Since the capacity of the Chinese Government to maintain and operate naval vessels had been taxed to the full by early transfers under the agreement, the Chinese Government requested an extension of the agreed-upon date-July 1, 1948 by which time transfers of vessels in the Philippines were to have been effected. (Under terms of the agreement the Chinese had 120 days after the transfer of a vessel to effect its movement.) This Government agreed to an extension of the transfer date until September 1, 1948, for 10 of the ships in the Philippines. Two of the seven vessels not transferred, the YMS 2017 and the SC 518, were either forced aground or sunk during the typhoon season. The other five were found to need reconditioning. The Chinese Navy did not avail itself of transfer rights on these vessels.

No further transfers of vessels pursuant to the December 8, 1947, agreement are contemplated.

Question 2 (b)

Have the Chinese Communist forces obtained, and are they obtaining, amphibious assault equipment from the Soviet Union or elsewhere?

Comment.-There have been many reports of varying degrees of reliability on this subject, many of which have appeared in the press. The Communist authorities have publicly announced that the capture of Formosa is now a major military objective and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the Communists are making all possible efforts to prepare the necessary amphibious assault equipment.

Question 2 (c)

Has the United States Government made any statement with respect to the recognition of the Communist regime by the United Kingdom?

Comment. In response to a question by a correspondent, the State Department spokesman on January 6, 1950, replied as follows:

"The American position on recognition has been previously stated.

"As has been previously announced, we have been in consultation with the British and other governments regarding this subject and each government has made its views known. The decision by a government whether to withhold or grant recognition to a new government is an exercise of a basic sovereign right and each government must make its own decision in the light of the situation as it sees it and of its own circumstances. It is the United States position that recognition of a government in no way constitutes or implies approval of that government. This is a widely held principle. The governments with whom we have been in consultation all seem to have the same ultimate objective of a stable, independent China free of foreign domination."

Question 2 (d)

Has the United States Government formulated its attitude with respect to admission of the Communist regime in China to the UN?

Comment.-The United States Government has formulated its attitude on this question and that attitude may be summarized as follows:

The United States Government recognizes the National Government as the Government of China and has instructed United States representatives at the UN to vote against motions which would have the effect of depriving National Government representatives of the seat which they are entitled to occupy in the Security Council or in other UN organs.

A motion to unseat a National Government representative or to seat a Chinese Communist representative is, in our view, a procedural matter for it relates to the internal organization of a UN organ. Under article 27 of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of any seven members and there is no right of veto. If this were not the case any permanent member could by its single vote decide in effect that one of two claimants should represent a member, even a permanent member of the Security Council. In other UN organs procedural matters are determined by a simple majority vote.

If a UN organ should vote in accordance with its rules of procedure to seat a Chinese Communist representative we would accept the will of the majority and continue active participation in such organs fulfilling in good faith our duties as a

UN member. Such action on our part would, of course, not constitute recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.

Question 2 (e)

What areas in Asia come within the scope of the Truman doctrine?1

Comment. The interrelated concepts of supporting those peoples who are resisting subjugation, of assisting free peoples to work out their own destinies, and of aiding, primarily through economic and financial means, in the establishment of economic and political stability, are basic to the policies of this Government with respect to Asia no less than to other parts of the world.

This has been evidenced by such actions as the Point IV proposals, aid to the recognized Government of China, economic aid to Korea, the steps taken in Japan to restore economic stability and to foster democratic institutions and ideas, and the encouragement of peaceful settlements in such areas as Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.

It is axiomatic that the application of these fundamental concepts must be adapted in the light of particular circumstances in various areas. Obviously certain programs which are effective in Europe, for example, may not necessarily be equally effective in Asia. Similarly, to consider Asia as a homogeneous entity would dangerously oversimplify a complex situation. In the formulation of its policies, this Government must take into consideration the diversities in peoples, problems, and opportunities existing not only between other areas of the world and Asia, but also within Asia itself. For example, as Secretary Acheson stated in his recent address to the Press Club, there is a "great difference between our responsibility and our opportunity in the northern part of the Pacific area and in the southern part of the Pacific area." 2

The Department is constantly studying those problems related to the foreign policy of this Government in order to determine how these basic concepts may best be applied to specific areas throughout both Asia and the rest of the world.

64. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 14, 1950 3

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;

Filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression;

Imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations organization;

1 See President Truman's message to Congress, Mar. 12, 1947; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1253-1257.

