c. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the Liaison Group of the other side with a detailed description of the markings utilized to identify motor convoys and rail movements. This shall include color, size and manner in which the markings will be displayed.

d. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shail provide the Liaison Group of the other side with the sites and markings of the bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys. e. Each side shall inform the Liaison Group of the other side, twenty-four (24) hours in advance of each movement, of the selected route, number of cars in rail movement or number of vehicles in motor movement, and the estimated time of arrival at Kaesong or Munsan-ni.

f. Each side shall notify the Liaison Group of the other side, by the most expeditious means of communications available, of the location of emergency stop-overs.

7. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the October 22, 1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers,' with the exception of the part therein provided for in Paragraph 8 of this Agreement, shall continue in effect. Liaison Groups of both sides and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within, the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each Liaison Group and its party shall be as determined by the Senior Member thereof; however, in order to avoid congestion in the conference site area, the number of personnel of each side in the area, including captured personnel under its control, shall not exceed three hundred (300) persons at any one time. Each side shall transfer repatriated personnel out of the Panmunjom conference site area as expeditiously as possible.

8. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the armed military police of each side, who undertake to maintain order within the conference site area, shall be increased from the maximum number of fifteen (15), as provided for in the October 22, 1951 Agreement Between Liaison Officers, to thirty (30).

9. Other administrative details shall be mutually arranged by officers designated by the Senior Member of the Liaison Group of each side.

10. This agreement is effective when signed and will terminate twenty (20) days after the commencement of repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel at Panmunjom.

1 For the full text of the agreement, see U.N. Command Rept. 32 (U.N. doc. S/2469, Jan. 5, 1952), in Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1952, pp. 270-272.

415900-57—vol. 2- 64

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, this 11th day of April 1953, in the English, Korean and Chinese languages, all texts being equally

authentic.

LEE SANG CHO

66. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command at the Armistice Discussions to the Senior Delegate of the Communist Command, June 18, 1953 2

Gen. NAM IL,

Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army, and the
Chinese People's Volunteers:

Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 North Korean prisoners of war, who have refused to be repatriated following an armistice, broke out of United Nations Command prisoner of war camps Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 9.

Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea indicate that the action had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at top levels in the Korean Government and that outside assistance was furnished the prisoners of war in their mass breakout. Republic of Korea Army security units assigned as guards at the prisoner of war camps did little to prevent the breakout, and there is every evidence of actual collusion between the Republic of Korea Army guards and the prisoners.

The Republic of Korea Army security guard units used at the camps containing anti-Communist prisoners of war had been considered especially suitable in view of the previous cooperative attitude of these prisoners while in custody.

These Republic of Korea Army security guard units which have left their posts at nonrepatriate camps are being replaced by United States troops.

Efforts are being made to recover the prisoners now at liberty and

1 Concerning approval by the U.N. General Assembly on Apr. 18, 1953, of the above agreement, and the General Assembly's decision to recess its Seventh Session upon completion of extant agenda items, subject to reconvening to consider the Korean question either on the signing of an armistice agreement or in case of other developments in Korea, see U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20A (A/2361/Add. 1), pp. 3-4.

2 Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 905-906.

as of 1 o'clock this afternoon, 971 escaped prisoners of war had been recovered.1

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Senior Delegate

United Nations Command Delegation.

67. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the President of the Republic of Korea, June 20, 1953 2

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the summer of '1950, when the United States and other nations responded to your appeal to the United Nations to repel the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, the United Nations received from you a message assigning command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea to the commander, United Nations Command, for the duration of hostilities.3

The United Nations Command did not seek, and indeed, did not consider necessary any further or more formal commitments from your Government regarding the participation of Republic of Korea armed forces in the United Nations Command. I therefore have considered and do now consider that I have full command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea. Nothing in our long association during our mutual prosecution of our common cause has prepared me to believe that I should consider otherwise. This notwithstanding, and in clear violation of my authority, certain officers and men of the Republic of Korea Army willfully permitted the escape of many thousands of lawfully detained prisoners of war from various prisoner of war installations during the early morning hours of 18 June 1953, such officers and men having been officially enjoined with responsibility for the security of said installations and for the detention of said prisoners. Further, I have received information through the public press that this action was initiated on your orders and issued through an official who is not within the forces under my command.

I must inform you with all the sincerity which I possess that I am profoundly shocked by this unilateral abrogation of your personal commitment, which was so freely and voluntarily given at the time.

