be resumed? No-it does not. The armistice agreement provides that it shall remain in effect until expressly superseded.

Will the Communists resume hostilities? I do not think so. The destruction in North Korea is indescribable. Whole villages have been wiped out, power stations have been destroyed, and factories, roads, farmhouses, and public facilities are in ruins. The Communists took a terrific beating. We stopped the tide and timetable of Red aggression.

Posters all over North Korea depict peace, and children releasing white doves. The emphasis is on civilian building. The construction of huge concrete bunkers and tunnels in the north leads us to believe they have no wish to resume hostilities but are preparing to hold the north.

Will President Rhee unilaterally resume hostilities? In my judgment the answer is "no."

President Rhee is an indomitable fighter for a free, united, and democratic independent Korea. Those are our objectives and of the United Nations. We admire his patriotism and courage and his fight against communism tremendously.

We have signed the armistice and are determined to keep it. On August 7, 1953, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles signed a joint communiqué1 in which President Rhee agreed to leave his troops under the United Nations Command and to take no unilateral action until the mutual defense pact might be expected to come into operation next spring if approved by the Senate. In view of his talks with Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, and Vice President Nixon and my many talks with him on this subject, I believe President Rhee will take no unilateral action.

What is the argument all about? Why can't we and the Communists agree on the time, place, and composition of the conference? Time and place are relatively easy. As to time, we are agreeable to any date so long as there is adequate time to prepare the necessary facilities, transport the delegations, etc. As to place, we say Geneva, the Communists say New Delhi, and we could probably agree on Beirut, or Colombo or Kandy or Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon.

The meat of the coconut is the composition. Who will attend the conference-who will be bound by agreements reached? Can we bring about unification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces? With regard to composition, although the armistice does not so provide, the other side proposed we should invite five neutrals, including the U.S.S.R. as one of them, with the same rights to participate in the discussions and to vote as the nations on the two sides. They include the U.S.S.R. among these truly neutral nations presumably to hide her aggression in Korea. The U.S.S.R. cannot be classified with such truly fine neutrals as Burma, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. We have said the U.S.S.R. can attend provided the other side wants her.

It is readily apparent why the U.S.S.R. is not a neutral and why it would be desirable to have her at the conference and to know her 1 See supra, doc. 84.

attitude on each agenda item at the conference-whether she agreed with the other side and whether she will be bound by any agreements reached.

Why do the Communists want neutrals? The Communists think they can stir up trouble for us with India by nominating her as a neutral at the conference. They want well-intentioned people to believe that the Government of the United States does not like India, its great leader, or its freedom-loving people, which is fantastic.

Let me here pay tribute to a great military man, a great humanitarian, and a man combining superb common sense with patience and a warm friendly feeling for the helpless prisoners of war-General Thimayya of India, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. I believe that General Thimayya is in full sympathy with our desire to observe the unalterable clockwork timetable of the agreement for the release of the prisoners of war.

If the political conference is in session December 22 to January 22, it can discuss until that date but no longer the disposition of prisoners who have not elected repatriation to the country of their origin. It cannot discuss that question longer than January 22. If it is not in session that does not affect by one jot the automatic operation of the time schedule for the release of prisoners.

On midnight, January 22, unless both sides ask them to remain, the Indian forces will withdraw and the prisoners will be assisted to a neutral country. We have assured General Thimayya our side will not so request.

I think there is reason to hope that there will be no action either by the Communists or the Republic of Korea to cause_bloodshed and that the prisoners will revert to civilian status on January 22 without difficulty or trouble.

To stop the other side's byplay as to neutrals and to further the early convening of the conference, our side has put forward an overall constructive proposal for the participation at the conference of neutrals as nonvoting observers on the items on the agenda as agreed between the two voting sides and in the order of discussion as agreed upon. This would permit India and the others to participate as nonvoting observers and to discuss items on the agreed agenda and in the agreed order. If an item is not on the agenda it cannot be discussed. Nor can items be brought up out of their agreed order.

Except for the other side's insistence on the U.S.S.R. participating as a neutral, and ironing out the particular neutrals to participate which really constitutes no fundamental difficulty, we have fully met the other side on this question as to the participation of nonvoting observers and their rights at the conference and voting procedures.

As to voting, each side votes as a unit. But any nation, in accordance with resolution 5 (b) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on August 28, 1953,2 can announce before the voting_she does not elect to be bound by her vote on that particular item. This should facilitate agreement.

1 See supra.

2 See supra, doc. 85.

The other side insists that talk continue and that there should be no voting until all nations on each side are bound. If any one nation's vote, as a practical matter, is really needed-for example, unification of Korea or withdrawal of foreign forces-this would, as a practical matter, have to be worked out before voting took place; so really we are not too far apart.

Thus we may have to have some agreement as to the territorial integrity of Korea and agreement to insure that the troops withdrawn across the northern border will not return or that other troops will not cross the border when we withdraw pursuant to some agreement to be worked out for phased withdrawal of troops at the peace conference.

