Asked how this related to the possible defense of the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the Secretary replied:

The situation there is inherently speculative because it depends upon the intentions and purpose of the Chinese Communists. The treaty that we have with the Republic of China excludes Quemoy and Matsu from the treaty area. That was done with much thought and deliberation. Therefore, the treaty does not commit the United States to defend anything except Formosa and the Pescadores, and to deal with attacks against that treaty area.

Public Law 4,' which authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States in relation to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, also allows the President to use those armed forces in relation to related areas if in the opinion of the President that is necessary or appropriate for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Therefore, the issue is, would an attack on Quemoy, Matsu, perhaps elsewhere, be part of an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores? If so, then both under the treaty and under the law the President would presumably react with U.S. force. If the President judges that the attack is not related to an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, then neither the treaty nor the law gives him authority to act. Up to the present time the Chinese Communists have indicated that their operations in the Formosa Straits are designed against Formosa and the Pescadores. When islands such as the Tachens were taken over, they did not say, "We have now regained some islands"; they said, "We have now gained a better position from which to attack Formosa." So that as the situation now stands, on the basis of the record made by the Chinese Communists, it would seem that their operations are designed against Formosa and the Pescadores.

2

Because of that fact, when I was in Taipei for our consultations there, and there were also military consultations, account was taken of the fact that it might in the future be judged by the President that the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu Islands was called for because of the intention of the Chinese Communists to make their operations an attack against Formosa. On the other hand, I don't know whether an attack will come; I don't know when it will come, it may be next week, it may be next year, it may be never. I cannot foresee or attempt to judge for myself, much less on behalf of the President, what the circumstances may be. Therefore, it is inevitable that the situation should be in some ambiguity, because, as I say, these areas are outside of the treaty area and the question of the U.S. use of force for their defense depends upon the circumstances under which an attack upon them occurs.

Secretary Dulles was asked about the statement of the British Foreign Secretary that the British were seeking to get a renunciation of force by

1 Resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc. 77.

2 The Secretary visited Taipei, Mar. 3, 1955, for the purpose of exchanging instruments of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with China.

both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. Is that in agreement with our position and did you discuss that with Mr. Eden, the Secretary was asked. He replied:

I made clear, as I think the President has repeatedly made clear, that we do not believe in or desire the solution to these problems to be worked out through the use of force, and that a cease-fire, which would end the actual hostilities in this area, would be welcomed by the United States. So far, there has been no evidence whatever that the Chinese Communists would accept a cease-fire, and, as you recall, they rejected an invitation to come to the United Nations Security Council to discuss that matter.'

Asked whether the renunciation of the use of force without a renunciation of a claim, as Mr. Eden suggests, would be considered the equivalent of a cease-fire by this Government, the Secretary replied:

Well, if there were a renunciation of the use of force, that would meet the immediate requirements of the situation and there would be no necessity that I can see for anybody, either on the Republic of China's side or the Communists' side, to renounce what they might call their legal pretentions, their legal claims.

Asked what the United States position would be if an attack on Quemoy and Matsu were accompanied by renunciation of the use of force against Formosa, Secretary Dulles replied:

Well, it would depend a good bit on whether we accepted that renunciation at face value, or whether we judged it as merely a trick or a device. If in fact the President judged that there was no attack against Formosa and the Pescadores, then it would be questionable whether the treaty and the law gave authority to use the armed forces of the United States. But, as I say, we have learned before now that the Communists' protestations are not necessarily to be taken at face value.

82. DEFENSE OF THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, April 5, 1955 (Excerpt) 2

At his news conference on April 5, Secretary Dulles was asked about the prospects of war or peace in the Formosa area. Secretary Dulles made the following reply:

To answer that question would require me to read the minds of people to whom I have no access; that is, the Communist leaders in Peiping. We have made perfectly clear our desire that there

1 See cablegram of Jan. 31, 1955, from Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Chou En-lai (supra, doc. 79) and Chou's reply, dated Feb. 3, 1955 (Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1955, pp. 254-255).

2 Ibid., Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 643–644.

shall be no war, our desire that there shall be a cease-fire. So, if there is any war, it will be entirely due to the provocation and initiative of those who unfortunately may not be subject to the pacific purpose which they proclaim. If, in fact, the Chinese Communists are faithful to what they talk about-peace-then there will be no fighting in the area.

1

Asked whether the release of the Chinese students on April 2 was intended as an indication of our preference for peace rather than war, the Secretary replied:

In a broad sense you can say that it was indicative of our desire to keep our relations with the Chinese Communists on, you might call, a civilized, peaceful basis. We did not desire to be in a position of holding any persons as hostages, and in fact they have never been so held. We have pushed ahead to complete the process of clearances, including the necessary legal steps which have to be taken, I believe, by the Department of Justice. As soon as those were completed, we announced these people were free to go.

