F. 20 October: A Chinese Communist Task Force known as the "56th" unit consisting of approximately 5,000 troops crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier of this Task Force states that his group was organized out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Manchuria.

G. 1 November: A flight of F-51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 to 9 Jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage was done to US aircraft. A red star was observed on the top of the right wing on one of the Jet aircraft.

H. 1 November: Anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F-80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of 1 UN aircraft.

I. 30 October: Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two additional regiments of 124 CCF 1 Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.

J. 2 November: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the 54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organization as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113 and 114 Divisions of the 38 CCF Army.

K. 3 November: Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119 and 120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.

L. 4 November: As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners had been taken in Korea.

The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the UN.

27. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA: Communiqué by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, November 6, 1950 2

The military position of the United Nations forces in the western sector of North Korea is now sufficiently stabilized and information on enemy unit identifications adequately evaluated to permit me to put the situation growing out of the last few days' operations in proper perspective.

The Korean war was brought to a practical end with the closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and seizure of the east coastal area, resulting in raising the number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over 135,000, which, with other losses amount

1 Chinese Communist Forces.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1950, p. 763.

ing to over 200,000, brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair estimate of North Korean total military strength.

The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies was thereby decisive. In the face of this victory of United Nations arms, the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border.

A possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid, calculated to encompass the destruction of the United Nations forces engaged in restoring order and the processes of civil government in the North Korean border area.

This potential danger was avoided with minimum losses only by the timely detection and skillful maneuvering of the United Nations commander responsible for that sector who, with great perspicacity and skill, completely revised the movement of his forces in order to achieve the greater integration of tactical power necessitated by the new situation, and avert any possibility of a great military reverse. The present situation, therefore, is this:

While the North Korean forces with which we were initially engaged have been destroyed or rendered impotent for military action, a new and fresh army now faces us, backed up by a possibility of large alien reserves, and adequate supply within easy reach to the enemy but beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action.

Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the gravest international significance.

Our present mission is limited to the destruction of those forces now arrayed against us in North Korea, with a view to achieving the United Nations' objective to bring unity and peace to the Korean nation and people.

28. RETENTION OF THE KOREAN-CHINESE

FRONTIER:

Draft Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, November 10, 1950 1

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,

3

Recalling the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,

1 U.N. doc. S/PV 72, Nov. 30, 1950, pp. 22–23. As a result of a Soviet veto on Nov. 30, 1950, the draft resolution failed of adoption.

2 Supra, doc. 8.

Res. 376 (V); supra, doc. 23.

1

Having noted from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 that Chinese communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,

Affirming that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,

Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

Calls upon all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea; Affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

Calls attention to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

Requests the Interim Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and, pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.

29. EXTENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA: Special Communiqué by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, November 28, 1950 2

2

Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past four days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea.

1 Supra, doc. 26.

2 Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session, p. 3495. Reprinted from the New York Times, Nov. 29, 1950.

There exists the obvious intent and preparation for support of these forces by heavy reinforcements now concentrated within the privileged sanctuary north of the international boundary and constantly moving forward.

Consequently, we face an entirely new war.

This has shattered

the high hopes we entertained that the intervention of the Chinese was only of a token nature on a volunteer and individual basis as publicly announced, and that therefore the war in Korea could be brought to a rapid close by our movement to the international boundary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations forces, leaving Korean problems for settlement by the Koreans themselves. It now appears to have been the enemy's intent, in breaking off contact with our forces some two weeks ago, to secure the time necessary surreptitiously to build up for a later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming force, taking advantage of the freezing of all rivers and roadbeds which would have materially reduced the effectiveness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly accelerated forward movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has been disrupted by our own offensive action, which forced upon the enemy a premature engagement.

General MacArthur later issued this additional paragraph to the communiqué:

This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of the United Nations military council-issues which must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world.

30. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (UNKRA): Resolution 410 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 1, 19501

The General Assembly,

A

Having regard to its resolution of 7 October 1950 on the problem of the independence of Korea,2

Having received and considered a report of the Economic and Social Council submitted in accordance with that resolution,3

Mindful that the aggression by North Korean forces and their warfare against the United Nations seeking to restore peace in the area has resulted in great devastation and destruction which the Korean people cannot themselves repair,

Recognizing that as a result of such aggression the people of Korea

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 31-35.

2 Res. 376 (V), supra, doc. 23.

3 See U.N. doc. A/1493

are desperately in need of relief supplies and materials and help in reconstructing their economy,

Deeply moved by the sufferings of the Korean people and determined to assist in their alleviation,

Convinced that the creation of a United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea is necessary both to the maintenance of lasting peace in the area and to the establishment of the economic foundations for the building of a unified and independent nation, Considering that, under the said resolution of 7 October 1950, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is the principal representative of the United Nations in Korea and hence must share in the responsibility for the work undertaken by the United Nations in furtherance of the objects and purposes mentioned in the said resolution,

Considering that it is nevertheless desirable to set up a special authority with broad powers to plan and supervise rehabilitation and relief and to assume such functions and responsibilities related to planning and supervision, to technical and administrative matters, and to questions affecting organization and implementation as are to be exercised under the plans for relief and rehabilitation approved by the General Assembly, such authority to carry out its responsibilities in close cooperation with the Commission,

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY FOR THE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA

1. Establishes the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General, who shall be assisted by one or more deputies. The Agent General shall be responsible to the General Assembly for the conduct (in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly and having regard to such general policy recommendations as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may make) of the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea, as that programme may be determined from time to time by the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea:

(a) To recommend to the Agent General such policies concerning the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's programme and activities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the Commission's responsibilities in relation to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea;

(b) To determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which the Agency shall operate at any time; (c) To designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relationships; and to advise the Agent General on the nature of such relationships;

(d) To take such steps as may be needed to support the Agent