to such return. Under the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the draft armistice agreement, the escaped prisoners of war can proceed to your side if they so desire after the armistice becomes effective.

Following the signing of an armistice, the exchange of those prisoners of war who desire repatriation will involve the 12,000 of our personnel reported by you in April 1952, plus the additional ones captured since that date and now in your hands, as compared with about 74,000 of your personnel, including approximately 69,000 Koreans, now in our hands, whom we are prepared to return to you.

This letter is an earnest effort by the United Nations Command to acquaint you with the facts. It is suggested that the delegations meet immediately to exchange information as to the time at which respective components of the neutral nations supervisory commission can be prepared to function in order that an effective date for the armistice may be established and, on receipt of that information, the armistice agreement as has been developed by our respective delegations be signed.

[KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, JULY 27, 1953] 1

1

69. SIXTEEN-NATION DECLARATION ON KOREA ISSUED AT WASHINGTON, JULY 27, 1953 2

"We the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commanderin-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms. "The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

"Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia."

1 Supra, pp. 724-750.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

70. TRIBUTE TO UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA: Resolution 712 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly, August 28, 1953 i

The General Assembly

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 25 June, 27 June and 7 July 1950 and the resolutions of the General Assembly of 7 October 1950, 1 December 1950, 1 February 1951, 18 May 1951 and 3 December 1952,2

Having received the report of the Unified Command dated 7 August 1953,3

Noting with profound satisfaction that fighting has now ceased in Korea on the basis of an honourable armistice,

1. Salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all those countries which sent armed forces to its assistance;

2. Pays tribute to all those who died in resisting aggression and thus in upholding the cause of freedom and peace;

3. Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful, and expresses its firm conviction that this proof of the effectiveness of collective security under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

E. INCIDENTS INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1953

71. SHOOTING DOWN OF SOVIET BOMBER: Message Delivered by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General, September 5, 1950 5

On September 4, 1950, United Nations naval forces were operating off the west coast of Korea at approximately the 38th parallel on missions in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of June 27, 1950.6

At 13:29 o'clock, Korean time, a twin-engine bomber identified only by bearing a Red Star passed over a screening ship and continued

1 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session. Supplement No. 20 B (A/2361/Add. 2), p. 2.

2 Supra, docs. 8, 10, 14, 23, 42, 44, and 62.

3 Supra, doc. 48.

4 Ernest A. Gross.

toward the center of the United Nations formation in a hostile manner. The bomber opened fire upon a United Nations fighter patrol which returned its fire and shot it down.

A United Nations destroyer succeeded in picking up the body of one member of the bomber crew. Identification papers indicated that the body was that of Lt. Mishin Tennadii Vasilebiu, of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., Serial No. 25054.

72. UNITED STATES REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SOVIET NOTE CONCERNING BOMBER: Statement by the American Ambassador at Moscow, September 6, 1950

1

The American Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, was called today to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, who read to him a note on the subject of the airplane incident which took place off Korea on September 4 and which was reported to the Security Council by the deputy representative of the United States, Ernest A. Gross, the following day."

Admiral Kirk made the following statement in reply to Mr. Vyshinsky:

The information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.

Admiral Kirk did not accept the note for delivery to this Govern

ment.

73. SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST UNITED NATIONS AIRCRAFT: Communication Delivered by the United States Representative at the United Nations to the U.N. Secretary-General, November 24, 19514

The United States representative to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to report the following from the Unified Command under the United States for submission to the Security Council:

A United Nations plane, a two-motored P2V bomber operating under General Ridgway's command in connection with the U.N. operations in Korea failed to return from a weather reconnaissance

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 454.

2 Supra.

3 Warren R. Austin.

Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 909.

over the Sea of Japan on November 6, 1951. An intensive search for survivors proved fruitless.

From the last reported position of this plane at 0850 (-9 time zone) on November 6, it is undoubtedly this plane that was the subject of a Soviet statement to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow on November 7 admitting that two Soviet fighter planes fired on a two-engine bomber at 1010 November 6 in the vicinity of Cape Ostrovnaya.

