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(2) In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea.

2. The three Communist delegations rejected these principles. In the first place, they argued that the United Nations, through the collective action taken in Korea, had lost its moral and legal authority to deal with the Korean problem. For example, in a speech to the Conference on 11 May 1954, Mr. Molotov said:

"In the situation which has arisen the United Nations has deprived itself of the possibility of acting as an impartial international organ [,] and it can no longer play an objective part in the settlement of the Korean question.""

The same viewpoint was expressed on 22 May by Mr. Chou En-lai, who asserted that:

"... the United Nations has been placed in the position of a belligerent in the Korean War and has lost its competence and moral authority to deal impartially with the Korean question". Mr. Nam Il told the Conference on 22 May that:

"We fail to understand the statement[s] of some delegates who have called upon the Korean people to respect the United Nations' actions and resolutions on the Korean question." "

3. The Governments which participated in the United Nations action in Korea believed that it was essential to declare and adhere to the first of the principles mentioned above in order to uphold the validity of the Charter of the United Nations and the legality of the collective action undertaken by the United Nations to repel the Communist aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea. This principle was reaffirmed by the General Assembly which, in a resolution of 28 August 1953, expressed satisfaction that "the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful" and expressed its firm conviction that "... this proof of the effectiveness of collective security under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security". Our delegations at the Geneva Conference therefore rejected the contention that the United Nations, in taking collective action against aggression, had lost its authority under the Charter to find a peaceful solution of the Korean question. We believe that, had we taken any other position in this matter at Geneva and accepted the repudiation of the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea,

1 The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (Department of State publication 5609; 1954), p. 97.

2 Ibid., p. 117.

this would have gravely undermined the principle of collective security which is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Our Governments also strongly believed that the second principle genuinely free elections was essential to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Free elections are the only means by which the Korean people can express their will without fear of coercion; they are, therefore, the essential first step towards the unification of Korea. To ensure that the elections are held under conditions of genuine freedom in Korea, we maintained that they must be conducted under appropriate supervision. In our view, such supervision must be impartial and effective and should be under the authority and auspices of the United Nations.

5. The proposals put forward by the three Communist delegations on the subject of elections were, briefly, that:

(1) Elections in Korea must be prepared and conducted by an "all-Korean commission" in which North and South Korea would have equal representation and which would function only by agreement between the two.

(2) International supervision of the elections must be limited to a "neutral nations supervisory commission", composed of an equal number of Communist and non-Communist nations to be designated by the Conference, and operating only by unanimous agreement.

6. In our view, these proposals were unacceptable. They repudiated the competence of the United Nations and were inherently unworkable. They failed entirely to provide any guarantee that elections would be carried out in genuine freedom. They rejected the principle of proportional representation by insisting that in the so-called "all-Korean commission" the minority of the population who inhabit North Korea should have the same number of representatives as the overwhelming majority of the population who live in South Korea. Even if the "all-Korean commission" could successfully have been constituted, it could only have functioned to the extent that its North Korean and South Korean members were in complete agreement. There was no provision for resolving points of disagreement. In practice, the Communist members would have retained an absolute veto over the conduct of the elections, which would have meant that they could never have taken place in freedom, if at all.

7. As for the proposed "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission", it could only have functioned in the unlikely event that the "all-Korean commission" was able to agree on a plan for the elections. Even then the equal representation of Communist and non-Communist nations, and the provisions under which decisions could only be taken by unanimous agreement, would have enabled the Communist members of the supervisory commission to frustrate the commission's operations and to prevent any effective observation of the elections. As was pointed out at Geneva, this form of international supervision would have been identical with that of the neutral nations supervisory commission established under the Korean Armistice Agreement. The

inherent vice in the proposal becomes the more patent in the light of past experiences when we consider that Communist representatives have freely used the veto to frustrate any contemplated action no matter how reasonable. There was no basis for believing that the proposed Commission would have been any more effective in practice than the neutral nations supervisory commission established by the Armistice Agreement which, because of Communist obstruction, has been unable to ensure compliance with the Agreement in North Korea. 8. The proposals of the three Communist delegations indicated plainly a refusal to submit the solution of the Korean problem to the will of the Korean people expressed in honest and free elections, adequately and impartially supervised. They sought to obliterate the distinction between the Government of the Republic of Korea, and the North Korean régime whose forces were declared by the United Nations to have committed aggression in Korea. The Communist proposals would have served to extend their control over all of Korea or, at the very least, to perpetuate its division.