2 Address of Jan. 12, 1950; supra, pp. 2310-2322.

3 The American Journal of International Law, vol. 44, no.3, July 1950, pp. 84-86.

Profoundly convinced that the consolidation of good neighborly relations and friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China;

Resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and appointed as their plenipotentiary representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China-Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China;

Who, after exchange of their credentials, found in due form and good order, agreed upon the following:

Article I

Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the spirit of sincere cooperation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these tasks.

Article II

Both the High Contracting Parties undertake by means of mutual agreement to strive for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, jointly with the other Powers which were allies during the Second World War.

Article III

Both High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any alliance directed against the other High Contracting Party, and not to take part in any coalition or in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article IV

Both High Contracting Parties will consult each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, being guided by the interests of the consolidation of peace and universal security.

Article V

Both the High Contracting Parties undertake, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual interests, and also mutual respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party-to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other every possible economic assistance, and to carry out the necessary economic cooperation.

Article VI

The present Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification; the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Peking.1

The present Treaty will be valid for 30 years. If neither of the High Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of this term of its desire to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for another five years and will be extended in compliance with this rule.

Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

65. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND RELATED AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, March 15, 1950 (Excerpt) 2

Since I spoke in January on the Far East 3 there has been one new and clear indication of Soviet Russia's intentions in China. We see it in the published terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, and the other agreements concluded and announced at the same time.1

The Soviet Union and its most ardent supporters in China may have temporary success in persuading the people of China that these agreements refute the contention of the non-Communist world that alliance with Soviet Russia holds an evil omen of imperialistic domination. These agreements promise help in the rehabilitation of

1 Communist China ratified the treaty, Apr. 10, 1950. The treaty entered into force, Apr. 11, 1950, when the Soviet Union completed its ratification procedure. 2 Delivered before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 27, 1950, pp. 468–469.

3 See supra, pp. 2310-2322.

For the texts of the two related agreements (a) on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny; and (b) on the granting of credits to Communist China, both signed at Moscow, Feb. 14, 1950, see The American Journal of International Law, vol. 44, no. 3, July, 1950, pp. 86-90.

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China's war-torn and impoverished economy. They promise, in particular, assistance in the repair and development of China's railroads and industry. The Chinese people may welcome these promises and assurances. But they will not fail, in time, to see where they fall short of China's real needs and desires. And they will wonder about the points upon which the agreements remain silent. Now, let us examine these assurances and promises of economic aid. First, Soviet Russia has promised to return certain Manchurian property but not the industrial equipment robbed by the Red Army in 1945. Is this aid? Is it even a belated admission of a theft which deprived not only China but all of Asia of some 2 billion dollars worth of productive capacity?

Second, Soviet Russia extends to China a 300 million dollars 5-year credit at an interest rate of 1 percent yearly. This works out at 60 million dollars each year. This announcement was made only to be followed by the news that the ruble was to be revalued, thus cutting down the effective aid by one-fourth if the new dollar-ruble rate should be applied to this credit. Thus, the Chinese people may find Soviet Russia's credit to be no more than 45 million dollars per year. They can compare this with a grant-not a loan of 400 million dollars voted by the American Congress to China in the single year 1948.1

China's needs are great and pressing. China today faces a prospect of 40 million people suffering from hunger between now and the next crops. Millions may die. And yet, food moves from China to the Soviet Union.

China's need for development capital runs into billions of dollars. In its issue of February 25, the London Economist makes the following penetrating analysis of Chinese needs and hopes and the extent to which they have been dashed by the agreements with Moscow:

it has not been the purpose of modern-minded Chinese to stagnate in the backwardness of a pre-industrial era; for many years they have been possessed by the dream of a rapid industrialisation whereby China would break out from its old weakness and poverty and take a place among the nations more in keeping with its vast population and considerable natural resources. There is, indeed, no sign at all of a great programme of industrialisation to be carried through with Russian aid; the idea seems rather to make China's economy more "colonial" than before, so that it can provide foodstuffs and raw materials for the new industrial areas of Siberia.

The more fanatical of the Communist leaders may be content with this, but it must bring a bitter disillusionment to many progressive Chinese who have supported the Communists against the Kuomintang in the belief that the new revolution would clear away obstacles to China's economic development. The new rulers of China have deliberately cut off their country from the possibility

1 See section, "Assistance to China," of title I of the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949 (PL 793, 80th Cong., 2d sess., June 28, 1948; 62 Stat. 1054).