by recommending their consideration at a political conference following an armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation accepted a revised Communist proposal now contained in article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, which provides:

"In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement. is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."

(4) Prisoners of war

The background of this question, and the position of the United Nations Command was outlined in the Special Unified Command report of 18 October 1952 (A/2228).1 As indicated at that time, the only issue preventing agreement was Communist insistence that all prisoners of war must be repatriated, even if the use of force should be necessary to effect their return, and United Nations Command refusal to use force against such unwilling prisoners. When the Communists insisted that there were in fact no prisoners who refused to be repatriated, but that the United Nations Command was detaining them against their will, the United Nations Command made numerous proposals for impartial determination of the true attitudes of the prisoners of war. The Communists refused to submit this question to the test and thus further delayed achievement of an armistice.

On 8 October 1952, the United Nations Command Delegation recessed the negotiations.2 In doing so, it made clear that the numerous proposals which it had made for an honourable solution of the prisoner question remained open. Whenever the Communists were prepared to negotiate in good faith, to accept any one of the United Nations Command proposals, or to make a constructive proposal of their own on the prisoner issue, the United Nations Command Delegation would be prepared to meet again.

At this juncture the Korean question came before the General Assembly, and the United States Government, as the Unified Command, reported on the state of the negotiations. It urged the Assembly to approve the principle of nonforcible repatriation and to call upon the Communists to accept an armistice on this basis. A definite plan for the solution of the prisoner-of-war question was proposed by India and discussed in the hope of gaining Communist approval, and on 3 December 1952, by a majority of 54 votes in

1 Released also as U.S. delegation press release No. 1554, Oct. 18, 1952. 2 See Suspension of the Korean Armistice Negotiations, Oct. 8, 1952; infra, doc. 61.

favour, with only the Soviet bloc in opposition, the General Assembly adopted resolution 610 (VII). This resolution specified that force should not be used against prisoners to prevent or effect their return, and it set forth a detailed series of proposals which the Assembly believed would form a just and reasonable basis for an agreement on the prisoner issue. The Communists rejected this plan, and hopes for an armistice in the foreseeable future appeared dim.

Nevertheless, the Unified Command continued to examine every possibility for solving the prisoner question. Seizing the opportunity offered by a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on 13 December 1952, which appealed to the parties, as a gesture of good will, to implement the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded prisoners of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, on 22 February 1953, addressed a letter to the Communist commanders stating that the United Nations Command still remained ready to implement, immediately, the repatriation of the sick and wounded, and asking if the Communists were prepared to proceed with the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners in their custody.2 The United Nations Command had made this same proposal to the Communists on a number of previous occasions during the armistice negotiations, but they had failed to respond. It was hoped that the Communists would at last agree to such an exchange, that it would bring about the return of at least some of the United Nations Command prisoners of war, and that this first step might pave the way for the solution of the prisoner issue as a whole. The hopes of the United Nations Command in this regard proved not unwarranted. On 28 March the Communists agreed to the principle of the exchange of sick and wounded, which they stated "should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war", and arrangements for the exchange were initiated through the respective liaison officers on 6 April.3

The Communist acceptance was followed on 30 March by a statement by Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Communist People's Government of the People's Republic of China, subsequently endorsed by the Prime Minister of the North Korean regime, indicating a desire to resume negotiations on the entire prisoner question and a readiness to take a more constructive and humane attitude on the question of forcible repatriation.

Sick and wounded prisoners of war were in fact exchanged between 20 April and 3 May 1953 pursuant to an agreement reached on 11 April 1953.5

1 Infra doc. 62.

2 See U.N. Proposal for the Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War, Feb. 22, 1953; infra, doc. 63.

3 See U.N. Request for Detailed Communist Statement Concerning the Question of Repatriating Prisoners of War, Apr. 5, 1953; infra, doc. 64.

▲ Ibid.

See Repatriation of Sick and Injured Captured Personnel, Apr. 11, 1953; infra, doc. 65. See also the 67th Report of the U.N. Command (S/3084), Aug. 21, 1953; also found in Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 28, 1953, pp. 423-425.

1

Negotiations by the plenary armistice delegations on the prisonerof-war question as a whole resumed on 26 April. At the outset, the Communists submitted a proposal for sending all prisoners not directly repatriated to an agreed neutral State where for six months after their arrival representatives of the States to which they belonged would "explain" to them matters related to their return; if after this period any non-repatriates remained, their disposition would be referred to the political conference. Discussion subsequently centered upon the questions of what neutral State should be nominated, of whether non-repatriates should be removed from Korea, and how long the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody. On 7 May, the Communists put forward a new proposal 2 providing for establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to be composed of the four States already nominated for membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, namely, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, and India as agreed upon by both sides. This Commission was to take custody of the prisoners in Korea. The United Nations Command on 13 May presented a counter-proposal shortening the period of time in which the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody, providing for release of Korean non-repatriates immediately after the armistice, and proposing that only Indian forces take actual custody of the non-repatriates. The Communists rejected this proposal.

