81. DISCUSSION OF GERM WARFARE CHARGES IN THE EIGHTH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Statement by the United States Representative,1 November 3, 1953 2

The objective of the United States in the discussion of this item was to bring the truth before the world so that these dreadful things would never happen again. Two main events have taken place since the General Assembly last April passed its resolution calling for an impartial investigation of the charges of use by the United Nations forces of bacteriological warfare. The first event was that the Republic of Korea and Japan indicated their acceptance of the investigation. The Chinese and North Korean Communists did not reply to the communication of the President of the Seventh General Assembly on this subject. The second event related to certain materials introduced by the Soviet Union in connection with the debate on this item in the Seventh General Assembly. I am referring to the so-called "confessions" of six American fliers that they had waged bacteriological warfare over North Korea and China.5

4

These fliers had been repatriated and had indicated their so-called "confessions" were obtained under coercion and torture. My Government brought this to the attention of the Committee and also indicated to the Committee the significance of the entire bacteriological warfare campaign in relation to the general political tactics of worldwide Communist imperialism."

Since the resolution of the Seventh General Assembly is still operative, my Government saw no occasion for any further resolution on the subject. An impartial investigation can be conducted pursuant to that resolution, any time that the Chinese or North Korean Communists indicate their willingness to cooperate.

The Soviet Union, however, introduced into the Committee discussion a resolution calling upon all states which have not acceded to or ratified the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,8 for the "prohibition of use of bacteriological weapons to accede to the Protocol or ratify it." This Soviet resolution was properly described in the Committee as a "red herring," totally irrelevant to the question which the Committee was discussing. It was pointed out that the sole motive of the action of the Soviet Union was to cast an aspersion on my Government and thus divert attention from a debate which it could not win.

1 Henry Ford II.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 758-759.

3 Res. 706 (VII), supra, doc. 79.

• Supra.

5 U.N. docs. S/2802 (Oct. 1, 1952) and A/C.1/L.28 (Mar. 12, 1953). See also letter from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative at the United Nations, to the Secretary-General, dated Oct. 26, 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1953, p. 648), and U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.66, dated Oct. 26, 1953, containing statements from U.S. fliers repudiating germ warfare confessions. See statement of Oct. 26, 1953, by Charles W. Mayo, U.S. Representative in the General Assembly, in Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1953, pp. 641–647. 7 U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.67, Oct. 26, 1953.

8 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, p. 65.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Colombia, France, and New Zealand introduced into the Committee, and the Committee accepted, a proposal to refer to the Disarmament Commission the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. My Government supported this resolution in the Committee and will vote for it today. The entire question of the elimination of bacteriological warfare as well as of other major weapons of mass destruction properly belongs in the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union has reintroduced into the General Assembly the same resolution which it presented to the Committee. The adoption by this Assembly of the resolution approved in the Committee in the view of my Government will make unnecessary a vote on the Soviet resolution.

I sincerely hope that the debate on this matter has established to the satisfaction of all members of the General Assembly that these frightful charges of the use of bacteriological warfare by U.N. forces in Korea are totally unfounded and are false. I further hope that all states will consider thoroughly the significance of such a campaign. of falsehood in relation to the broader subject of the political tensions now engulfing the world.

G. EFFORTS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN KOREA, 1953-1955

82. COMMON OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO KOREA: Joint Statement Issued at Seoul by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 2 and the President of the Republic of Korea, July 11, 1953 3

During the past 2 weeks we have had many frank and cordial exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep friendship existing between the Republic of Korea and the United States and have gone far toward achieving mutual understanding of the troubled questions which have arisen in connection with arrangements for an armistice, the exchange of prisoners, and the forthcoming political conference.

These discussions have cemented our determination to continue and extend in the postarmistice period the close collaboration for our common objectives, marking our relations since the Communist aggression commenced 3 years ago.

In respect to the prisoners of war, we have reaffirmed our determination that no prisoners shall be subject to coercion and that, at the end of the specified period, all prisoners desiring to avoid returning to Communist jurisdiction shall be set free in South Korea, or, in the

1 U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.68, adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1953. 2 Walter S. Robertson.

3 Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, pp. 72-73. For further information relating to the Rhee-Robertson talks, see ibid., July 27, 1953, pp. 101–102. 415900-57-vol. 2-65

case of the non-Communist Chinese, to proceed to a destination chosen by them.

Our two Governments are in agreement in respect to entering into a mutual-defense pact, negotiations for which are under way.

We have likewise discussed collaboration along political, economic, and defense lines, and our conversations have disclosed a wide area of agreement concerning these matters.

In particular, we wish to emphasize our determination to work together for the realization within the shortest practical time of our common objective; namely, a free, independent, and unified Korea.

