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3. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, February 14, 19501

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act be cited as the "Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950".

SEC. 2. To enable the President until June 30, 1950, to obligate funds heretofore appropriated for assistance in certain areas of China, section 12 of Public Law 47, Eighty-first Congress,' is amended by striking out "February 15, 1950" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1950".

SEC. 3. (a) The Administrator for Economic Cooperation is hereby authorized to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in conformity with

(1) the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, wherever such provisions are applicable and not inconsistent with the intent and purposes of this section 3; and

(2) the agreement on aid between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea signed December 10, 1948, or any supplementary or succeeding agreement which shall not substantially alter the basic obligations of either party.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Administrator shall immediately terminate aid under this section in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition government which includes one or more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of northern Korea. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Administrator is authorized to make available to the Republic of Korea merchant vessels of tonnage not in excess of two thousand five hundred gross tons each, in a number not to exceed ten at any one time, with a stipulation that such vessels shall be operated only in east Asian waters and must be returned forthwith upon demand of the Administrator and in any event not later than June 30, 1951. Any agency of the United States Government owning or operating any such vessel is authorized to make such vessel available to the Administrator for the purposes of this section upon his application, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law and without reimbursement by the Administrator, and title to any such vessel so supplied shall remain in the United States Government.

(d) In order to carry out the provisions of this section 3, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, in addition to

1 PL 447, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (64 Stat. 5-6; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 13, 1950, p. 405).

2 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1322-1327.

Ibid., pp. 1299-1321. For other amendments prior to Feb. 14, 1950, see 62 and 63 Stat., passim.

4 TIAS 1908; 62 Stat., pt. 3, p. 3780.

sums already appropriated, not to exceed $60,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950.

(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, until such time as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate $30,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this section, in such manner, at such times, and in such amounts as the Administrator shall request, and no interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for this purpose. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall be repaid without interest for advances made by it hereunder, from funds made available for the purposes of this section 3.

SEC. 4. The authorization for appropriations in this Act is limited to the period ending June 30, 1950, in order that any subsequent authorizations may be separately passed on, and is not to be construed as an express or implied commitment to provide further authorizations or appropriations.

4. EXTENSION OF THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Statement by the Secretary of State, March 7, 19501

I appreciate the invitation to appear before your Committee with Mr. Hoffman to explain to you briefly why I feel the continuation of the Korean economic recovery program for a second year is of real importance to the success of American foreign policy. I shall indeed be brief because I know that, although I myself was not present, this matter was fully discussed with you by Mr. Webb and Mr. Hoffman only a few months ago. In addition, I have referred to the importance of our Korean program in discussions we have had during the present session.

I believe the main questions we have to consider are: (1) the importance of the proposed continuation of the economic recovery program to the success of our over-all policy toward Korea and (2) the part which our Korean policy plays in United States policy for the Far East.

First as to Korea: You will recall that the United States has taken the leadership among the nations to attain the realization of our fundamental declaration made at Cairo in 1943 with the United Kingdom and China (and later joined by the U. S. S. R.) "that in

1 Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 20, 1950, pp. 454-455.

The Under Secretary of State, James C. Webb, and the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Paul G. Hoffman, testified in executive session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 28, 1949; S. Rept. No. 748, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.

due course Korea should become free and independent." When our own efforts to persuade the U. S. S. R. to join in holding free elections to establish a united country were unsuccessful, we referred the matter to the United Nations.2 The General Assembly has used and is using its best efforts to bring about the accomplishment of this end, desired by all the Korean people.3 The success of its efforts has, thus far, been limited to assisting in the establishment of a free government, the Republic of Korea, in what was formerly the area of United States occupation.*

Upon the establishment of the Republic, the United States undertook to assist it to survive and develop as a democratic, representative government. To do this, the United States is providing the Republic with political support. Through our information and educational programs, we are seeking to help the Republic develop a sound educational system founded on principles of representative democracy. At the request of the Republic, we are maintaining there a Military Advisory Group to assist in training Korean security forces and to insure the efficient employment of United States military assistance by those forces. Supplementing the prior transfer of military equipment under the Surplus Property Act, the Congress has authorized under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act the extension of military aid to Korea. And the Congress has recently authorized the Economic Cooperation Administration to undertake a program intended to bring the economy of the Republic as nearly as possible to a selfsupporting basis. In doing so the Congress authorized the expenditure in the fiscal year 1950 of the total sum of 120 million dollars."

5

By means of these and related measures, the United States hopes to achieve the objective of strengthening the Republic of Korea to the point where it can (1) successfully withstand the threat of expanding Communist influence and control arising out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive Soviet-dominated Communist regime and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country on a democratic basis.

