and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of the representation of China in the United Nations.

37. TRANSMITTAL OF THE PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GROUP ON A CEASE-FIRE IN KOREA TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME: Resolution of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, January 13, 1951 1

The First Committee

Invites the Chairman of the First Committee, through the SecretaryGeneral, to transmit the principles approved by it on 13 January 19512 to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and invite that Government to inform him as soon as possible whether it accepts those principles as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems. Upon the receipt of the reply from the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chairman of the First Committee will convene the Committee to consider that reply.

38. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRESSORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the House of Representatives, January 19, 1951 4

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the United Nations should immediately act and declare the Chinese Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea.

39. LABELING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS AGGRESSORS IN KOREA: Resolution of the United States Senate, January 23, 1951 5

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee Meetings, p. 500.

2 i.e., the principles adopted by the General Assembly's Group on a Cease-Fire in Korea on Jan. 11, 1951; supra.

See the reply of Jan. 17, 1951, by Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, declining to accept the principles (Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 29, 1951, pp. 165-166) and Secretary Acheson's comments of the same date (ibid., p. 164).

4 H. Res. 77, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

5 S. Resolution 35, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

40. CONDEMNATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA: Statement by the United States Representative at the United Nations Before Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, January 24, 1951 2

Mr. Chairman: The present stage of debate in this Committee reveals a situation which is confused and uncertain. We must not let our minds be taken away from essential facts and basic principles. The facts are not in dispute. The principles are the principles of the Charter. This Committee should stop a moment and consider calmly and objectively the essential elements of the situation which confronts us. What are these elements?

First, an organized armed aggression was committed by the forces of North Korea against the Republic of Korea across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. The facts of this aggression are unchallengeable. They were established by the United Nations Commission in Korea.3 Let us at the very beginning be absolutely clear about these events. There would have been no fighting in Korea except for that aggression. Further, that aggression was committed with the encouragement, participation, and support of the authorities in both Peiping and Moscow who furnished manpower and supplies to enable the aggression to occur. Interrogation of prisoners of war taken by the United Nations forces reveals that long before June 25, Communist China provided to North Korean authorities large numbers of military personnel of Korean ancestry, estimated at 50,000 troops, drawn from the forces of Communist China.

Most of the military supplies came from the Soviet Union. At the very beginning of this aggression, the Security Council passed two resolutions on June 25 and June 27.4 I should like to urge that delegates reread these resolutions. They still apply to the present situation. Those resolutions and the action taken by the United Nations thereafter illustrated a principle of the Charter in operation; the United Nations was in fact and in deed fulfilling its purpose to maintain international peace and security and to that end taking collective measures for the suppression of an act of aggression.

Another essential element is that the Peiping regime has put its own organized armed forces into Korea to assist the North Koreans. It has committed a special offense in waging war against the United Nations. It has affronted the United Nations by the pretense that these forces are volunteers. Does anyone in this room really believe that the intervention in Korea of the Chinese Communists' troops is a spontaneous act by the Chinese people and not an official decision of the Peiping regime? Does anyone believe that this intervention does not in fact and in law constitute aggression as that word is used in the Charter?

1 Warren R. Austin.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1951, pp. 203-205, 220. For a similar statement by the U.S. Representative on Nov. 28, 1950, in the United Nations Security Council, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1950, pp. 929–936. See supra, pp. 2537-2538.

See supra, pp. 2538-2539 and 2540-2541.

These are the facts from which we must start. What is the United Nations called upon to do in this present situation? We must oppose and not reward the aggression. The first article of the Charter states that it is the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law adjustment or settlement of situations. What does this mean? It means the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea where they have no right to be. Fundamental to the present situation is the fact that the United Nations forces are in Korea to repel aggression and to restore peace. United Nations forces should leave Korea when these missions are accomplished. United Nations forces should not leave Korea under such conditions as would invite an early resumption of North Korean or Chinese Communist aggression. A second step is to settle the Korean problem. On what basis? The United Nations gave long consideration to this last October before the General Assembly adopted its resolution of October 7, 1950. That resolution is as valid today as it was then because it is in accordance with the principles of the Charter. We might all pause and reread that resolution and refresh our recollection of what are the United Nations objectives in Korea and how they should be achieved. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly also sets forth conditions for the withdrawal of United Nations forces.

A third step to bring about a general easing of the tension in the Far East is to turn to the peaceful settlement of other Far Eastern questions. As far as the United States is concerned, we are ready at all times to take part in appropriate processes of peaceful settlement for these and other questions. The United States Government takes seriously its solemn obligations under article 33 of the Charter. If discussions are held, the United States will enter them in good faith. We will not commit ourselves in advance nor will we insist in advance, as the Chinese Communists do, that the discussions must lead to a predetermined result in our favor.

Where are we now in terms of carrying out the purposes of this great organization? What has been happening since the Chinese Communist intervention began and this Committee started dealing with the problem?