We are confident that the spirit of accord in which our talks have progressed, and the large areas of agreement which have resulted, will be followed by continuing mutual consideration and by the spirit of mutual accommodation which will lead most certainly to our broad objective of a secure and lasting peace in the Far East.

83. UNDERSTANDING RESPECTING A POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA: Statement by the Secretary of State at a News Conference, July 28, 19531

Asked about reports that the United States had agreed with President Syngman Rhee to withdraw from the Korean political conference after 90 days of the convening of that conference, Secretary Dulles said:

I think that what there is to say has already been said, but I will be glad to try to make it clearer. We have agreed through Assistant Secretary Robertson that if after 90 days it seems that the conference is a sham and unproductive and is being availed of by the Communists as a cover for carrying on subversive activities in Korea, we would join with President Rhee in walking out of the political conference. We will make our own decision on this as the conference progresses. We have made it clear to President Rhee, however, that we would not automatically resume war at that time. It was made clear to him that the question of what, if anything, we would do would be a matter for discussion and agreement at that time in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

84. POST-ARMISTICE UNITED STATES-KOREAN POLICY: Joint Statement Issued at Seoul by the Secretary of State and the President of the Republic of Korea, August 8, 1953 2

Our friendly and understanding consultations demonstrate clearly the determination of the United States and the Republic of Korea to stand together in cordial cooperation to achieve our common objectives, including the reunification of Korea.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 10, 1953, pp. 176–177. 2 Ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203-204.

We have today initialed a draft of a mutual defense treaty. That treaty is designed to unite our nations in common action to meet common danger and it will cement the ties which have brought us together to combat in Korea the menace of Communist aggression.

Our two Governments will actively proceed with the constitutional processes necessary to bring this treaty into full force and effect. These constitutional processes, in the case of the United States, require that the U.S. Senate consent to the ratification. The U.S. Senate, having adjourned this week, will not again be in regular session until next January. However, U.S. Senate leaders have been kept fully informed of the exchange of views which have led to the action we have taken today and it is our sincere hope that this will lead to prompt and favorable U.S. Senate action.

Between now and the date when the mutual defense treaty can be expected to come into force and effect, our armed forces in Korea will be subject to the U.N. Command which will comply with the armistice terms. If, during this period, there should occur unprovoked armed attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice, the UNC, including the Republic of Korea forces, would at once and automatically react, as such an unprovoked attack would be an attack upon and a threat to the UNC itself and to the forces under its command. Such reaction to an unprovoked armed attack would not be a new war but rather a resumption by the Communist forces of the active belligerency which the armistice has halted. The UNC will be constantly alert against such an attack. Our Governments will promptly negotiate agreements to cover the status of such forces as the United States may elect to maintain in Korea after the mutual defense treaty comes into force and effect, and the availability to them of Korean facilities and services needed for the discharge of our common task. In the meantime, the Republic of Korea will continue to cooperate with the UNC and the status of UNC forces in Korea and the availability to them of Korean facilities and services will continue as at present.

The armistice contemplates that a political conference will be convened within 3 months, that is, prior to October 27, 1953. At that conference the U.S. delegation, in cooperation with the Roк delegation and other delegations from the UNC side, will seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and independent nation. We and our advisers have already had a full and satisfactory exchange of views which we hope and trust will establish a preparatory foundation for coordinated effort at the political conference.

If, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it becomes clear to each of our Governments that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communist delegates mainly to infiltrate, propagandize, or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, we shall then be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free, and independent Korea which is the postwar goal the United States set itself during World War II, which has been ac

cepted by the United Nations as its goal and which will continue to be an object of concern of U.S. foreign policy.

We recognize that the Republic of Korea possesses the inherent right of sovereignty to deal with its problems, but it has agreed to take no unilateral action to unite Korea by military means for the agreed duration of the political conference.

We contemplate that the projected 3 to 4 year program for the rehabilitation of the war-ruined Korean economy shall be coordinated through the combined economic board, under the joint chairmanship of the Korean and American representatives. This program contemplates the expenditure of approximately one billion dollars of funds, subject to appropriations thereof by the U.S. Congress. Two hundred million dollars has already been authorized, out of prospective defense savings.

We have exchanged preliminary views with respect to various problems involving the maintenance and development of Rok land, air, and sea forces.

We feel confident that the relationship thus established between our two Governments marks an important contribution to the developing of independence and freedom in the Far East. With unshaking faith in the principle of collective security, and with loyal adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, we intend to move forward together toward the achievement of our common objectivethe restoration of a unified, democratic, and independent Korean nation.

There are no other agreements or understandings stated or implied resulting from these consultations other than those herein contained.

85. CONVENING OF A POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON KOREA: Resolution 711 (VII) of the United Nations General Assembly, August 28, 1953 ì

1

A

IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 60 OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE

The General Assembly

AGREEMENT

2

1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

1 U. N. General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20 B (A/2361/Add. 2), p. 2.

Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724-750.