Q. You would like to have the Nationalists be more receptive to the idea of a cease-fire?

A. There has been no secret of the fact that the United States has hoped for a cease-fire in the area. The President made that perfectly clear in his message to the Congress. That was last January when he spoke of what we then thought was the most hopeful route of action before the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire and the acceptance of a principle of the United Nations that nations should renounce force to accomplish their objectives. There has been some difference of viewpoint between the Chinese Nationalists and ourselves with respect to that matter, but I am not in a position to say to what extent that was discussed at Taipei or what the result was, because I haven't heard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand you correctly that it would be possible for us to accept a declaration from the Chinese Communists as to their willingness to agree to a cease-fire without participation of the Chinese Nationalists in any such declaration?

A. I think the United States would welcome an assurance of the abandonment of force by the Chinese Communists in whatever way it came.

Q. Should it be made a public statement?

A. I think it should be public, for unless it was made public we would not have the adequate sanction of the weight of public opinion behind it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you get it down to this: Do we consider it our turn now to get in touch with the Chinese Communists, or do we consider that we must hear more from the Chinese Communists about this peace conference that Chou En-lai originally proposed?

A. I don't know about this question of whose "turn" it is. However, I would say this: When the issues are as grave as those that confront us in the Formosa area, we are not disposed to stand upon protocol.

A proposal has been made which may or may not be sincere, which may or may not have any substance to it. We believe that the circumstances under which it was made are apt to give it a greater degree of credibility than perhaps if it had been made under other circumstances. It was made to and in the presence of a very large group of other countries, made to them first privately and then it was made publicly. Therefore, a statement made under those conditions carries greater weight than if, for example, it had been a pure propaganda statement issued by Peiping radio sometime.

Now, since a statement was made under those circumstances, we are disposed to try to probe it further. As to the order of events, if we should get a further clarification which would come spontane

1 Message of Jan. 24, 1955; supra, doc. 76.

ously from the Chinese Communists, that would be well and good. But we shall not merely sit around and wait on that. We may probe the thing ourselves to find out if it has any substance.

As I say, there was an ambiguous phrase about their sovereign right to "liberate" Formosa which could not be any way impaired. Now, I have said previously that we would not expect the parties to this struggle, whether the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists, to renounce their ambitions. We don't expect that to be done any more than we expect that to happen in the case of Germany or Korea or Viet-Nam. But even though they retain their ambitionsretain their claims-they might renounce the use of force to satisfy their claims and their ambitions. Now I don't know whether what Chou En-lai said was intended to be responsive to what I had previously said on that phase of the matter, or not. That is one of the things which I think deserves further exploration.

Q. Can you tell us what are the mechanics, what you are doing to find out, what is happening as far as our Government is concerned? Mohammed Ali, the Pakistan Premier, this morning reported he had a conversation with Chou and that Chou En-lai told him the door was still open a crack. Also, Chou En-lai told him he felt there was a possibility of successful negotiation, or implied that. He also said Chou En-lai made to him what he regarded as a reasonable proposition for the settlement of the present crisis. He didn't give the details. Have you asked Mohammed Ali to tell you what the details are or asked him to give the reaction of the U. S. to this conversation? What are we doing? That is what I want to know.

A. I thought I had made clear, in answer to a prior question, that we have not yet done anything that the information which is prerequisite to sober, intelligent action is only beginning to come in. Only a few minutes ago did we receive word through the Pakistan Embassy of what you refer to, and we have not yet collected all the relevant data. Until we have all the relevant data we are not going to go off doing things.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why should you insist that this evidence of sincerity should be made public? Would you be satisfied with assurance given through diplomatic channels, shall we say, by private diplomacy?

A. Well, that is a hypothetical question and I wouldn't want to respond categorically to it. But it does not seem to me that it is possible to make plans on the assumption that there will be a cease-fire in the area unless we can let it be known. It affects all of our own thinking and all of our own planning and the planning of the Chinese Nationalists, and it is quite incredible to me that there should be a secret agreement to have a cease-fire. I would think it would be quite a problem as to how to keep it secret.

85. NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA FOR A CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 26, 19551

Last April at the Bandung conference Mr. Chou En-lai suggested that there should be bilateral talks with the United States. He said, "The Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States. We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means."

Immediately (on April 23, 1955) the Department of State responded by stating that "the United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world."2 Then at my subsequent press conference (April 26, 1955) I referred to Mr. Chou En-lai's statement and said, "Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists are merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor to our ally, the Republic of China." 3

Developments since then indicate the possibility of obtaining beneficial results from a continuance of the talks which have been going on at Geneva for the past year and their restoration to the original ambassadorial level.

Four out of the 15 United Nations prisoners of war have been released. * 4 A few more United States civilians have been released. These results, though meager, are something. Chinese Communist warlike activities, such as had been displayed in relation to I-chiang and Tachen, have not been resumed and there has been something approximating a de facto cease-fire in the Taiwan (Formosa) area. The former belligerent Communist propaganda about Taiwan and against the United States has recently been somewhat subdued.

