網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

Since then, the President of the United States on July 19 made the following declaration in a message to the Congress:

[There follows a portion of the text of the President's message as printed, infra, pp. 2552–2560.]

These statements and the facts to which they related make perfectly clear certain fundamental points which the people of the world will have clearly in mind:

1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations Forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China.2 Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be or will be diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic See Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950; infra, pp. 25382539 and 2540-2541.

2 General Assembly Res. 291 (IV), Dec. 8, 1949; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 726–727.

of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression. Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the President of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda which is the Complaint of Aggression Against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

I request that this letter be circulated to members of the Security Council.

[The United Nations considered three items relating to Formosa: (1) The Chinese Communist complaint regarding “armed invasion of Formosa", submitted August 24, 1950. On November 30, 1950, the Security Council rejected by a 9-1-1 vote a Soviet resolution which would have condemned the United States.

(2) The Soviet complaint of "aggression against China by the United States of America", submitted September 20, 1950. The First Committee of the General Assembly rejected a Soviet resolution on this subject by a vote of 49-5-3 (February 1, 1951). The General Assembly itself rejected the same resolution on February 1, 1951, by a similar margin.

(3) The question of Formosa, submitted by the United States September 20, 1950 (supra, pp. 174-175). After hearing Mr. Dulles' statement of November 15, 1950 (infra, doc. 74), the First Committee decided to postpone consideration_of_the question. On February 7, 1951, the First Committee adopted a British proposal to adjourn discussion sine die.

For information regarding the discussion of these items, see United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178; 1951); ibid., 1951 (Department of State publication 4583; 1952); Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1950–30 June 1951 (General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 1; U. N. doc. A/1844); and Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, Covering the period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951 (ibid., Supplement No. 2; U. N. doc. A/1783). See also statement of Nov. 28, 1950 by Ambassador Austin regarding the Chinese Communist charges; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1950, pp. 929-936.]

73. UNITED STATES REQUEST THAT THE "QUESTION OF FORMOSA" BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, September 21, 19501

2

In accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, the Delegation of the United States offers the following observations in connection with and in support of its request that the

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, pp. 607–608.

See the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (U. N, doc. A/520; Dec. 12, 1947).

"question of Formosa" be placed on the agenda of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly as an additional item of an important and urgent character within the meaning of Rule 15.

In the joint Declaration at Cairo of 1 December 1943,' the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of China stated

It is their purpose that . . . Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. . . The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

In the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945,2 defining the terms for Japanese surrender the three Allied leaders declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this Proclamation were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender. General Order No. 1 of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued pursuant to the terms of surrender provided for the surrender of the Japanese Forces in China (excluding Manchuria) and Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act. For the past five years, Chinese authority has been exercised over the island."

On 25 June 1950, a breach of the peace occurred in the Pacific area in the form of an armed attack against the Republic of Korea. In the resolution adopted on that day, the Security Council took the first step toward restoring the peace. On 27 June, the President of the United States stated that the North Korean forces had

... defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operation against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

5

The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

1 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22.

2 Ibid., pp. 49–50.

3 The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, vol. II, p. 442. + Infra, pp. 2538-2539.

See supra, doc. 66.

The limited question, that of charges of the Peiping Regime against the United States, as set forth in document S/1715, remains before the Security Council. The United States considers that the General Assembly could make an important contribution towards carrying out the purpose and principles of the United Nations in the Pacific Area if it should study the general situation with respect to Formosa with a view to formulating appropriate recommendations.

74. POSTPONEMENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF THE "QUESTION OF FORMOSA" (TAIWAN): Statements by the United States Representative 2 Before the General Assembly, November 15, 1950 3

3

I am going to suggest that we should defer and put to a later place on our agenda this item of the question of Formosa.

We put the item of the question of Formosa on the agenda because, as our Secretary of State said in his opening statement to the Assembly in general debate,

It is the belief of my Government that the problem of Formosa and the nearly 8 million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or by unilateral action. We believe that the international community has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means.1

That is basically the reason, Mr. Chairman, why we asked that this item be placed on the agenda, and we still believe that the item should stay on the agenda.

We do, however, suggest that it should not be considered at the present time.

When the Secretary of State spoke, as I indicated, in September, it seemed at that time that there was a reasonable prospect that peace and security would be reestablished in Korea speedily and satisfactorily by the action of the United Nations and its forces there. I am sorry to say that that prospect has now been, in recent days, considerably changed by the rapid and substantial increase of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The situation that results creates a very serious problem both for the United Nations and for my own Government.

A resolution dealing with the intervention in Korea is now pending before the Security Council and is being considered."

[Later in the debate, Mr. Dulles made the following remarks responding to a Soviet statement.]"

If the delegate of the Soviet Union understood correctly the interpretation of what I said, I had not said that this question should be

1 See Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 607.

2 John Foster Dulles.

3 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 911.

Statement of Sept. 20, 1950; supra, pp. 169-179.

5 Draft resolution of Nov. 10, 1950; infra, pp. 2583-2584. Note in Department of State Bulletin.

postponed until there could be an arrival here of the representatives of the Chinese so-called government.

I am quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that the interpreters could not fall into such a grievous error. I am quite sure that what Mr. Malik says he thinks I said is a case of the wish perhaps being followed by the thought. It is not a case of error by the interpreters.

I never suggested in any degree whatsoever that the motivation for my proposal for adjournment was to allow the Chinese Communists to get here. Quite the contrary, the one reason I hesitated to urge the adjournment was that it might be interpreted, as it has been misinterpreted-I am afraid-deliberately by the honorable delegate of the Soviet Union.

What I did say was that, in the light of the conduct of this so-called government, things we can't shut our eyes to the intervention in north Korea, the invasion of Tibet, the great aid to Ho Chi-minh in Indochina, and the threats of invasion of Formosa-we face the situation, Mr. Chairman, of the risk, at least, that that whole area. may be engulfed in aggressive war.

If that is going to happen, then a discussion here of the long-range future of Formosa would be somewhat academic.

The primary task of the Security Council is to do everything it possibly can to be sure that that great disaster does not occur, and the only reason, Mr. Chairman, why I suggested the postponement of the discussion here was lest by misventure, in the course of our debate here, we might say something about this delicate problem which might make more difficult the already difficult enough task of the Security Council.

Attempts To Effect a Cease-Fire in the Formosa (Taiwan) Area, 1954-1955

[For texts of the Mutual Defense Treaty and exchange of notes between the United States and the Republic of China on Formosa (Taiwan), Dec. 2 and 10, 1954, see supra, pp. 945–949.]

75. RELATION OF THE TACHEN ISLANDS TO THE DEFENSE OF FORMOSA (TAIWAN): Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, January 18, 1955 (Excerpt) 1

1

Secretary Dulles was asked if he had any reports on the attempt of the Chinese Communists to take one of the offshore islands from the Nationalists. Secretary Dulles made the following reply:

I have had some reports about the fighting, which is rather severe

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 191–192.

415900-57—vol. 2—53

« 上一頁繼續 »