If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war-not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

THE BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China? It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong-tragically wrong-for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war.) It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have

inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength. every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea-and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Commurist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

AVOIDING CONFUSION OVER U.S. POLICY

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: the fighting must stop.

Two: concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: there must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective-to repel attack and to restore peace. In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace. The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming. We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

44. UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC EMBARGO AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: Resolution 500 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, May 18, 19511

The General Assembly,

Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,2

Recalling its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951,3

Nothing [Noting] that:

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,

(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of States have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,

(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contribu

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 A (A/1775/Add. 1), p. 2.

2 See U.N. doc. A/1799.

3

Supra, doc. 42.

tions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,1

1. Recommends that every State:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war;

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo; (c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution;

(d) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within thirty days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution;

2. Requests the Additional Measures Committee:

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;

(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

3. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

45. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT: Statement by the Secretary of State, June 1, 1951 2

The real issues in the discussion before us are peace or war, and the survival of human freedom.

It is not just a difference as to method which is now under examination. What is challenged is the bedrock purpose of our foreign policy, and of what we have been trying to do. That is the place I would like to start, in this brief statement.

See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee, 443d Meeting.

2 Made before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees; Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1951, pp. 923–926.

The foreign policy of the United States has a central and dominant objective to protect the nation and to safeguard the future of its people. We stand ready to defend our future by force of arms if that necessity is forced upon us. But we seek to deter war if we can.

Another world war would be destructive beyond experience; it would not solve problems, but multiply them. Therefore, it is part of our fundamental purpose to prevent, by all honorable means, the outbreak of another general war.

Even before the last world war was over, while our young men were storming the beaches at Normandy and Saipan and dozens of other places now engraved in our memories, the resolution was forming among our people that future wars must be prevented.

Their conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of our nation and of our people was to prevent war, and that the way to go about it was through an international system of collective security.

The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nationsthese were not cynical slogans. They represented the idea which our people felt in their hearts was worth fighting for.

It has been the purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with that idea.

The attempt to build a collective security system on the basis of the cooperation of all the great powers broke down because of the policies of the Soviet Union. But Soviet ambitions have not been able to obstruct our determined efforts.

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, we have been building a collective security system based on the cooperation of those nations who are dedicated to peace.

The united and determined effort of our people to build effective instruments for keeping the peace is recorded in a series of vigorous and far-sighted actions: the United Nations Charter itself, the Rio Treaty, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. We have been building our strength, together with our allies. We must be strong enough to keep the peace.

Side by side with these programs there is another basic element in our foreign policy: to assist the hundreds of millions of people who were acquiring their independence after the war, so that they might be free to develop in their own way, and to join in an international system for preserving the peace.

Our hopes for peace required us to understand the changes which were in motion among vast populations of the Middle East and Asia, and to help peoples who had just gained their independence from losing it again to the new imperialism of the Soviet Union.

Those are the big, central ideas that express what we have been trying to do in the world.

THE CHALLENGE OF KOREA

The attack on Korea was a blow at the foundation of this whole. program. It was a challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world. It