Former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has characterized these uses of force as "international police action", saying:

They amounted to executive use of the Armed Forces to establish our own and the world's scheme of international order. Two American Presidents used men, ships and guns on a large and expensive scale.1

In 1888 and 1889, civil war took place in Samoa where the United States, Great Britain, and Germany had certain respective treaty rights for the maintenance of naval depots. German forces were landed, and the German Government invited the United States to join in an effort to restore calm and quiet in the islands in the interest of all the treaty powers. The commander of the United States naval forces in the Pacific was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy that the United States was willing to cooperate in restoring order "on the basis of the full preservation of American treaty rights and Samoan authority, as recognized and agreed to by Germany, Great Britain, and the United States." He was to extend full protection and defense to American citizens and property, to protest the displacement of the native government by Germany as violating the positive agreement and understanding between the treaty powers, but to inform the British and German Governments of his readiness to cooperate in causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring peace and order on the basis of the recognition of the Samoan right to independence.2

On July 7, 1941, the President sent to the Congress a message announcing that as Commander in Chief he had ordered the Navy to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of communications between Iceland and the United States as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts and that American troops had been sent to Iceland in defense of that country. The United States, he said, could not permit "the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." For the same reason, he said, substantial forces of the United States had been sent to the bases acquired from Great Britain in Trinidad and British Guiana in the South to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere.3

Thus, even before the ratification of the United Nations Charter, the President had used the Armed Forces of the United States without consulting the Congress for the purpose of protecting the foreign policy of the United States. The ratification of the United Nations Charter was, of course, a landmark in the development of American foreign policy. As noted above, Senator Connally and Senator Millikin agreed that the President was entitled to use armed forces in

1 World Policing and the Constitution, published by the World Peace Foundation, 1945, pp. 66, 67. [Citation in the original memorandum.]

2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. 1, pp. 545-546. [Citation in the original memorandum.]

3 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 87, pt. 6, July 7, 1941, p. 5868. [Citation in the original memorandum.]

protection of the foreign policy represented by the Charter. This view was also expressed in the Senate debates in connection with the ratification of the Charter. For example, Senator Wiley made the following pertinent statement:

It is my understanding, according to the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, that the terms "agreement or agreements" as used in article 43 are synonymous with the word "treaty.' On the other hand, I recognize that Congress might well interpret them as agreements brought about by the action of the Executive and ratified by a joint resolution of both Houses. These agreements would provide for a police force and the specific responsibility of each nation. But outside of these agreements, there is the power in our Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the "supreme laws" are faithfully executed. When we become a party to this charter, and define our responsibilities by the agreement or agreements, there can be no question of the power of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation to international policing. His constitutional power, however, is in no manner impaired.1

An even fuller exposition of the point was made by Senator Austin, who stated:

Mr. President, I am one of those lawyers in the United States who believe that the general powers of the President-not merely the war powers of the President but the general authority of the President—are commensurate with the obligation which is imposed upon him as President, that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That means that he shall take all the care that is required to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

Of course, there are other specific references in the Constitution which show that he has authority to employ armed forces when necessary to carry out specific things named in the Constitution; but the great over-all and general authority arises from his obligation that he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That has been true throughout our history, and the Chief Executive has taken care, and has sent the armed forces of the United States, without any act of Congress preceding their sending, on a great many occasions. I have three different compilations of those occasions. One of them runs as high as 150 times; another of them 72 times, and so forth. It makes a difference whether we consider the maneuvers which were merely shows of force as combined [comprised?] in the exercise of this authority-as I do or whether we limit the count to those cases in which the armed forces have actually entered upon the territory of a peaceful neighbor. But there is no doubt in my mind of his obligation and authority to employ all the force that is necessary to enforce the laws.

It may be asked, How does a threat to international security and peace violate the laws of the United States? Perhaps, Mr. President, it would not have violated the laws of the United States previous to the obligations set forth in this treaty. Perhaps we have never before recognized as being true the fundamental doctrine with which I opened my remarks. But we are doing so now. We recognize that a breach of the peace anywhere on earth which threatens the security and peace of the world is an attack upon us; and after this treaty is accepted by 29 nations, that will be the express law of the world. It will be the law of nations, because according to its express terms it will bind those who are nonmembers, as well as members, and it will be the law of the United States, because we shall have adopted it in a treaty. Indeed, it will be above the ordinary statutes of the United States, because it will be on a par with the Constitution, which provides that treaties made pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law of the land.

So I have no doubt of the authority of the President in the past, and his authority in the future, to enforce peace. I am bound to say that I feel that the President is the officer under our Constitution in whom there is exclusively vested the responsibility for maintenance of peace.

1 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, July 27, 1945, p. 8127-8128. [Citation in the original memorandum.]

2 Ibid., July 26, 1945, p. 8064-8065. [Citation in the original memorandum.]

Action contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is action against the interests of the United States. Preservation of peace under the Charter is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. President Truman said in his inaugural address in 1949:

In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.

First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness.1

In the Korean situation, the resolution of the Security Council of June 25 determined, under article 39 of the Charter, that the action of the North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace and called upon "the authorities in North Korea (a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel." It also called upon "all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." This is an application of the principles set forth in article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter, which states: "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter .. The Security Council resolution of June 27, passed after the North Korean authorities had disregarded the June 25 resolution, recommended "that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." This recommendation was also made under the authority of article 39 of the Charter.

The President's action seeks to accomplish the objectives of both resolutions.

The continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities would have meant that the United Nations would have ceased to exist as a serious instrumentality for the maintenance of international peace. The continued existence of the United Nations. as an effective international organization is a paramount United States interest. The defiance of the United Nations is in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations to bring about a settlement of the problem. It is a threat to international peace and security, a threat to the peace and security of the United States and to the security of United States forces in the Pacific.

These interests of the United States are interests which the President as Commander in Chief can protect by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States without a declaration of war. It was they which the President's order of June 27 did protect. This order was within his authority as Commander in Chief.

1 Address of Jan. 20, 1949; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 124.

14. DESIGNATION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND: Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, July 7, 19501

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 2 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea; 3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

15. DESIGNATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMANDER: Statement by the President, July 8, 1950 3

The Security Council of the United Nations, in its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27,5 make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

The Security Council resolution also requests that the United States designate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council

and have designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the military forces which the members of the United Nations place under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it.

I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

16. UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN REPELLING THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA: Message From the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of India, July 18, 1950 1

I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted Your Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13, 1950, through your distinguished Ambassador in Washington 2 and your subsequent message of the 17th transmitting Prime Minister Stalin's reply to your similar letter to him of July 13. Both the President and I have given the most thoughtful consideration to these communications.

3

One of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the United Nations is the most effective instrument yet devised for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. The United States is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the United Nations.

The purpose of the United States Government and of the American people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the United Nations to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. We desire both to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea and to end it there as required by the Security Council of the United Nations.

We are deeply conscious of the fact that law-abiding governments and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in

1 Transmitted telegraphically through the American Ambassador at New Delhi; Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, pp. 170-171.

2 The message of July 13 contained an appeal for "breaking the present deadlock [over Chinese representation] in the Security Council so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and, whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China, with the help and cooperation of other peaceloving nations, can find a basis for terminating the [Korea] conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem" (ibid., p. 170).

Message of July 15, 1950; Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50 (London, 1953), p. 717.