69. AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP FOR THE PEOPLES OF CHINA: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,1 May 18, 1951 2

I should like, first of all, to congratulate the China Institute on its quarter century of splendid public service and to compliment you who are responsible for this timely chance to recall the warm friendship which has marked the relations between the Chinese and American people throughout the last two centuries.

Something of what we have in mind this evening is contained in a concurrent resolution which passed the Senate on May 4 and which is now before the House of Representatives, which reads in part:3

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, and declares

That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war

Despite the artificial barriers which now separate us from most of the peoples of China, we meet to reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for the people of China.

Most of you here this evening are better qualified than I to explore the origins and elements of Chinese-American friendship. Over the centuries, this friendship has come to be taken for granted; cordial sentiments between a free China and a free America became strong and durable because they were constantly nourished by common purposes and common practical interests.

We and the Chinese, for example, have had a vital interest in the peace of the Pacific. Each of us wants security on our Pacific flank and wants to be able to look across those vast waters to find strength, independence, and good will in its great neighbor on the other side. It was inevitable that the driving force of Japanese militarism would sooner or later bring China and America together to oppose it, just as we had moved 40 years earlier to support China's independence and integrity against threats from Europe. The same issues are now posed again and are made more difficult to deal with because foreign encroachment is now being arranged by Chinese who seem to love China less than they do their foreign masters.

1 Dean Rusk.

Made before the China Institute, New York; Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1951, pp. 846-848. See also statement of May 21, 1951, by the Department of State (ibid., May 28, 1951) and remarks by the Secretary of State on June 1, 1951 (Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area, part 3, pp. 1737-1739). 3 Resolution of June 26, 1951 (65 Stat. B69–B70; supra, pp. 1952–1954).

We meet here this evening to reaffirm our friendship with the Chinese people-but not merely as a routine and elegant expression of good will. For the friendship we have taken for granted for so long is now being attacked with every available weapon by those who have come to power on the mainland of China. Their sustained and violent effort to erase all evidence of this friendship bears powerful witness to the validity and strength of the bonds between our two peoples. American influence among the Chinese people is intolerable to those in power in Peiping and Moscow because they know, and quite rightly, that the idea of national and individual freedom which is at the heart of American political thought is the greatest threat to their own evil purposes.

Is the message of this meeting this evening to our friends in China prompted solely by narrowly conceived American interests? That important American interests are involved, there can be no doubt. But our historical relations with China have always reflected a high regard on our part for Chinese interests, and it is these we ask our friends in China now to consider.

The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world, there is room for only one master-a jealous and implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese, in one community after another, are now being destroyed because they love China more than the Soviet Union? How many Chinese will remember in time the fates of Rajk, Kostov, Petkov, Clementis, and all those in other satellites who discovered that being Communist is not enough for the conspirators of the Kremlin?

The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria, Siberia or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech-these are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty promises.

The territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. The movement of Soviet forces into Sinkiang, the realities of "joint exploitation" of that great province by Moscow and Peiping, the separation of Inner Mongolia from the body politic of China, and the continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression mean in fact that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Are our Chinese friends reflecting upon the maps of China now being published on the mainland which show Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and areas in the west and southwest as something distinct from China? Are our friends in China impressed by trade union buttons appearing on the streets of Peiping which no longer show Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia on the map of China? Have the authorities in Peiping themselves fully considered what it means for them to have Soviet troops on Chinese soil, in the light of the experience of the miserable satellites of Eastern Europe?

The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese youths are being sacrificed in a fiery furnace, pitting their waves of human flesh against the fire power of modern weapons and without heavy equipment, adequate supply, or the most elementary medical attention. Apart from Korea, the Chinese are being pressed to aggressive action in other areas-all calculated to divert the attention and energies of China away from the encroachments of Soviet imperialism upon China itself.

I find it hard to believe that the Chinese people will acquiesce in the kind of future which their masters are now preparing for them. I find it impossible to believe that our friends in China have given up their desire to live at peace with their neighbors, to play a major role as a peaceful member of the international community of nations, to trade freely with all the world, to improve their own conditions in accordance with their own needs, aspirations and traditions, to maintain their independence as a nation, to preserve their territorial integrity, and to live out their lives in dignity and with the respect of their fellow

men.

Events in China must surely challenge the concern of Chinese everywhere-in Formosa, on the mainland, and in overseas communities. There is a job to be done for China which only the Chinese can do a job which will require sustained energy, continued sacrifice, and an abundance of the high courage with which so many Chinese have fought for so long during the struggles of the past decades. The rest of us cannot tell them exactly what is to be done or how. We cannot provide a formula to engage the unity of effort among all Chinese who love their country. But one thing we can say as the Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes-they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go into specific elements of our own national policy in the present situation. But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government-a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct-the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly embarked.

We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We

believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.

If the Chinese people decide for freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who have known and love freedom. They shall find added strength from those who refuse to believe that China is fated to become a land of tyranny and aggression and who expect China to fulfill the promise of its great past.

70. REVISED MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTH FLEET IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Message by the President to the Congress, February 2, 1953 (Excerpt) 1

In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.2

This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China. Regardless of the situation of 1950, since the date of that order the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea to attack the United Nations forces there. They have consistently rejected the proposals of the United Nations Command for an armistice. They recently joined with Soviet Russia in rejecting the armistice proposal sponsored in the United Nations by the Government of India. This proposal had been accepted by the United States and 53 other nations.

Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear: This order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.

1 H. Doc. 75, 83d Cong., 1st sess. For more complete text of the President's message, see supra, pp. 61-65.

2 Statement by the President, June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 66. See Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 74-78.

Communist Charges of United States Aggression in the Formosa (Taiwan) Area

71. UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMUNIST CHARGES: Statement by the Department of State, August 24, 19501

The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the Formosa problem. By direction of the President, Ambassador Austin notified the Security Council at once of the action taken by the United States on June 27.2 In the President's statement of that same date, it was indicated that the problem is one which might be considered by the United Nations.3

Of course, the Security Council should not be diverted from the urgent business already on its agenda, the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

72. REFUTATION OF THE COMMUNIST CHARGES: Letter From the United States Representative at the United Nations to the Secretary-General, August 25, 1950 (Excerpts) 5

There has been circulated to members of the Security Council a paper which charges the United States with aggression against Formosa. The paper asks the Security Council to consider the question of Formosa.

6

The United States Government does not intend to discuss at this time this paper or the ridiculous falsehoods which it contains. It does wish to take this occasion to make a further statement about the Formosan question.

On June 27 the United States representative read at the Security Council the following statement of the President of the United States:

[There follows the text of the President's statement as printed, infra, pp. 2539-2540.]

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 4, 1950, p. 395.

2 Supra, doc. 66.

See Ambassador Austin's statement of June 27, 1950; Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, pp. 6-8.

• Warren R. Austin.

5 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 11, 1950, pp. 411-412.

Message of Aug. 24, 1950, from Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Premier and Foreign Minister, to Yakov Malik, President of the Security Council; ibid., Oct. 16, 1950, p. 607.