Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955,1 submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

78. SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Remarks by the United States Representative 3 Before the Security Council, January 31, 1955 1

5

4

In the few remarks which I shall make I shall first refer to the item proposed by New Zealand and then to the item proposed by the Soviet Union."

The United States favors inscribing the item proposed by New Zealand. We agree that the hostilities in the area of the Chinese offshore islands have produced a situation which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. The present threatening situation results directly from intensified Chinese Communist military pressures against the offshore islands which began on September 3, 1954, when the Chinese Communists without warning initiated a heavy and long continued artillery barrage against Quemoy. The Chinese Communist land, sea, and air assaults against the offshore islands from the Tachens to Quemoy have continued intermittently since that date. Only recently, the Chinese Communists attacked

1 S. Exec. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

2 Supra, pp. 945-947.

3 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 252-253.

5 See letter of Jan. 28, 1955, from the New Zealand representative; ibid., p. 253. • See letter of Jan. 30, 1955, from the Soviet representative; ibid., pp. 253–254.

and overran the island of I-chiang, which up to then was under continuous control of the Government of the Republic of China.

The forces of the Government of the Republic of China have limited their response to these attacks to operations of a purely defensive character in the immediate vicinity designed to reduce the capacity of the Chinese Communists to continue the attacks.

The danger to the peace which exists as a result of this situation can only be removed through the cessation of hostilities.

The United States Government believes that recourse to the Security Council is desirable and therefore endorses the initiative commendably taken by the New Zealand representative in this

matter.

Now, Mr. President, let me say a word about the Soviet item. The Soviet Union tells us not to interfere, if you please, in the internal affairs of another country. That is the phrase. Here it is-you can read it for yourself-from the letter signed by the Soviet representative, "the intervention of the United States of America in the internal affairs of China," etc.

Now, Mr. President, when I hear the Soviet Union telling others not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, I really feel that I can honestly say that I have heard everything!

Here is this Soviet regime which always interferes to the maximum extent possible in the internal affairs of all countries, which has interfered and is interfering with deadly effect and to the fullest extent of its power in the internal affairs of China-here is this regime in a tone of unction, if you please, making a charge of interference against the United States.

Now, Mr. President, it is not necessary for me to say that the United States has never interfered in the internal affairs of China and that the entire letter of the Soviet representative and the Soviet Union item is a preposterous cold war fraud.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet statement this morning committed a whole series of flagrant inaccuracies, a few of which I shall briefly correct as follows:

The message of President Eisenhower to Congress' does not threaten the Chinese Communists with war. There is not one aggressive syllable in it. It is purely defensive. It reflects the true views of Dwight Eisenhower, our President, who is known to his countrymen and is known all over the world as a man of peace, as a man who knows the horrors of war and who is deeply dedicated to peace. Then the resolution passed by Congress, and passed by almost unanimous vote, is also purely defensive. It is aimed entirely at preventing aggression.

2

The Mutual Security Treaty3 to which reference was made is entirely defensive. It has no aggressive or offensive potentialities whatsoever. What is aggressive in the modern world, Mr. President, is communism. There is the real aggressor. The Soviet representative

1 Message of Jan. 24, 1955; supra, doc. 76.

Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra.
Supra, pp. 945-947.

knows full well that the international Communistic organization which his Government controls continues its attempts to dominate the world. He must know that if the Soviet Union were to give up its support of the international Communist movement, the greatest obstacles to organizing peace would disappear.

The Soviet representative's utterances this morning let the cat out of the bag. I say this because the Soviet Union's actions today leave no room for doubt that international communism would certainly like to take over Formosa or any other place on this earth if it could.

Now, Mr. President, in accordance with our custom, we will not oppose putting the Soviet complaint on the agenda, specious though it is. We are not afraid of a discussion. In fact, we welcome it. And we are satisfied that after we have told our story all but the hard-core professional Communists will applaud what we have done.

Our whole effort the whole effort of the United States Government is for peace. The world knows that we agreed to a truce in Korea,1 to a settlement in Viet-Nam; 2 the world also knows, as Sir Anthony Eden once pointed out, that no one has ever been enslaved by the United States.

What the Soviet Union proposes is the standard Communist line. I doubt if many persons really believe it, least of all those who utter it and write it. I hope I will be proved wrong, but I very much fear that this latest Communist move is merely a rather obvious smokescreen to conceal the Communist refusal to agree to a cessation of hostilities.