In the same way, we recently turned back at Hong Kong seven Communist fishermen that had been picked up in a storm and rescued. In some quarters the suggestion had been made that we should hold them as a barter. We do not believe in bartering human beings, and we hope that our conduct and example in that regard might possibly have some influence in Communist China.

Asked whether this was done at the suggestion or request of Mr. Hammarskjold, Mr. Dulles replied:

No. Mr. Hammarskjold is dealing only with the prisoners of war who were in the United Nations Command, and he has not concerned himself particularly about the civilian situation. As far as I am aware, Mr. Hammarskjold was not informed about the steps we were taking to release these civilians. He was informed of the steps which we took to release the seven fishermen that I referred to. That took place some weeks ago.

Asked whether any new steps had been taken or if any were in prospect to find a common allied position with regard to Formosa either through diplomatic channels or through the United Nations, Secretary Dulles replied:

We are in close contact with the nations having an interest in that part of the world, and we have frequent discussions with their representatives. There is a very active exchange of advice steadily going on with reference to this situation. We all realize it is a highly dangerous situation, and we want to eliminate to the maximum degree possible the dangerous elements there. Whether we shall succeed or not, as I said before, depends very largely upon whether the Chinese Communists are willing to have an abandonment of force.

1 See statement of Apr. 2, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, doc. 91.

Asked to comment on the fact that the Canadians have stated publicly that they would not back us if war comes out of Quemoy and Matsu and whether that represented a divided allied position, the Secretary replied:

No. On the contrary, as a result of my trip up there there is a much closer understanding between our two Governments than had existed before. We have never expected that if there were a war in the Formosa area the Canadian Government would be a participant in that war. They have no treaty arrangements of any kind which relate to that part of the world, and that kind of support has never been anticipated. I think there is now an understanding of the problem and that our relations in that respect are much better than they have been before.

Asked whether he believed that the overall world position of the United States would necessarily be weakened or might in fact be strengthened if the United States were to base its commitments in the Formosa area exclusively upon Formosa and the Pescadores, the Secretary replied:

I have said many times, and I am glad to have a chance to say again, something which I can repeat by heart: The only commitment of the United States in that area is based exclusively on Formosa and the Pescadores.

We have a treaty which confines the treaty area to Formosa and the Pescadores. We have a law which says that the armed forces of the United States can be used in that part of the area for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We have no commitment of any kind, sort, or description, expressed or implied, which binds the United States to anything except the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Now you get to the question-if there seems to be an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores, how do you defend against that attack? That is the only question. Some people say that we should announce in advance precisely how we are going to defend and carry out our commitment on Formosa and the Pescadores and to say we will carry out that commitment by doing this or by not doing that. Once you extend your commitment to defend Formosa to a commitment as to particular means which you may use for defense, then you are getting into very difficult ground. We have a commitment, certainly, to defend the United States of America. But nobody yet has required us to state publicly precisely what the means would be of defense in the event of certain types of attack which cannot be predicted. I repeat-again and again and againthat our only commitment is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores and if there were no challenge to Formosa and the Pescadores, then there wouldn't be any question as far as we are concerned of fighting in that area.

1 Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945-947.

2 Joint resolution of Jan. 29, 1955; supra, doc. 77.

Asked if he were saying in that connection that we would not aid the Chinese Nationalists to defend Quemoy and Matsu for the sake of Chinese Nationalist morale, Mr. Dulles replied:

Unless that were vital for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. It all comes back to that.

83. RELAXING TENSION IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Statement by the Department of State, April 23, 1955 1

1

The Department of State has received press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung conference.2 The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the free Republic of China, and of course the United States would insist on free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.

If Communist China is sincere, there are a number of obvious steps it could take to clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. One of these would be to place in effect in the area an immediate cease-fire. It could also immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invitation by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.3

84. POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING A CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, April 26, 1955

4

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with Senator George that the United States should sit down and talk with Red China even though Nationalist China might not be present?

A. That depends on what we talk about and whether there is evidence that such talks would be held in good faith on both sides. We are not going to talk about the interests of the Republic of China behind its back.

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, p. 738.

2 Statement of Apr. 23, 1955: "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially in the Taiwan area" (New York Times, Apr. 24, 1955, p. 1).

3 See Secretary-General Hammarskjold's cablegram to Chou En-lai, Jan. 31, 1955; supra, doc. 79.

4 Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1955, pp. 755–759.