any people who follow the Communist dictatorship down its dark and bloody path. Against the futile and tragic course of dictatorship, we uphold, for all people, the way of freedom-the way of mutual cooperation and international peace. We assert that mankind can find progress and advancement along the path of peace. At this critical hour in the history of the world, our country has been called upon to give of its leadership, its efforts, and its resources, to maintain peace and justice among nations. We have responded to that call. We will not fail. The task which has fallen upon our beloved country is a great one. In carrying it out, we ask God to purge us of all selfishness and meanness and to give us strength and courage for the days ahead. 21. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGGRESSION IN KOREA: Report of the United Nations Commission in Korea, September 4, 1950 (Excerpt) 1 1 Part Four ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS A. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGGRESSION 202. The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan. 203. This plan of aggression, it is now clear, was an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities, the object of which was to secure control over the whole of Korea. If control could not be gained by peaceful means, it would be achieved by overthrowing the Republic of Korea, either by undermining it from within or, should that prove ineffective, by resorting to direct aggression. As the methods used for undermining the Republic from within proved unsuccessful, the North Korean authorities launched an invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea. B. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 204. The origin of the conflict is to be found in the artificial division of Korea and in the failure, in 1945, of the occupying Powers to reach agreement on the method to be used for giving independence to Korea. 1U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/1350), pp. 32-33. This report, covering the period Dec. 15, 1949, to Sept. 4, 1950, was transmitted by the Chairman of the Commission to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations on Sept. 4, 1950, for transmission to the General Assembly. 2 See Korea's Independence (Department of State publication 2933; 1947), pp. 2-11. This failure was not due to anything inherent in the attitude of the people of Korea themselves, but was a reflection of those wider and more fundamental differences of outlook and policy which have become so marked a feature of the international scene. 205. This artificial division was consolidated by the exclusion from North Korea of the United Nations Temporary Commission, which had been charged by the General Assembly to observe the holding of elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. In the circumstances, it was decided to hold such elections in South Korea alone. 206. Had internationally-supervised elections been allowed to take place in the whole of Korea, and had a unified and independent Korea thereby come into existence, the present conflict could never have arisen. C. PROSPECTS OF UNIFICATION 207. The Korean people, one in race, language and culture, fervently desire to live in a unified and independent Korea. Unification can be the only aim regarding Korea. It did, however, appear to the Commission, before the aggression took place, that unification through negotiation was unlikely to be achieved if such negotiation involved the holding of internationally-supervised elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. Experience suggested that the North Korean authorities would never agree to such elections. 208. It was hoped that, at some stage, it might be possible to break down the economic and social barriers between the two political entities as a step toward unification. That too proved illusory, as the North Korean authorities persisted in their policy of aiming at the overthrow of the Republic of Korea. 209. After the consolidation of the division of Korea, propaganda and hostile activities on the part of the North Korean authorities accentuated tension which, in turn, stiffened the attitude of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea, and even further prejudiced such possibility of unification by negotiation as might have remained. Notwithstanding the continued efforts of the Commission, it appeared on the eve of the aggression that the Korean peninsula would remain divided indefinitely, or at least until international tension had slackened. D. DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 210. The necessity to safeguard the stability and security of the Republic of Korea from the threat from the North gradually became a controlling factor in all the major activities of the administration of the Republic, and absorbed energies and resources which were needed to develop the new form of representative government and to carry out the economic and social reconstruction programme. 1 See U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678); 195 (III) of Dec. 12, 1948 (U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 25-27); and 293 (IV) of Oct. 21, 1949 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 682-684). 211. The first two years of the new National Assembly reflected clearly the difficulties which it would be normal to expect in a body dealing with a new and unfamiliar political structure. It had become clear, long before the act of aggression occurred, that the Legislature was making good progress in its efforts to exert parliamentary control over all departments of government, and would not rest content until its relations with the Executive had been satisfactorily adjusted. The growing civic responsibility shown by the Legislature augured well for the future of representative government in Korea. 212. At the elections of 30 May 1950, the people showed very considerable enthusiasm, and the electoral machinery functioned well. Among the cases of interference with candidates which occurred, some were explainable in the light of the stringent precautions which the Government found it necessary to take in order to safeguard the stability and security of the State against the threat from the North. Although there appeared to be little justification for interference in some other cases, the results of the elections, in which many candidates critical of the Administration were returned, showed that the voters were in fact able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice among candidates, and had cast their votes accordingly. The results also showed popular support of the Republic, and a determination to improve the Administration by constitutional means. 213. The division of Korea added to the economic difficulties that had arisen at the end of the Japanese domination, and made it most difficult for the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting. Funds which might have been expended for the execution of the social and economic programme of the Republic were consumed by heavy defence expenditures. Nevertheless, when the aggression occurred,' substantial progress was being made with that programme. E. KOREAN NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS 214. Serious problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, particularly the grave refugee problem, already confront the country. To these problems will be added problems of yet greater magnitude when the military conflict comes to an end. It will be quite beyond the capacity of the country to provide from its own resources means for rehabilitation. A healthy and viable democracy in Korea cannot come into being unless very considerable aid and assistance are provided from outside Korea. 215. Finally, as the division of the country and the resulting antagonisms were artificial, the Commission believes that, when the conditions under which they arose disappear, it will be possible for the Korean people of both North and South to come again together; to live in peace and to build the strong foundations of a free, democratic Korea. DONE in a single copy in the English language at House No. 328 at Camp Hialeah, Pusan, Korea, this fourth day of September in the year nineteen hundred and fifty. Anup SINGH (Chairman) (India) A. B. JAMIESON (Rapporteur) (Australia) LIU Yu-Wan (China) Angel Gochez MARIN (El Salvador) Bernabe AFRICA (The Philippines) Kamil IDIL (Turkey) Bertil A. RENBORG (Principal Secretary) 22. CALL FOR THE SURRENDER OF THE NORTH KOREAN FORCES: Message From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces, October 1, 19501 The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum. of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct, and I call upon you at once to liberate all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenanceand immediate transportation to such places as I indicate. North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care dictated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable. I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property. Douglas MACARTHUR Doc. S 1829, printed in U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year. Supplement for September through December, 1950, p. 70. 23. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK): Resolution 376 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 19501 The General Assembly, Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112 (II)),2 of 12 December 1948 (195 (III))3 and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)),* Having received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, 5 Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea, Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea, 6 Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area, Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea, 1. Recommends that (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 9-10. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions (A/810), pp. 25-27. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 682-684. (A/1350). 5 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16 |