59. REQUEST FOR SOVIET GOOD OFFICES IN OBTAINING NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: Note Delivered by the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister,2 July 23, 1952 3

3

1

Early in the course of the Korean hostilities, on July 13, 1950, the North Korean authorities issued a declaration stating that they would strictly abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention in respect to prisoners of war. On July 16, 1952, the Chinese Communist authorities issued a declaration of intention to adhere, with certain reservations, to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, for the protection of prisoners of war.

Up to the present time, the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities have failed to observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention. More specifically, the following provisions which are of particular importance to the welfare of the personnel of the United Nations Command who are prisoners in North Korean and Chinese Communist hands have not been observed: inspection of prisoner of war camps by an impartial international body has not been permitted (Article 126); relief parcels have not been delivered (Article 72); and prisoner of war camps have been placed in areas in proximity to military objectives, exposing the prisoners to danger of attack (Article 23). The United Nations Command has consistently abided by the provisions of the Geneva Convention and has in good faith carried out the responsibilities laid upon belligerents by this convention.

It is, therefore, requested that in the interest of the accomplishment of the humanitarian objectives of the Geneva Convention, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics use its good offices with the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities, for the purpose of requesting them to observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

60. PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR PROBLEM: Statement by the Chief United Nations Command Negotiator at Panmunjom, September 28, 1952 6

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I have an important statement to make. For many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked the achievement of an armistice in Korea. On July 1 we suggested to you that a solution to the problem

1 George F. Kennan.

2 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.

Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 4, 1952, pp. 171-172.

Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims (Department of State publication 3938; 1950), pp. 84–161. The convention was ratified by the United States on July 14, 1955.

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr.

Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 549–550.

must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation.

Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command has made honest efforts to achieve an armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United Nations Command delegation has attempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.

We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without military observers of both sides, be admitted to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all prisoners of war of both sides be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:

A. International Committee of the Red Cross

B. Teams from impartial nations

C. Joint teams of military observers

D. Red Cross representatives from each side

Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fear you might have had that the prisoners of war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an armistice.

I now present to you three additional alternate proposals any one of which will lead to an armistice if you truly desire one.

I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an armistice by both sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to one of the following procedures.

A. Proposal Number One:

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance with the provisions of article three of the armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner of war shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so.

Such former prisoner of war shall thereupon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status,

and, in accordance with paragraph 52 of the armistice agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.

B. Proposal Number Two:

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:

1. International Committee of the Red Cross

2. Joint Red Cross teams

3. Joint military teams

C. Proposal Number Three:

As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective, all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those prisoners of war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint teams of military observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.

We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals.

For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hours on 8 October.

Our staff officers will be available at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals.

61. SUSPENSION OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS: Statement by the Secretary of State, October 8, 19521

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As was made clear by General Clark's statement, the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom are not terminated. After the Communists rejected all of the latest proposals made by the U.N. Command delegation, General Harrison 3 called a recess. The duration of the recess is entirely up to the Communists. General Harrison made it clear that the U.N. Command delegation continues ready to negotiate and will again meet with the Communist delegation whenever they are ready to accept any one of our numerous proposals or make a constructive proposal of their own for an honest settlement

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 600.

2 Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command; see ibid., pp. 600-601, for his statement.

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., U.S. Army, senior delegate, U.N. Command Delegation.

of the prisoner-of-war question. However, the U.N. Command delegation will not continue to go to Panmunjom merely to be subjected to Communist abuse and propaganda harangues.

For many months we have been attempting to negotiate an honorable armistice with patience and sincerity. The three alternative proposals which General Harrison presented on September 281 represented a further earnest effort by the United Nations to find an acceptable solution to the prisoner-of-war question. All three of those proposals preserve the humanitarian principles of nonforcible repatriation. Any one of these proposals could lead to an armistice. The Communists have claimed that the U.N. Command has forced prisoners to say they would resist repatriation, although, in fact, the opposite was the case. The U.N. Command pointed out to each prisoner the possibilities that his family might be persecuted if he refused repatriation and that the U.N. Command could make no promise whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who refused to go home. General Harrison's proposals even included the device that the prisoners should be taken in small groups to a neutral area and there be released to walk north or south. Certainly, nothing could be more fair or reasonable. If the Communists want to settle this issue, our latest proposals point the way.

We have submitted numerous proposals throughout the negotiations and have thoroughly explored every possible solution, while the Communist negotiators have utilized the negotiating table as a sounding board for false and vicious propaganda. We have tried everything we can think of to meet the considerations raised by the Communists.

We have said and will continue to say that we shall not compromise on the principle that a prisoner should not be forced to return against his will. For us to weaken in our resolve would constitute an abandonment of the principles fundamental to this country and the United Nations. We shall not trade in the lives of men. We shall not forcibly deliver human beings into Communist hands.

General Harrison's action last night does not represent a loss of hope in an armistice; we believe that it is an affirmative step toward obtaining an armistice. The Communists must now recognize that the position of the U.N. Command is firm as well as right. The Communists must now recognize that they cannot continue to toy with the hopes of the world for a Korean peace. We continue to believe that a humanitarian solution to the prisoner-of-war question can be found, and that this can be done at Panmunjom.

As General Clark said this morning, we remain ready at any time to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to show whether they too want such an armistice.

1 Supra.

62. PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR PROBLEM: Resolution 610 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1952 1

The General Assembly,

Having received the special report of the United Nations Command of 18 October 1952 on "the present status of the military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea" and other relevant reports relating to Korea,

2

Noting with approval the considerable progress towards an armistice made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question,

Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved,

Mindful of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting,

Deeply conscious of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,

Anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the political conference as provided in article [paragraph] 60 of the draft armistice agreement,3

1. Affirms that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement;

2. Affirms that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention;

3. Accordingly requests the President of the General Assembly to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the

4

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2361), pp. 3-4.

2 U.N. doc. A/2228, Oct. 18, 1952.

Ibid., annex A.

On Dec. 17, 1952, the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the President of the U.N. General Assembly acknowledging receipt of the above resolution and rejecting its provisions; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1953, pp. 422-423.