followed after the signing of an armistice agreement. The U.N. delegation presented the following principles:

1. There shall be a cease-fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.

2. There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.

3. There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.

4. The Military Armistice Commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the Armistice Commission.

5. There shall be general withdrawal of forces of each side, Air, Ground, and Naval, Regular and Irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.

6. There shall be no armed forces in the Demilitarized Zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.

7. The Military Commanders shall administer their portion of the Demilitarized Zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

55. EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR: Proposal by the United Nations Command, January 2, 1952 1

The UNC [United Nations Command] proposal is as follows:

1. POWS [Prisoners of War] who elect repatriation shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis until one side has exchanged all such POWs held by it.

2. The side which thereafter holds POWs shall repatriate all those POWs who elect to be repatriated in a one-for-one exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side, and for civilians and other persons of the one side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in the territory under control of the other side, and who elect to be repatriated. POWs thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual shall not again bear arms against the side releasing him.

3. All POWs not electing repatriation shall be released from POW status and shall be paroled, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict.

4. All remaining civilians of either side who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so elect.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 21, 1952, pp. 105-106. For the text of a Soviet counter-proposal introduced in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on Jan. 3, 1952, and comments thereon by the Secretary of State, see ibid., Jan. 14, 1952, pp. 46-47.

5. In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made without duress, delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs at the points of exchange, and all civilians of either side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory under the control of the other side.

6. For the purposes of paragraphs 2, 4 and 5, civilians and other persons of either side are defined as those who on 25 June 1950 were bona-fide residents of either ROK 2 or the DPRK.3

In summary, the UNC proposal provides for the release of all POWs, including soldiers of the other side who may have been incorporated into the army of the detaining power. Thus, it is consistent with the first principle advanced by your side that all POWs be released. As regards repatriation, it permits freedom of choice on the part of the individual, thus insuring that there will be no forced repatriation against the will of an individual. It provides repatriation not for POWs alone but for those other victims of war, the displaced civilians. All those who desire it are permitted to return to their former homes. Finally the proposal provides for a supervisory organ to interview the persons involved to insure that, whatever their choice, such choice will be made freely and without duress.

In advocating your proposal of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war your side has many times asked the question, "What could be fairer than the release and repatriation of all prisoners of war following the armistice?" Today, in the proposal, the UNC gives you the answer to that question. The release of all persons who are or should be classified as prisoners of war, and the repatriation of those who desire to be repatriated, is fairer than the release and forced repatriation of all prisoners of war. Moreover, it is fairer to permit displaced civilians who so desire to return to their former homes, under the Armistice Agreement, than to neglect their interests in that agreement. We ask your earnest consideration and early acceptance of this proposal.

56. CONVENING OF A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON CONCLUSION OF AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: Resolution 507 (VI) of the United Nations General Assembly, February 5, 1952 *

The General Assembly,

4

Desiring to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations in Panmunjom and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, and Wishing to avoid premature consideration of items 17 and 27 of the agenda of the present session,5

1 International Committee of the Red Cross.

2 Republic of Korea.

3 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

4U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119), p. 7.

5 Item 17 concerned the problem of the independence of Korea; item 27, the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

Decides that:

I

(a) Upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the SecretaryGeneral shall convene a special session of the General Assembly at the Headquarters of the United Nations to consider the abovementioned items; or

(b) When other developments in Korea make desirable consideration of the above-mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly,' shall convene a special session or an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the Headquarters of the United Nations;

II

Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by General Assembly resolution 571 B (VI) of 7 December 19512 to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

57. THREE-POINT PROPOSAL FOR AN ARMISTICE SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND: Statement by the President, May 7, 1952 3

3

The United States fully approves and supports without qualification the proposal for reaching an armistice which General Ridgway has offered to the Communist aggressors in Korea.1

Last July the United Nations forces had repulsed Communist aggression in Korea, had proved to the Communists that aggression cannot pay, and had brought new hope for peace to free men around the world. The Soviet Union then indicated that Korean hostilities could be terminated by a military armistice. The United Nations Command in good faith and in a sincere desire to find a basis for a peaceful settlement began armistice talks with the Communists in Korea.

