difficulties. I can't answer whether any of them are in such financial difficulties that they haven't got the money to pay their fare home. That is a question which will no doubt be looked into as a result of the talks taking place at Geneva. But as far as any legal impediments are concerned, I can say categorically that there are none.

Q. Mr. Secretary, about how many of these students are there who want to return to China? You said last week that there were a few.

A. It is in the general order of under 50. I am sorry I don't have the precise number in my mind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that statement of Chou En-lai's, he reiterated an argument that he made before, namely, that there was no point in discussing a cease-fire with the United States, since there is no shooting between the two countries. You have taken the point of view, I believe, that the cease-fire is a matter of discussion. How do you reconcile those differing views?

A. I would gather that Mr. Chou En-lai is using that word in a rather technical sense, whereas I have used it in a broad sense. It is quite true that there is no fighting going on at the moment between the Chinese Communists and the United States military forces in the area. On the other hand, there has been very considerable danger of such fighting. And what I have wanted to bring about was an assurance that the Chinese Communists were not planning to use military force in order to achieve their ambitions in that area.

I made that quite clear, I think, in several statements which I have made, and particularly in the statement which I made last week.2 I was very glad to note that Mr. Chou En-lai quoted with apparent approval one statement which I had made to the general effect that whatever were the differences which divided countries it should not be sought to resolve that difference by use of force, and I thought in general the tone of the speech indicated his going further in the renunciation of force than anything he had said before.

Q. In other words, if I might follow that, what you are seeking is not a cease-fire in the terms that perhaps most Americans have been thinking about between the Nationalists and the Chinese but something much broader, in terms of perhaps a U.N. Charter declaration, between the Chinese Communists and the United States?

A. That is correct. And also you must bear in mind that a display of military activity there by the Chinese Communists which was designed to possess themselves by force of Formosa would bring into play our treaty of defense with the Republic of China.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could the United States give the Chinese Communists assurances in any such discussions that the Chinese Nationalists would not engage in force?

1 Address of July 30, 1955; New York Times, July 31, 1955.

2 Statement of July 26, 1955; supra.

A. I think that the treaty arrangements which we have with the Republic of China make it quite clear that it is in our mutual contemplation that force shall not be used. The whole character of that treaty is defensive. That is underlined throughout the treaty itself and in the concurrent understandings that were arrived at in that connection; so while the United States would not feel that it was in a position to act as in any sense an agent for the Republic of China, nevertheless I do think that the whole pattern that has been woven there by the United States is in itself evidence that we accept for ourselves, and in our alliances seek to make it a principle of those alliances, that force shall not be used to achieve national ambitions. That is the same principle which we invoke and which we hope will guide the Chinese Communists, and we naturally accept it for ourselves. As you probably know, all of the agreements under which we give military assistance to various countries are very explicit in their provisions that the equipment shall not be used for any aggressive purpose.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this also apply to the South Korean declaration of today, I believe it is, that they wish to recover areas below the 38th parallel, including Kaesong and the Ongjin Peninsula? 2

A. It would apply equally to that, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that you don't expect the idea of a broader no-shooting arrangement to come about out of these current Geneva talks. Do you envisage a high-level talk or how do you expect to bring this about?

A. I would expect this to come about primarily as a declaration of policy which leaders or the rulers of a country would make rather than as the subject of a bilateral agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you elaborate a little more on this broader agreement relating to a cease-fire? Just how do you expect it to evolve? Does it have a U.N. connection, for example?

A. No. What we hope to arrive at by progressive steps is a situation where the Chinese Communists will have renounced the use of force to achieve their ambitions. That is the thing I have been emphasizing and driving at for months because, if they are not willing to do that, if they want to use force to achieve their ambitions, that will almost surely start up a war the limits of which could not be defined in advance. How that is brought about I don't know. That is a matter of policy for the Chinese Communists. I don't know how they will choose to make that clear, if indeed they do make it clear. I already have said that the speech of Chou En-lai of last Friday went further in that direction than anything that he has yet said. I hope that what is taking place either at Geneva or outside of Geneva, and the whole trend of world events, will create a situation

1 See the treaty of Dec. 2, 1954, and notes exchanged Dec. 10, 1954, between the United States and the Republic of China; supra, pp. 945-949.

2 See the New York Times, Aug. 2, 1955.

so that we can feel that we are not under the threat of war from the situation in that area. I said in my press conference of April 26,1 you may remember, that the United States was not willing to negotiate with a pistol at its head; that the first thing to do is to find out whether there was a threat of war there because, if that was the case, then as far as the United States is concerned it would be quite impossible to negotiate these practical matters.

I pointed out last week that a number of things had happened which indicated that the pistol had been laid down and that it made it possible to try to clear up now some of these practical matters between us. But the important thing is that the pistol should be permanently discarded, and we hope that the trend of events will bring reassurance on that point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the Communists laying down their pistol, is there any relation between that and SEATO, the Southeast Asia defense alliance?