9. The three Communist delegations also called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea before the holding of elections. This proposal would have involved the withdrawal of the United Nations forces before the mission of the United Nations to establish peace and security in Korea had been completed, leaving behind them a country still divided, still without a single government, and with no early hope of obtaining one. Furthermore, the proposal amounted to a demand that the aggressor forces in Korea should be placed on a plane of equality with the United Nations forces which are in Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions to repel aggression.

10. Our Governments were all agreed that all United Nations forces should be withdrawn as soon as this could be done without prejudice to the objectives of the United Nations to restore peace and security in the area. We believed, therefore, that the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea should be completed as soon as these objectives had been achieved and after the establishment of a unified Korea.

11. For more than seven weeks every effort was made by our delegations to secure agreement on a basis consistent with the principles set out in paragraph 1 above. These efforts were in vain. It became clear that serious negotiation was impossible and that the Conference was being exploited by the Communist spokesmen to attack the very basis of the United Nations action in Korea and to attempt to confuse world opinion on the fundamental issues in the Korean question. To the very end, the Communist proposals would have made the unification of Korea impossible, except on the basis of extending Communist control over all of Korea. We came to the conclusion, therefore, that further discussions at the Geneva Conference could hold out no prospect of success.

12. At the final session of the Conference on 15 June, the three Communist delegations presented a number of further proposals. These were designed essentially to blur the issues at stake and to make it appear that the Conference was in complete agreement on

the objectives it sought in Korea. Nevertheless, it quickly became evident that the Communist Delegations maintained their previous position on the points of principle discussed above. They still insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea before the beginning of the elections, and that these elections should be arranged by an "all Korean Commission" and supervised by a "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission" in each of which the Communist members would retain a power of veto. They continued to assert (in the words of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union on 15 June) that the United Nations Organization "has acted in Korea as a belligerent and... in consequence has no moral right to function as an impartial organization for the solution of the Korean problem". 1

13. They also claimed that the adoption of their proposals was necessary in order to bind all parties in Korea to maintain peace there. It was pointed out to them that the Korean Armistice Agreement already contained formal and exact provisions for the maintenance of the cease-fire in paragraph 62 which lays down that:

"The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides".

14. In our view the proposals submitted by the three Communist delegations at the final session could have served only to conceal the serious issues of principle which remained unresolved. We considered that it was better to face the facts of our disagreement and that it would be wrong to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing there was agreement when in truth there was none. Accordingly, at the final plenary session of 15 June, our Delegates and the Delegate of the Republic of Korea made the Declaration by the Sixteen (of which the text is attached),2 in which we informed the Communist Delegations that we had been compelled, reluctantly and regretfully, to conclude that, so long as they rejected the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose.

15. The Governments which participated in the United Nations action in Korea deeply regret that the Communist delegations persisted at Geneva in the same refusal to accept elections impartially supervised which has frustrated the efforts of the United Nations since 1947 to bring about the unification of Korea.

Our delegations made it clear that the failure of the Geneva Conference to solve the Korean question does not prejudice the armistice

1 The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference differs somewhat, reading:

p. 179.

The translation

the United Nations, which is acting the part of a belligerent in Korea and has, therefore, no moral grounds for assuming the role of an impartial body with regard to the Korean question.

2 Not printed as attachment here; see Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea Issued at Geneva, June 15, 1954; supra, doc. 90.

in Korea, which remains in effect. We expressed our intent to continue to support the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, in particular that of achieving a unified, independent, and democratic Korea by peaceful means. It is our hope that, through the acceptance of the fundamental principles set forth in the first paragraph of this report, it may yet prove possible to achieve this objective.

93. APPROVAL OF REPORT ON THE KOREAN PHASE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA: Resolution 811 (IX) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 11, 1954 1

The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea signed at Seoul, Korea, on 17 August 1954,2

Having received the report on the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva from 26 April to 15 June 1954,3 in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953,

Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objectives in Korea,

Recognizing that these objectives should be achieved by peaceful methods and by constructive efforts on the part of the Governments concerned,

Noting that paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides",

1. Approves the report on the Korean Political Conference;

2. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

3. Expresses the hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress towards these objectives;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to place the item on the provisional agenda of its tenth session.

U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), p. 5.

Ibid., Supplement No. 15.

3 Supra.

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