After many trying months of negotiation, in which each issue has been dealt with individually, tentative agreement has been reached

1 U.N. doc. A/520/Rev. 2, June 5, 1951.

2 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119), p. 66.

3 Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, pp. 787-788.

The proposal was made to the Communists at Panmunjom by the U.N. Command Delegation on Apr. 28, 1952, in an executive session. Following the Communist rejection of the proposal, the executive sessions were terminated, and General Ridgway released the substance of the proposal to the press (see ibid., pp. 786–787).

on all but three issues. It is now apparent that the three remaining issues cannot be resolved separately. The United Nations Command proposal offers a just and a real opportunity to resolve these three issues together and simultaneously. The three-point proposal is:

1. That there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war as the Communists have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United States and of the United Nations.

We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.

The United Nations Command has observed the most extreme care in separating those prisoners who have said they would forcibly oppose return to Communist control. We have offered to submit to an impartial re-screening-after an armistice of those persons we would hold in our custody.

Nothing could be fairer. For the Communists to insist upon the forcible return to them of persons who wish to remain out of their control is an amazing disclosure before the whole world of the operation of their system.

2. That the United Nations Command will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields.

3. That the neutral nations supervisory commission should comprise representatives of four countries; Poland and Czechoslovakia chosen by the Communists, Sweden and Switzerland chosen by the United Nations Command.

The three parts of General Ridgway's proposal are all parts of a whole. They must be considered as an entity-not piecemeal. Our agreement is contingent upon acceptance of the whole proposal. This is our position. The Communists thus far have indicated only a willingness to withdraw their proposal that the U.S.S.R. be a member of the neutral inspection commission. This spurious issue was raised by them late in negotiations and its withdrawal is no real concession on their part.

The patience and understanding shown by General Ridgway and the United Nations Command negotiators merit the highest praise. In spite of almost overwhelming provocation, they have made real progress in reaching agreement on many substantial terms for an armistice. General Ridgway's proposal offers a sound and sensible way to settle the remaining issues all at once. It will have compelling appeal to those sincerely desiring peace.

58. PROGRESS OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS: FortySecond Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the United Nations Security Council, June 13, 1952 (Excerpt) 1

1

Substantive progress was made on agenda item 3, concrete arrangements, through the persistent efforts of United Nations Command staff officers.

The subject of ports of entry was finally resolved when the United Nations Command reduced its requirement for these complexes from six to five and the Communists agreed to the following United Nations Command provisions:

A. A port of entry shall include the railheads, airheads and seaport facilities associated with and supporting a city, and

B. Rotation and replenishment shall be conducted only in the mutually agreed ports of entry.

Detailed maps of the ports of entry were prepared by each side and were exchanged. The following specific ports of entry have been prepared:

A. By the Communists: Sinuiju, Chongjin, Manpojin, Hungnam and Sinanju.

B. By the United Nations Command: Pusan, Inchon, Kangnung, Kunsan and Taegu.

Slight progress was made on the subject of the neutral nations inspection teams when the Communists agreed, on the staff officers level, that these teams will not be authorized to inspect or examine secret designs or characteristics of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons or ammunition.

The United Nations Command Representatives have brought up repeatedly the problem of neutral nations and the previously agreed to principle which stated that the neutral nations would be selected on the basis of being mutually acceptable to both sides, reiterating their stand that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not acceptable to the United Nations Command as a neutral nation. In each instance the Communist side answered with vague generalities.

There are only two important issues remaining to be settled under agenda item 3. United Nations Command reports numbers thirtyseven, thirty-eight and forty have explained the United Nations Command position on these issues, which are:

A. Agreement to limit airfield construction and rehabilitation
B. Agreement on the composition of the neutral nation inspection

teams

1 U.N. doc. S/2662, June 13, 1952, pp. 2-3.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 597-599; ibid., May 5, 1952, pp. 715-718; ibid., June 23, 1952, pp. 998-1001.