Do I feel there still is a good chance for a true Korean peace, or has Panmunjom demonstrated the futility of a Korean political conference? I do believe the Chinese Communists are determined to keep North Korea politically and economically integrated into their own economy. The outlook is discouraging but by no means hopeless. There is no easy, pat solution. It will take all the brains, energy, resolution, and patience at our command.

Communists are in no hurry. They have no timetable. They think time is on their side and that Americans, being optimistic, friendly, truthful, constructive, and inclined to believe and to hope for the best, will become discouraged.

They believe that at a long, drawn-out conference the American negotiators will be forced by American public opinion to give in, in order to have a "successful" conference. Impatience mounts as no progress is reported. People ask, "What progress did you make today?"

The Communists know this and burn bonfires under the American negotiators and utter rude, insulting, arrogant demands that the American negotiators stop their unconstructive, stalling tactics.

The Communist press is completely government-controlled. Ours is free and pray God it ever shall be. The Communists can plan and talk and vote as a unit. We must marshal facts, argue, and convince the individual nations on our side. I wouldn't have it otherwise. But sometimes it's tough to see your best play spilled before it gets off the ground because someone has unintentionally revealed the signals.

As against that, consider how much better off we would be today if the secret agreements with respect to China, Manchuria, and the U.S.S.R. had never been entered into at Yalta without notice to Nationalist China or to the American public.

The issue between us and the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists-slavery or freedom-is fundamental. There is no easy formula which can either hide it or solve it.

We are fighting to free the minds and souls of men from communism and we in the free world must stand together in this great fight.

It is not a fight of left against right. It is a fight for the human dignity of man as a creature of God against the Communist doctrine that he has no value except as the state desires to use him.

88. RESOLUTION ON THE HOLDING OF A FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE AGREED TO BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION AT THE BERLIN FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 18, 1954 2

1

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

89. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED AND INDEPENDENT KOREA: Statement by the Secretary of State at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, April 28, 1954 *

We are here to establish a united and independent Korea. It may be given us to write a new page in what has been a tragic history. The people of Korea for centuries lived together as one nation, and together they have long endured foreign subjugation and aggression. They have sought to be united in freedom and independence. This is a right which no nation or group of nations can legitimately deny them.

The United States has come here with the Republic of Korea and with the other governments whose armed forces came to Korea's

1 John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Georges Bidault, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

2 Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399; 1954), pp. 221–222. The substance of this resolution was incorporated in the quadripartite communiqué of the Berlin Conference, Feb. 18, 1954; supra, pp. 2372-2373.

The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954, pp. 45-53.

assistance, in a renewed and determined effort to aid the Korean people to realize their reasonable and rightful aspirations.

Why does Korea remain divided? The 1943 Declaration of Cairo 1 promised that victory over Japan would be used to make Korea "free and independent." But that has not happened.

The present phase of Korea's martyrdom goes back to August 1945. Then the United States, which had for four years borne the burden of the Japanese War, agreed that the Soviet Union might move into Manchuria and Korea north of the 38th parallel, in order to accept there the surrender of the Japanese. But the Soviets, having gotten into North Korea for one purpose, stayed on for another purpose. Their goal has been, directly or through puppets, to turn North Korea into a satellite state and, if possible, to extend their rule throughout all Korea. In so doing, they have consistently defied agreements with their former allies, and also the collective will represented by the United Nations.

It is important that we should constantly have in mind that what is here at stake is not merely Korea, important as that is; it is the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations assumed primary responsibility for establishing Korea as a free and independent nation. It helped to create the Republic of Korea and nurtured it. When aggressors threatened the Republic of Korea with extinction, it was the United Nations which called on its members to go to Korea's defence.

Korea provides the first example in history of a collective security organization in actual operation. If this Conference is disloyal to the United Nations and its decisions, then each of us will bear a share of responsibility for destroying what protects us all.

Yesterday, the Delegates of the Republic of Korea and of Colombia told eloquently of the mission which the United Nations had assumed in relation to Korea.3 It is a story that bears repetition.

The United Nations first took jurisdiction of the Korean problem in the year 1947. It then created a Temporary Commission for Korea to help.organize a government of Korea and to observe the initial elections. The Soviet Union refused to permit the United Nations Commission to have access to North Korea. Elsewhere the Commission functioned as the United Nations had intended.

In December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly received the report of its Temporary Commission and it adopted, by a vote of 48 to 6 with one abstention, a resolution which I shall read. The resolution declared:

"That there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and juris

1 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22.

2 See General MacArthur's Order No. 1 of Sept. 2, 1945; The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. II, pp. 442–445.

Statements of Apr. 27, 1954; The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 34-39 and 41-45.

General Assembly Res. 112 (II), Nov. 14, 1947; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677–678.