4

On 25 May, the United Nations Command, in another effort to obtain Communist agreement on an equitable solution of the prisoner issue, submitted a new proposal providing for the transfer of both Korean and Chinese non-repatriates to neutral custody and for consideration of the disposition of any remaining non-repatriates by the political conference for a limited period, after which they might either be released to civilian status or the question of their disposition referred to the General Assembly. On 4 June, the Communists offered a counter-proposal in effect based upon the mechanics of General Assembly resolution 610 (VII), also closely parallelling the United Nations Command 25 May proposal, but vague on the basic principle of non-forcible repatriation. The United Nations Command succeeded in reaching agreement with the Communists on elaboration of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission's terms of reference to insure that there could be no abuse and that the principle approved by the General Assembly that force should not be used to compel or to prevent repatriation of any prisoner of war would be fully observed.

On 8 June, the Senior Delegates for the United Nations Command and for the Communists signed the Prisoner-of-War Agreement which is attached to and incorporated by reference in the Armistice Agree

1 See Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1953, pp. 687-688.

2 Ibid., May 18, 1953, p. 727.

3 Ibid., May 25, 1953, pp. 755-757.

See 70th Report of the U.N. Command, Sept. 14, 1953 (S/3096).

ment. The delegations then proceeded to the final arrangements looking toward an early signature of the armistice.

As a result of discussions with the Republic of Korea, described in the succeeding section, a Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of War was signed on 27 July 1953, which permits the United Nations Command (and the Communists if applicable), to transport the nonrepatriates to the Demilitarized Zone where the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission will take custody of them.

D. The attitude of the Republic of Korea

On 18 June an incident occurred which further delayed the achievement of an armistice at a time when the conclusion of hostilities seemed imminent. On that date, officials of the Republic of Korea brought about a break-out from prisoner-of-war camps of some 27,000 Korean prisoners of war who had previously indicated they would resist repatriation to North Korea.3 This action by the Republic of Korea was inconsistent with the 8 June Agreement on Prisoners of War which the United Nations Command had entered into on behalf of all the forces under its command. The United Nations Command at once protested the action of the Republic of Korea Government.* It immediately informed the Communists of the event and told them that, while efforts would be made to recover as many of the escapees as possible, there was not much hope that many of these could be recaptured since they had melted into the South Korean population.5

6

This incident led to immediate discussions with the Republic of Korea by representatives of the Unified Command. After prolonged conversations, the Republic of Korea gave assurances that it would not obstruct the implementation of the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

The incident, however, gave the Communists an excuse for delaying still further the conclusion of the armistice. They demanded assurances that the United Nations Command would live up to the Armistice Agreement, that the Republic of Korea and its forces would also abide by it, and that the released prisoners would be recaptured." The United Nations Command reply to the Communists stressed that the armistice was a military agreement between military commanders and that it was being entered into by the United Nations Command,

1 Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724–750.

2 Ibid.

See Escape of North Korean Non-Repatriate Prisoners of War, June 18, 1953; infra, doc. 66.

See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 20, 1953; infra, doc. 67. See also message of June 22, from the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Lester B. Pearson, to the President of the Republic of Korea; Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, pp. 14-15.

See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 29, 1953; infra, doc. 68.

Concerning these discussions, see statement by Assistant Secretary Robertson of June 22 on his departure for Korea (Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1953, p. 14) and statement by the Secretary of State of June 30 on the status of the Rhee-Robertson discussions (ibid., July 13, 1953, pp. 45-46). See also Common Objectives with Respect to Korea, July 11, 1953; infra, doc. 82.

7 See letter from the Commanders-in-Chief of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces in Korea to the Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command, June 19, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906-907.

as Commander of all the forces under its command, including those of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command Delegation also told the Communists that so far as recovering the released prisoners of war, as they had already been informed, this would be impossible; they were assured, however, that the remaining nonrepatriate prisoners would be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, as provided by the agreement on prisoners of war. The Communists were assured that the United Nations Command forces (including those of the Republic of Korea) would observe the armistice. The United Nations Command informed the Communists, however, that it would not undertake to use force against the Republic of Korea forces to ensure compliance with the armistice. by the Republic of Korea.'

Despite these comprehensive assurances by the United Nations Command, the Communists continued to delay negotiations and in the meanwhile launched the biggest offensive in more than two years, an offensive which obviously took much planning and preparation and caused heavy casualties. Finally, however, on 19 July, the Communists stated their readiness to proceed with the final work on the Armistice Agreement leading to its signature.

The armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953, at 10 a. m. Korean time.

49. INITIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN SOVIET AND UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATION OF AN ARMISTICE: Statement by the Department of State, June 28, 1951 2

The United States has sought in New York and in Moscow a clarification on certain aspects of the statement made by Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, on June 23.3 Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States Ambassador in Moscow on June 27. In discussing Mr. Malik's statement, Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic Command, on the one hand, and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units,' on the other, to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters; the military representatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption of hostilities.

Beyond the conclusion of an armistice, the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that

1 See Escape of Prisoners of War, June 29, 1953; infra, doc. 68.

2 Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 45.

Text in New York Times, June 24, 1951.