1 For the texts of the reply of the Communist commanders of June 19, 1953, charging the U.N. Command with the responsibility for release of the prisoners, and of other pertinent statements made after this outbreak, see ibid., pp. 905-908. 2 Ibid., June 29, 1953, p. 907. For other documents on the release of the prisoners by officers and men of the ROK Army, including a statement of June 18, 1953, by the Secretary of State, see ibid., pp. 905-908. For a message from Lester B. Pearson, President of the U.N. General Assembly, to President Rhee concerning the release of the prisoners, see ibid., July 6, 1953, pp. 14-15.

For the text of President Rhee's letter of July 15, 1950, see ibid., Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206.

1

As a matter of fact on several occasions in recent weeks you have personally assured both Ambassador Briggs and me that you would not take unilateral action with reference to R. O. K. forces under my control until after full and frank discussion with me.

Your actions today have clearly abrogated these assurances.

I cannot at this time estimate the ultimate consequences of this precipitous and shocking action on your part, nor can its effect on the common cause for which we have sacrificed so much during these past several years be forecast at this time.

Sincerely,

MARK W. CLARK,
General, U.S. Army

68. ESCAPE OF NORTH KOREAN NON-REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR: Letter From the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the Commanders-in-Chief of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces,2 June 29, 1953 3

The United Nations Command agrees, of course, that the escape of about 25,000 captured personnel of the Korean People's Army is a serious incident and unfortunately has not been conducive to the early armistice for which both sides have been earnestly striving. The United Nations Command, by means of General Harrison's letter of 18 June 1953, immediately informed you of the facts regarding the loss of these prisoners.*

We felt that you deserved to have this information at the earliest possible time. However, in your letter of 19 June I note that for one reason or another you fail to accept the realities of the situation which we accurately reported to you, and you have made several inaccurate statements of fact. In an earnest endeavor to achieve an early armistice, I shall further clarify these facts.

Despite our voluntary and accurate presentation of these facts you still seem to consider that the "escape" of the prisoners and their "release" by order of the Republic of Korea Government are contradictory terms. The fact is, as you are well aware by this time, that the prisoners "escaped" by breaking through the prison fences and barricades and, except for those who were captured, disappeared into the civil population. They were "released" in that the Republic of Korea Government, without the knowledge of, and contrary to the intent of, the United Nations Command, planned and arranged the breakout, and the Republic of Korea Army security guards made little real effort to prevent the escape.

1 Ellis O. Briggs, American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

2 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai.

3 Department of State Bulletin, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47. For the text of the Communist commanders' reply to the June 29 letter, see ibid., July 20, 1953, pp. 73-74.

Supra, doc. 66.

For the text of the Communist commanders' letter to General Clark of June 19, 1953, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.

In replying to the questions which you asked in your letter, I believe that you realize the armistice which both of us seek is a military armistice between the military commanders of both sides. The United Nations Command is a military command and, contrary to the opinion indicated in your letter of 19 June, does not exercise authority over the Republic of Korea, which is an independent sovereign state whose government is the product of the self-determination of its millions of people. The Republic of Korea Army was placed by its Government under the control of the United Nations Command in order to more effectively repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea. I believe it should be clear to you that the United Nations Command, as the result of a commitment made by the Republic of Korea, does not command the Republic of Korea Army. In this incident that Government violated its commitment, issuing orders which were unknown to me, through other than recognized military channels to certain Korean army units, which permitted the prisoners of war to escape.

You also asked whether the armistice in Korea included the Republic of Korea as represented by President Syngman Rhee; another question, which is closely related, expressed your interest in knowing what assurances there may be for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea. It is necessary here to reiterate that the armistice which we seek is a military armistice between the commanders of both sides and involving the forces available to the commanders of both sides.

It is recognized that certain provisions of the armistice agreement require the cooperation of the authorities of the Republic of Korea. You are assured that the United Nations Command and the interested governments concerned will make every effort to obtain the cooperation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Where necessary the United Nations Command will, to the limits of its ability, establish military safeguards to insure that the armistice terms are observed.

Our willingness to do this should be apparent to you by the concurrence which we have given to those portions of the terms of reference which require the United Nations Command to take certain action to insure the safety and security of the neutral nations reparation commission and its personnel.

It is regrettable that you choose to allege that the United Nations Command connived in the escape of the prisoners. Besides being contrary to the obvious facts, such accusation tends to obstruct rather than to facilitate an armistice agreement. The United Nations Command is continuing its efforts to recover the prisoners of war who have escaped. It would be unrealistic, however, and misleading to imply that an appreciable number of these prisoners could be recovered now that they have disappeared among the population, which is disposed to shelter and protect them. You undoubtedly realize that the recovery of all these prisoners would be as impossible for us as it would be for your side to recover the 50,000 South Korean prisoners "released" by your side during the course of hostilities. You, of course, understand that the cessation of hostilities will facilitate the return of the escaped Korean prisoners of war to your side if they are not opposed