apparently around the island of I-chiang, an island which lies, I believe, about 8 miles to the north of the Tachen Islands.

Asked how important the Tachen Islands are to us, the Secretary replied:

I would not say that the Tachen Islands are in any sense essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, which we do regard as vital to us.

Asked whether they are useful in the defense of those places, Mr. Dulles replied:

Well, that would call for a military judgment rather than one I would want to try to express as a civilian. There is, I believe, on the island a radar point which is perhaps of some utility in picking up possible air attack against Formosa. It lies about 200 miles north of Formosa. But whether the Tachen radar could pick it up and get word to Formosa in advance of the detection of it by radar actually on Formosa I wouldn't know.

Asked whether it had any value to the United States position on Okinawa, the Secretary replied:

No.

Asked whether he was talking about the island that is currently under attack and whether it is considered one of the Tachen group or not, Secretary Dulles replied:

No, it is not one of the Tachen group. It is part of a group of islands most of which actually passed from Nationalist to Communist hands last May. There is a little group of four or five islands there, and most of them were taken over by the Communists about last May. The loss didn't attract any particular attention at that time. Since then, public opinion has been focused more on these little offshore islands than was the case last May. But the island itself (I-chiang) is without any particular importance. It is subject to artillery fire from some of these islands that were taken over last May, and it was not held by any regular forces of the Republic of China.

Asked whether it was correct to say that the Tachen Islands were not essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, the Secretary replied:

I didn't put it as flatly as that. I put it that that was a matter of military judgment. My own information is that the only relation that it has to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores is that there is a radar station on the island, and whether or not that radar station can usefully pick up a possible air attack against Formosa and relay knowledge of that to Formosa before that air attack could be detected by the radar on Formosa itself, that is something that I do not have

any precise knowledge of. I would say the relationship to the defense of Formosa was at the best marginal.

76. EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN DEFENSE OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Message by the President to the Congress, January 24, 19551

To the Congress of the United States:

The most important objective of our Nation's foreign policy is to safeguard the security of the United States by establishing and preserving a just and honorable peace. In the Western Pacific a situation is developing in the Formosa Straits that seriously imperils the peace and our security.

Since the end of Japanese hostilities in 1945, Formosa and the Pescadores have been in the friendly hands of our loyal ally, the Republic of China. We have recognized that it was important that these islands should remain in friendly hands. In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes, for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt north-south communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly

to us.

The United States and the friendly Government of the Republic of China, and indeed all the free nations, have a common interest that Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into the control of aggressive Communist forces.

Influenced by such considerations, our Government was prompt, when the Communists committed armed aggression in Korea in June 1950, to direct our Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from possible invasion from the Communist mainland.2

These considerations are still valid. The Seventh Fleet continues under Presidential directive to carry out that defensive mission.3 We also provide military and economic support to the Chinese Nationalist Government and we cooperate in every proper and feasible way with that Government in order to promote its security and stability. All of these military and related activities will be continued.

In addition, there was signed last December a Mutual Defense Treaty between this Government and the Republic of China, covering

1 H. Doc. No. 76, 84th Cong., 1st sess. See also resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; infra.

2 See President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950; supra, doc. 66.

* See President Eisenhower's message to Congress, Feb. 2, 1953; supra, pp.

Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores. It is a treaty of purely defensive character. That treaty is now before the Senate of the United States.

Meanwhile Communist China has pursued a series of provocative political and military actions, establishing a pattern of aggressive purpose. That purpose, they proclaim, is the conquest of Formosa. In September 1954 the Chinese Communists opened up heavy artillery fire upon Quemoy Island, one of the natural approaches to Formosa, which had for several years been under the uncontested control of the Republic of China. Then came air attacks of mounting intensity against other free China islands, notably those in the vicinity of the Tachen group to the north of Formosa. One small island (Ichiang) was seized last week by air and amphibious operations after a gallant few fought bravely for days against overwhelming odds. There have been recent heavy air attacks and artillery fire against the main Tachen Islands themselves.

The Chinese Communists themselves assert that these attacks are a prelude to the conquest of Formosa. For example, after the fall of Ichiang, the Peiping radio said that it showed a

determined will to fight for the liberation of Taiwan [Formosa]. Our people will use all their strength to fulfill that task.

Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and indeed to the peace of the world. We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.

Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the Armed Forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The actions that the United States must be ready to undertake are of various kinds. For example, we must be ready to assist the Republic of China to redeploy and consolidate its forces if it should so desire. Some of these forces are scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa. Because of the air situation in the area, withdrawals for the purpose of redeployment of Chinese Nationalist forces would be impractical without assistance of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Moreover, we must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action.

I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty

Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945–947.

now awaiting ratification. But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores. Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress can act I would not hesitate, so far as my constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the United States.

It

However, a suitable congressional resolution would clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to employ the Armed Forces of this Nation promptly and effectively for the purposes indicated if in his judgment it became necessary. would make clear the unified and serious intentions of our Government, our Congress, and our people. Thus it will reduce the possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States, and precipitate a major crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.

In the interest of peace, therefore, the United States must remove any doubt regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be required to carry out that purpose.

To make this plain requires not only Presidential action but also congressional action. In a situation such as now confronts us, and under modern conditions of warfare, it would not be prudent to await the emergency before coming to the Congress. Then it might be too late. Already the warning signals are flying.

I believe that the threatening aspects of the present situation, if resolutely faced, may be temporary in character. Consequently, I recommend that the resolution expire as soon as the President is able to report to the Congress that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions, resulting from United Nations action or otherwise.

Again I say that we would welcome action by the United Nations which might, in fact, bring an end to the active hostilities in the area. This critical situation has been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists, not by us. Their offensive military intent has been flaunted to the whole world by words and by deeds. Just as they created the situation, so they can end it if they so choose.

What we are now seeking is primarily to clarify present policy and to unite in its application. We are not establishing a new policy. Consequently, my recommendations do not call for an increase in the Armed Forces of the United States or any acceleration in military procurement or levels of defense production. If any unforeseen emergency arises requiring any change, I will communicate with the Congress. I hope, however, that the effect of an appropriate con

gressional resolution will be to calm the situation rather than to create further conflict.

One final point: The action I request is, of course, no substitute for the treaty with the Republic of China which we have signed and which I have transmitted to the Senate. Indeed, present circumstances make it more than ever important that this basic agreement should be promptly brought into force, as a solemn evidence of our determination to stand fast in the agreed treaty area and to thwart all attacks directed against it. If delay should make us appear indecisive in this basic respect, the pressures and dangers would surely

mount.

Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if, with your help, we demonstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

For the reasons outlined in this message, I respectfully request that the Congress take appropriate action to carry out the recommendations contained berein.

77. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT ÁREA: House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st Session), January 29, 19551

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

169 Stat. 7. See also White House statement of Jan. 27, 1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 7, 1955, pp. 213–214) and President Eisenhower's statement of Jan. 29, 1955 (ibid., p. 214).