A. Obviously the laying down of the pistol is applicable to the situation in Indochina as well as to the situation in the Formosa Straits. We have there a series of armistice agreements 2 which purport to bring the fighting there to an end. Obviously any resumption of that fighting would be violating the principle to which I have alluded.

Q. We would not be willing, for instance, to trade a declaration by the Reds abandoning the use of force for our abandoning SEATO, or disbanding SEATO?

A. Absolutely not, any more than we would be prepared to abandon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are absolutely convinced that these collective security organizations are in the interest of peace. We know that they are defensive in purpose and in spirit, and we believe that they are in harmony with the general trend of the times which brings every community to organize itself on a collective security basis. The old days when each had to defend his own home with his own gun have passed. We have a central police force; we have a central fire department. The whole idea of getting security through collective action rather than individual action is in our opinion a tremendous advance. Now the Soviets and Communists seem to take the view that each country should stand alone on its own feet, that there shouldn't be any collective organizations for security. We believe that is turning the clock back to go in that direction, and we are not disposed to turn the clock back by dismantling either NATO or the so-called SEATO, the Manila Pact.3

I explained that at Geneva. I said this North Atlantic Treaty Organization isn't anything directed against the Soviet Union. If

1 Supra, doc. 84.

2 Agreements of July 20, 1954; supra, pp. 750-785.

Treaty of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912-916.

• See Secretary Dulles' statement of July 20, 1955; supra, pp. 1891-1892.

there weren't any Soviet Union in the world today it would be almost as important because it ties together, it integrates, these nations who make up its membership in a way which makes it most unlikely and impractical that any one of them shall assume an offensive nationalistic action of its own. That is its essential value. As I say, even if so-called tensions between the East and West were totally resolved, I believe that this type of organization should persist and that that marks the enlightened future which we should seek.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that parallel with an easier relationship with the Soviet Union there is now developing an easier relationship with Red China? Is that the import of much that you have said?

A. The release of the fliers, the release of the civilians, if it comes about, such statements as are made by Chou En-lai, if I interpret them right and if they are sincere and permanent parts of policy, might mark the beginning of a new phase in Chinese Communist relations with the rest of the world. I pointed out some time ago that the Chinese Communists seem to be much more violent and fanatical, more addicted to the use of force than the Russians are or have become. Whether or not there is going to be a change in that respect I don't know. There are some auguries, but we always have to remember the adage that one swallow does not make a summer.

The Problem of United States Nationals Detained in Communist China

87. IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS BY CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES: Statement by the Department of State, May 21, 1951 1

The Department of State has been extremely concerned for an extended period of time over the imprisonment by Chinese Communist authorities of a number of American nationals, now believed to number more than 30. At least some are definitely known to have been allowed no communication with anyone outside. In most cases, the local Chinese Communist authorities have given no explanation of the arrests or any information concerning the welfare or whereabouts of the persons arrested. Access has been denied to legal counsel and to British officials, who have been representing American interests in Communist China since the closure of our consulates. This Government has been in constant communication on this subject with the British Government.

On April 30, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping, acting on instructions of the Foreign Office, made representations to the respon1 Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, p. 947.

sible Chinese Communist authorities at Peiping on behalf of all Americans arrested, as well as the United Kingdom, Canadian, and Australian nationals under arrest. He appealed to these authorities to take appropriate steps to permit those imprisoned to have access to legal counsel and to friends outside. It was hoped that their speedy release would be effected, on humanitarian no less than on equitable grounds. No reply has yet been received by the British Government from the Chinese Communist authorities.

The Department of State has also been concerned for some time over the continued denial by Chinese Communist authorities of exit permits to certain Americans, including a number of Shanghai businessmen, some of whom have been endeavoring for over a year to leave China. Arbitrary refusal to permit aliens to depart from a country is of course a violation of the elementary principles of international law and practice.

88. DETENTION OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS: Statement by the Department of State, December 12, 1951 1

1

The Department has for some time been concerned about detention of Americans by officials of the Chinese Communist regime." Meanwhile information on the general situation in which Americans in Communist China find themselves has been made available to any who inquire.

The Department, however, has refrained from making individual names public. It has advised the relatives or associates of persons detained that publicity in individual cases was a matter for their decision and it has not discouraged those who wished to give publicity to the arrests.

The Department has refrained from publicizing the names and specific situations of those persons or all of the action the Department has taken in their behalf for two major reasons: (1) requests of relatives or associates of the person concerned that no publicity be given for fear of jeopardizing the person's welfare; and (2) warnings by countries assisting in making representations to the Chinese Communists that in their opinion official publicity, particularly during the period of their activity on our behalf, might jeopardize the success of their efforts.

Americans are not the only ones under detention in Communist China. There are numerous other foreigners also under arrest, including nationals of countries which have recognized the Chinese Communists and which have established diplomatic relations in Peiping. All foreigners face these same difficulties.

In this connection it will be recalled that the Department issued a series of warnings to American citizens in China to evacuate that country before the Communists took over unless they were prepared

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1014. The statement represents the substance of an oral announcement to the press on Dec. 8, 1951. 2 See statement of May 21, 1951, by the Department of State; supra.