5

In addition, various governments which have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China have indicated their own belief in the desire of the Chinese Communists to pursue a peaceful path. Under these circumstances the United States proposed on July 11 to Mr. Chou En-lai that the talks that had been going on at Geneva, recently at the consular level, should be somewhat raised in level and enlarged in scope. This proposal was made through the intermediary of the United Kingdom, which represents the interests of the United States in Communist China. There was prompt acceptance of this proposal and, after the date was agreed to, a mutually agreed communiqué with reference to it was arrived at and simultaneously issued in Peiping and in Washington yesterday morning.

6

It was made clear that the offer of the United States did not imply any diplomatic recognition whatsoever. It was also made clear that we were not prepared in any way in these talks to make arrangements

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1955, pp. 220–221.

2 Supra, doc. 83.

3 Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1955, p. 754.

See statement of June 1, 1955, by the Department of State; infra, doc. 92. 5 See remarks of Jan. 18, 1955, by Secretary Dulles; supra, doc. 75.

See infra, doc. 93.

which would prejudice the rights of our ally, the Republic of China. The United States will be represented at Geneva on August 1 by our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, U. Alexis Johnson. It was Ambassador Johnson who represented the United States in the Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists when these talks first began a year ago. Prior to that, as a Departmental officer, he devoted himself largely to the Korean Armistice negotiations.

The United States is concerned with getting back the American civilians still detained in Communist China. In this connection we are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Communists the status of the few Chinese students in the United States who desire to return to Communist China and who the Chinese Communists claim, without foundation, are prevented.

We also want to reinforce the efforts of the United Nations to get back the Americans who as members of the United Nations Command in Korea became prisoners of war and are still held by the Chinese Communists.

As to other practical matters which might be considered, the United States would like to be sure of precautions taken against a repetition of such incidents as involved the shooting down of the Cathay airliner with loss of American lives and injury to American civilians.2

Of course, the basic thing is that which I pointed out in my press conference of April 26, namely, "whether we must prepare for war in that area or whether there is apt to be a cease-fire in the area." 3

The United States believes that whatever may be the differences which now divide countries, these differences should not be settled by recourse to force where this would be apt to provoke international war. The United States has itself consistently acted on that belief. Wherever we give any military assistance, it is under the explicit condition. that it will not be used for aggressive purposes. There is no doubt but what East Germany is part of Germany, but Chancellor Adenauer has given solemn assurance that he will not use force to unite his country. There is no doubt that North Korea is a part of Korea, but the security treaty which we made with the Republic of Korea makes clear that the United States will not extend its protection other than to areas which we recognize as having been lawfully brought under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea, and we do not believe that aggressive force is such a lawful means. There is no doubt but that North Viet-Nam is part of Viet-Nam, but we stated in connection with the Indochina armistice that we were opposed to any renewal of aggression to bring about the unification of Viet-Nam.

Both the Republic of China and the Chinese People's Republic claim that the area held by the other is part of China. But in connection with the mutual security treaty which the United States made

1 See the Mar. 1, 1955, statement by the Department of State; infra, doc. 90. 2 See infra, docs. 97 and 98.

Supra, p. 2499.

See the declaration by the German Federal Republic in Part V of the Final Act of the London Conference, Oct. 3, 1954; supra, p. 1481.

Treaty of Oct. 1, 1953; supra, pp. 897-898.

• Declaration of July 21, 1954; supra, pp. 787–788.

with the Republic of China, it was agreed that the Republic of China would not use force except as a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which was clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.2

We believe that the principle of nonrecourse to force is valid not merely for the United States and its allies but that it is valid for all. We shall hope to find out in the forthcoming talks whether the Chinese Communists accept the concept of a cease-fire in accordance with the United Nations principle of avoiding any use or threat of force which could disturb the peace of nations.

No doubt the Chinese Communists will have matters of their own to bring up. We shall listen to hear what they are, and if they directly involve the United States and Communist China we will be disposed to discuss them with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement. As President Eisenhower said last night,

the United States will go to any length consistent with our concepts of decency and justice and right to attain peace. For this purpose we will work cooperatively with the Soviets and any other people as long as there is sincerity of purpose and a genuine desire to go ahead.3

That is the principle which will govern the continuation of our talks with the Chinese Communists at Geneva.

86. NEGOTIATION OF A BROAD CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) AREA: Transcript of a News Conference of the Secretary of State, August 2, 1955 (Excerpt) *

4

At his news conference on August 2, Secretary Dulles was asked a series of questions regarding the ambassadorial talks at Geneva between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Following is a transcript of that portion of the news conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any obstacles presently on the return of Chinese in this country to the mainland, and do you know of any case of any Chinese here who have been prevented from returning?

of

A. No, there are no restrictions whatsoever on the return to China any of these Chinese here, particularly students, who have expressed a desire to return, and we have tried to ascertain who of them does desire to return. Now Mr. Chou En-lai in his speech the day before yesterday, I think it was, or 3 days ago, said something about financial

1 Treaty of Dec. 2, 1954; supra, pp. 945-947.

2 See notes exchanged between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on Dec. 10, 1954 (supra, pp. 947-949) and report of Feb. 8, 1955, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (supra, pp. 957-965).

3 Supra, pp. 111-114.

4 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 15, 1955, pp. 260-262. See also statements of Aug. 1, 1955, by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarding the release of American military prisoners by the Chinese Communists (ibid., p. 262) and Secretary Dulles' remarks of Aug. 16, 1955, concerning the Geneva talks with Chinese Communist representatives (ibid., Aug. 29, 1955, pp. 341–342).