The testimony presented to your Committee by Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Webb, and other witnesses at the time of hearings on the bill authorizing the program for fiscal year 1950 indicated very plainly that the

1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22. The Soviet Union adhered to the Cairo Declaration by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, in its declaration of war against Japan, Aug. 8, 1945; see Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945-1946 (Princeton, 1948), pp. 848-849.

2 See Korea's Independence (Department of State publication 2933; 1947).

3 See General Assembly Resolutions 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678); 195 (III) of Dec. 12, 1948 (U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 25–27); and 293 (IV) of Oct. 21, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 682–684). The independence of the Republic of Korea was provided for, in part, in General Assembly Res. 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678) and was proclaimed, Aug. 15, 1948.

5 Act of Oct. 3, 1944; 58 Stat. 765.

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Oct. 6, 1949, and Second Supplementary Appropriation Act, 1950; 63 Stat. 716, 975.

7 Third Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1949, Oct. 10, 1949; 63 Stat. 739.

authority requested was to carry out the first year of a planned 3-year program intended to help Korea make substantial progress toward a self-supporting economy. The program for which authority is now requested for fiscal year 1951 is the second year of this 3-year program. Since Mr. Hoffman will go into the economics of the program with you, I will not attempt to do so beyond saying that the Department of State has participated in the preparation of the program which he will outline and supports it fully.

Second, as to the place of this proposal in our over-all Far Eastern policy, I have said that the United States is taking the leadership among the nations in helping the people of Korea attain the goal of a united independent nation, free from foreign domination. As a result of this initiative, the United States today is looked to not only by the people of Korea but by the peoples of the Far East and, in fact, by the people of democratic nations everywhere as the leader in the struggle for the survival of a Korean Republic, both for itself and as a possible nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of that country. Broadly speaking, the United States foreign policy in the Far East is directed toward encouraging and assisting the efforts of the peoples of that area to improve their welfare and security, to stabilize and develop their economies, to strengthen free institutions, and to advance the cause of self-government free from outside domination. Korea is one place in which the United States can continue to take well-defined positive steps to help a free democratic country to survive in the face of efforts of communism to engulf it. Hundreds of millions of people of Southern and Southeastern Asia and the islands of the Pacific are now in a period where they must choose between the roads toward democracy or totalitarianism. As the President said in his message to the Congress on Korean aid in June of last year:

Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value of the ideals and principles of democracy which the Republic is putting into practice are being matched against the practices of communism which have been imposed upon the people of north Korea. The survival and progress of the Republic toward a self-supporting, stable economy will have an immense and far-reaching influence on the people of Asia. Such progress by the young Republic will encourage the people of southern and southeastern Asia and the islands of the Pacific to resist and reject the Communist propaganda with which they are besieged. Moreover, the Korean Republic, by demonstrating the success and tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon to the people of northern Asia in resisting the control of the Communist forces which have overrun them.1

The people of Asia, as well as the people of Korea, have been able to see the way in which economic assistance from the United States has contributed already to the ability of the Korean people to move toward economic independence. The Economic Assistance Program has increased agricultural production and the well-being of the large farming population of Korea. It has given food to the families of the industrial workers and, by increasing production, has brought about mounting employment. It has made possible a small surplus for export as a source of foreign exchange with which necessities may

1 Message of June 7, 1949; H. Doc. No. 212, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

be imported. This progress, together with the rehabilitation of factories, mines, and fishing facilities important to the Korean economy, has helped to give them faith in their form of government, strength to resist the constant pressures of communism, and confidence in their future.

There is one further and fundamental question which must be considered: That is the probability of ultimate success of the effort of the Korean Republic to survive. In recent debates, a number of Members of the Congress have indicated their feeling that the possibility of failure makes them doubt the wisdom of the United States giving a helping hand in this effort. It is my belief that American policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on fear of the possibility of failure. Despite the problems with which the Republic of Korea is beset, both internally and externally, and despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of stability and public order have continued to improve and the threat of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained.

There is good reason to hope from progress made thus far that with our assistance, the Republic of Korea can survive and thrive. This cannot, of course, be guaranteed. However, it continues to be true that without our assistance there can be no such hope.

B. INITIAL PHASE OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT, JUNE-OCTOBER 1950

5. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK: Telegram From the American Ambassador at Seoul to the Secretary of State, June 25, 1950 2

According to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field adviser reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 a.m. Ongjin was blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 a.m. North Korean infantry commenced crossing the [38th] parallel in the Ongjin area, Kaesong area, and Chunchon area, and an amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was reportedly

1 John J. Muccio.

2 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis (Department of State publication 3922; 1950), p. 11. The telegram was received in the Department of State on June 24, marking the difference between Korean and Washington time.

On May 2, 1951, the United Nations Command released two captured documents setting forth detailed North Korean preinvasion plans for attack on the Republic of Korea; Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for 1 April through 30 June, 1951 (S/2112), pp. 88–94.

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