It has been 7 weeks since the General Assembly put this item on its agenda as an important and urgent matter. In the weeks which intervened, the Committee and its members have made unceasing efforts to bring about in Korea peace with justice, in accordance with principles of international law and the Charter. All these efforts were rebuffed by Peiping.

The final effort was made on January 13 with the transmission to Peiping of the five principles representing the minimum basis on which an honorable settlement could be achieved. On January 17, the

1 See supra, pp. 2576-2578.

2 See supra, doc. 37.

Peiping regime flatly rejected the five principles. Its response, including its so-called counterproposal,' was utterly unacceptable. This final effort at peaceful settlement having been rebuffed, the United States introduced its resolution setting forth the undisputed facts and providing for further steps which, we believe, the United Nations is called upon to take under the Charter.2

This is where things stood when Sir Benegal Rau reported a further communication from Peiping to the Indian Ambassador.3 The United States has great respect for India and for Sir Benegal's sincerity. We admire his efforts, but, as the Philippine delegate said, we cannot agree that this new communication changes very much.

In the first place, what is the status and character of this communication and to whom is it addressed? Does it purport to supersede the response from Chou En-lai dated January 17, or is it merely an amplification of the earlier response? If it is in answer to some questions put to the Peiping government, what were those questions? Has the Peiping government reconsidered its earlier reply, and does it wish now to make a further communication to the United Nations? If that is so, there are simple ways for making such official and responsible communications and the Chinese Communists know how to do it. The United States does not wish ever in any case to close the door to the possibility of negotiation and settlement by peaceful means in an honorable way. Nor do we wish to be lacking in decent respect for the opinion of others. But this latest communication from Peiping appears to have all the aspects of a dusty answer. It appears to be designed to confuse the United Nations, to divide its members, and to becloud the issues that are before us.

If we read the proposal as a new offer to the United Nations and give it the benefit of every doubt as to its purport and its purposes, one thing remains clear: it is not an acceptance of the United Nations' proposal of January 13. Nowhere does it recognize the United Nations or the resolutions of this Assembly.

The latest communication talks of a cease-fire for a limited time. Does that mean that the negotiations might be interrupted at any moment by a new attack from the Chinese Communists because the talks were not going in exactly the way they wish? Are they seriously asking the United Nations to enter discussions in such circumstances? The five principles contemplated the immediate arrangement of a cease-fire to continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by the United Nations.

The Chinese Communist response does not accept the principle that all non-Korean troops shall be withdrawn by appropriate stages from Korea. Instead, it says only that the Central People's Government will "advise" Chinese volunteers to return to China if the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea has been accepted and is being put into practice. In other words, the United

1 See United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951 (Department of State publication 4263), pp. 35–36.

2 See infra, doc. 42.

3 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee, Meetings, p. 525.

Nations forces are to be treated as having less right in Korea than the forces of the aggressor, and only after the withdrawal of United Nations forces has begun will the Central People's Government "advise" its troops to go home.

Further, the cease-fire is not to be arranged in advance, but it is to be negotiated by a 7-nation group while hostilities are still in progress. Later negotiations, after the limited cease-fire, are agreed to by the Central People's Government only in terms which prejudge the outcome according to that Government's desires. Is this negotiation or discussion in the accepted meaning of the word? Is this what this committee had in mind when it transmitted the basis for a cease-fire to Peiping?

Finally, the response demands, and I am now quoting the language read to us by Sir Benegal on Monday, "The definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be insured." This presumably means that the United Nations is given an ultimatum that it must agree to accept a government currently an aggressor as the representative of China. The decision as to which government should represent China in the United Nations is a decision to be made by the United Nations. We have every confidence that it will be made soberly and justly, taking into account all the relevant circumstances. Surely, one of these relevant circumstances is the behavior of the Peiping regime and the fact that its armies are now on foreign soil as an invader, presently in battle with the forces of the United Nations and shedding the blood of soldiers of many of the Governments sitting at this table. It is a matter of common sense as well as of principle that no government can gain entry to the United Nations by force of bayonets and bullets. You can't shoot your way into the United Nations.

The question of Formosa, the Chinese representation, and of other Far Eastern problems have been or can be put on the agenda of the United Nations and dealt with by orderly United Nations processes. Various members of the United Nations may take differing views on the question of Chinese representation and perhaps also on the future of Formosa. But they cannot possibly disagree with my Government's view that these problems must be solved in the United Nations. in accordance with the Charter and the procedures provided for therein and not by blackmail.

When we compare the five principles and the latest Peiping communication, what do we find? The five principles meant in effect. that if the Chinese Communists ceased their attacks on United Nations forces, there could be an end to hostilities in Korea, and then there could be bona fide discussions with a view to achieving United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means and to settling other outstanding questions in the Far East. The Peiping communication does not in fact agree to a cessation of hostilities; it does not in fact agree to discussions in good faith.

It is clear to us, as I am sure it is to most other members of the United Nations, that the Peiping reply is another rejection. It is