The route this plane was following did not approach closer than 40 miles to U.S.S.R. territory, and the plane crew had been thoroughly briefed not to approach closer than 20 miles to U.S.S.R. territory under any circumstances.

It can only be concluded that an intentional or unplanned approach to the Russian coast was not made, and the plane was intercepted and attacked without warning while over international waters, and furthermore, while well outside of 20 miles from the Russian coastline.

74. SHOOTING DOWN OF SOVIET IL-12 BY UNITED NATIONS AIRCRAFT: Statement by the Department of State, August 1, 1953 2

According to confirmed information received from United States military authorities, an aircraft of the IL-12 type was attacked and shot down by a United States Army Air Force fighter plane on a combat mission for the United Nations' Command over Korean territory at 12:25 p. m., local time, on July 27, 1953. The location of the United States plane at the time of the attack was 41 degrees 38 minutes north latitude and 126 degrees 55 minutes east longitude. This position is inside Korean territory approximately eight miles from the Yalu River.

The United States Government assumes that the foregoing incident is the one which is the subject of the Ministry's Note of July 313 in which the Soviet Government falsely alleges that the attack took place over Chinese territory. Since facts available to United States military authorities and to the United Nations' Command have clearly established that the attack was carried out over Korean territory prior to the termination of hostilities there, the Embassy has been instructed to reject the Ministry's Note as being without foundation in fact.

The United States Government can only deplore the loss of life incurred in this incident. In view of the fact, however, that the incident occurred in the Korean Zone of hostilities, the responsibility therefore must rest with those Soviet authorities who flew the Soviet aircraft through Korean territory.

1 See ibid.

2 Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179. For a reply to this note by the Soviet Foreign Ministry handed to Ambassador Bohlen on August 11, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1953, p. 237. For the U.S. reply of Jan. 26, 1954, to the Soviet note, see ibid., Mar. 15, 1954, pp. 410-413.

Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179.

F. THE COMMUNIST "GERM WARFARE" CAMPAIGN, 1951-1953

75. REFUTATION OF COMMUNIST CHARGES OF GERM WARFARE: Statement by the Secretary of State, May 7, 19511

I have just been reading the alleged "confessions" of two American fliers who were shot down in Communist-held North Korea in January. I should like to talk about these so-called "confessions" for a minute because they are so revealing, though not in the sense that Communist propagandists intended.

A reading of these statements makes one fact crystal clear: while they may have been signed under duress by the American fliers, they were dictated by Communist propagandists. They contain all the Communist clichés so alien to American youths. We have no way of knowing, of course, whether the fliers signed the statements at all.

Both statements have picked up the standard Communist picture of the world as divided into two hostile "camps"-the so-called "peace-loving camp" of Communists and the "imperialistic" and "warmongering" camp of Wall Street.

For example, Lt. Kenneth Enoch is alleged to have stated: "I have seen the truth as printed by the democratic Chinese press, and all these truths and kind treatment show all the more clearly the lies and untruthful war propaganda of the Wall Street radio and press . . . I am beginning to see very clearly just who is the peace-lover and who is the warmonger responsible for this inhuman war, and I am determined to struggle for peace against Wall Street capitalism, to clear my conscience of past errors. I am filled with determination to join the peace-loving camp."

I submit that there are no two men in the whole U. S. Air Force who would of their own volition express themselves in such terms.

These statements are, of course, merely additional trumped-up "evidence" to support the utterly false Communist charges that we have waged bacteriological warfare in Korea. They are another example of the incredible lengths to which they will go to propagate the "big lie."

These charges have been flatly denied by American authorities, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by authorities of other nations having forces in Korea. Moreover, the Communists, knowing their charges would not stand up under the scrutiny of competent, independent investigators, have refused the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct an impartial investigation on both sides of the battleline in Korea. They have rejected an offer of the U. N.'s World Health Organization to provide technical assistance in Communist-held areas where we were accused of having caused epidemics.

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, p. 777.