of the United States and Japan recognized that Japan, as a major power in Asia, should play an active role in friendly cooperation with other Asian nations in contributing to stability and peace in Asia. They agreed that in view of Japan's efforts to establish internal stability, reconstruct the national economy and strengthen its defense capacity, there is a firmer basis for continuing cooperation between the United States and Japan. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles confirmed anew the determination of their Governments to expand this relationship further so that they together and with others may pursue their work for the consolidation of world peace and freedom.

E. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AND COMMUNIST CHINA

Immediate Results of Communist Seizure of Mainland China, 1950

60. UNITED STATES POLICY RESPECTING THE STATUS OF FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Statement by the President, January 5, 19501

The United States Government has always stood for good faith in international relations. Traditional United States policy toward China, as exemplified in the open-door policy, called for international respect for the territorial integrity of China. This principle was recently reaffirmed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 8, 1949, which, in part, calls on all states—

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To refrain from (a) seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign controlled regimes within the territory of China; (b) seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China.3

A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa. In the joint declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943, the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of China stated that it was

1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 727-728.

2 See Secretary Hay's instruction of Sept. 6, 1899, to the American Ambassador in Great Britain and his circular instructions of Mar. 20, 1900, and July 3, 1900; United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Department of State publication 3573; 1949), pp. 414-417.

3 Res. 291 (IV); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 726-727. ♦ Ibid., p. 22.

their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China. The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945,1 which declared that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender.2 In keeping with these declarations, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,3 and for the past 4 years, the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island.

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the Island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program

of economic assistance.

61. ELABORATION OF POLICY RESPECTING THE STATUS OF FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Remarks by the Secretary of State at a Special News Conference, January 5, 1950 +

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I am having this conference this afternoon at the request and at the direction of the President for the purpose of going into the background of the statement which he made this morning on the subject of Formosa.5

I should like to make a few remarks on this subject for the purpose of trying to put it in its setting for you, and then we will get down into such details as you want to get into.

Why was the statement made at this particular time? That is a question that arises in all of your minds and I want to recall to you that I have said very often in these meetings that the foreign policy of the United States is determined not merely by what the State Department says, or not even by what the President says, and not even by what the Congress says, but reflects the sum total of the activities, thoughts, and speech of the American people. For the past week or

1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 49–50.

2 Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; ibid., pp: 625-626.

3 See General Order No. 1 by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, Sept. 2, 1945; The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. II, pp. 442-445.

Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1950, pp. 79–81.

5 Supra.

415900-57-vol. 251

10 days, this subject of Formosa has become one of the foremost subjects of discussion throughout the country.

The ordinary processes of life in this town of Washington have made their contribution. We have had leak and counterleak, gossip and countergossip. We have had the contributions of distinguished statesmen in the debate. We have had a great deal of talk in the press and on the radio. Much of that is good and much of that is desirable, and all of it has to go on to make the United States the democracy that it is. But we slide very easily from discussion to the statement of fact. I have here a distinguished foreign newspaper dated Friday last [December 30] which announces as a fact that President Truman has decided, et cetera, and et cetera, giving something which President Truman had not decided and had not intended to decide. Therefore, what has occurred is that we have gotten a great deal of confusion in the minds of our own people. We have gotten a great deal of confusion in the minds of foreign people. We have stirred up a good deal of speculation, all of which, if allowed to continue, would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the United States of America. And therefore, it was the President's desire to clarify the situation. He was not primarily concerned in stating anything new, and you will find very little which is new in the statement. What he was interested

in doing was bringing clarity out of confusion.

That, I think, gives you the background as to why it was necessary to make the statement at the present time. It would have been desirable from our point of view if the whole question of the Far East, and all of the parts of the Far East and of Formosa, which after all is a small part of the great question of the Far East, could have been discussed very fully with members of both parties on the Hill before any statement was made. But one has to choose in this life, and it was more important to clarify thinking than it was to go on and have the most desirable of all possible things which is consultation. Now, getting down to this statement, let's be clear about one or two things. There has been a great deal of amateur military strategy. indulged in in regard to this matter of Formosa. The underlying factors in the decision are not in that area. They have to do with the fundamental integrity of the United States and with maintaining in the world the belief that when the United States takes a position it sticks to that position and does not change it by reason of transitory expediency or advantage on its part. If we are going to maintain the free nations of the world as a great unit opposed to the encroachment of communism and other sorts of totalitarian aggression, the world must believe that we stand for principle and that we are honorable and decent people and that we do not put forward words, as propagandists do in other countries, to serve their advantage only to throw them overboard when some change in events makes the position difficult for us.

We believe in integrity in our foreign relations. We believe also in respect of the integrity of other countries. That is a view not held by some other countries. That is a view not held by some other countries with respect to China.

It is important that our position in regard to China should never be subject to the slightest doubt or the slightest question.

Now, what has that position been? In the middle of the war, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the President of China agreed at Cairo that among the areas stolen from China by Japan was Formosa and Formosa should go back to China.

As the President pointed out this morning, that statement was incorporated in the declaration at Potsdam and that declaration at Potsdam was conveyed to the Japanese as one of the terms of their surrender and was accepted by them, and the surrender was made on that basis.

Shortly after that, the Island of Formosa was turned over to the Chinese in accordance with the declarations made and with the conditions of the surrender.

The Chinese have administered Formosa for 4 years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority and that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any lawyers' doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments.

Now, in the opinion of some, the situation is changed. They believe that the forces now in control of the mainland of China, the forces which undoubtedly will soon be recognized by some other countries, are not friendly to us, and therefore they want to say, "Well, we have to wait for a treaty." We did not wait for a treaty on Korea. We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.+

Whatever may be the legal situation, the United States of America, Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyers' words about the integrity of its position. That is where we stand. Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa. We are not going to attempt to seize the Island. We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the Island of Formosa. So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever believed that we should involve our forces in the island.

I do not believe that is new policy. It would be new policy if we decided to do that. The President is affirming what so far as I know

1 Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 625-626.

2 General Order No. 1 provided that Soviet forces should receive the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel and that American forces should receive the Japanese surrender south of that line. After efforts to unite the country had failed because of Soviet obstruction, free elections were held in South Korea under U. N. supervision, May 10, 1948. The Republic of Korea, established, Aug. 15, 1948, as a result of these elections, was subsequently recognized by the United States and the United Nations.

3 General Order No. 1 provided that Soviet forces should receive the Japanese surrender in the Kuriles.

* General Order No. 1 provided that American forces should receive the Japanese surrender in the Mandated Islands (now known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands).

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