If the Communists really are opposed to war and violence, as their statement affirms, they can easily demonstrate it by joining the peaceloving nations of the world in supporting a cessation of hostilities. That is why we of the free world are here today.

[Following discussion of the question by the Security Council, Ambassador Lodge continued:]

The United States agrees that the Security Council should invite the Chinese Communist regime to send a representative to be present at the Council's discussion of the New Zealand item. We believe that in any effort to end an armed conflict to which the Chinese Communist regime is a party, it is useful for this regime to be present. This was our attitude in 1953 concerning the Korean Political Conference. It is also the case here and now.

3

Our support for this motion has no bearing whatever on the question of our opposition to the representation of China by the Chinese Communists in the United Nations or in any body thereof. Nor does our support for this motion imply any change in our established attitude against recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.

1 Armistice agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724-750. 2 Cease-fire agreement of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-767. See infra, pp. 2676-2684.

79. INVITATION TO THE "PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA" TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) QUESTION: Cablegram From the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chinese Communist Premier,1 January 31, 1955 2

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 690TH MEETING ON 31 JANUARY 1955 DECIDED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS IN ITS AGENDA:

"1. LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW ZEALAND DATED 28 JANUARY 1955 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA OF CERTAIN ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF THE MAINLAND OF CHINA (S/3354).3

"2. LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE AREA OF TAIWAN AND OTHER

IN APPROVING ITS AGENDA THE COUNCIL DECIDED THAT IT WOULD COMPLETE CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST ITEM BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSS THE SECOND.

IT FURTHER DECIDED TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO THE CENTRAL PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO BE PRESENT IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST ITEM AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE IN ORDER TO PRESENT THE VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT.

80. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE EVACUATION OF THE TACHEN ISLANDS: Statement by the Department of State, February 5, 1955 5

The Government of the Republic of China has informed the U.S. Government that it will redeploy its military forces from the Tachens, a group of small islands 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions. It has requested the aid of U.S. forces in protecting and assisting the redeployment of these military forces and the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands. The U.S. Government has

1 Chou En-lai.

2U.N. doc. S/3358, Feb. 4, 1955. See also Chou's reply, dated Feb. 3, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254–255.

Ibid., p. 253.

Ibid., pp. 253–254.

Ibid., p. 255. See also statement of Feb. 11, 1955, by the Department of State (ibid., Feb. 21, 1955, p. 290) and statement of Feb. 18, 1955, by the White House (ibid., Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 332-333).

given orders to the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces to assist in this operation.

The U.S. Government has further advised the Chinese Government that with the object of securing and protecting Formosa, in consonance with the congressional resolution approved January 29, 1955,1 the U.S. Government will extend assistance to the Republic of China in defending such related positions and territories now in its hands as the United States deems to be essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is hoped that these steps will contribute to a cessation of Communist attacks and to the restoration of peace and security in the West Pacific.

81. CONDITIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE OF QUEMOY AND THE MATSU ISLANDS: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, March 15, 1955 (Excerpt) 2

At his news conference on March 15, Secretary Dulles was asked a series of questions relating to United States defense commitments in the Far East and Southeast Asia and its plans for implementing these arrangements. He was asked at the outset whether the United States would commit American forces to specific points in the area. Secretary Dulles made the following reply:

3

No, there has been no change in the basic U.S. policy which I announced first at Manila and repeated at Bangkok. That is that we believe that our most effective contribution to the defense of the entire area is by a strategic force with a high degree of striking power by sea and by air. That power is available to be used wherever the occasion arises. U.S. policy is not to split that power up into fragments of which one part is irrevocably committed, let us say, to Korea, and another part irrevocably committed to Japan, and another part irrevocably committed to the Ryukyus, and another part irrevocably committed to Formosa, and another part irrevocably committed to the Philippines, and another part irrevocably committed to various parts of Southeast Asia.

If you are going to divide our strength up, and irrevocably commit parts of it to each one of the areas which are in danger and which we are committed to help to defend, you may not have enough at the area which is attacked. We don't know where the attack is coming, and a commitment which would deprive us of the right to use our full power wherever the need arose would not, in my opinion, be in the interests of anybody involved.

1 Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc. 77.

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 28, 1955, pp. 526–527.

Statement of Sept. 6, 1954; supra, pp. 917-919.

Statement of Feb. 25, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1955,

pp. 374-375.