trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained after 25 September 1953;

3. Requests the Secretary-General, in the name of the United Nations, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of these eleven United Nations Command personnel, and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report progress to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.1

104. COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL: Statement by the Department of State, January 19, 1955 2

Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson met with the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Dag Hammarskjold, and U.N. Under Secretary Ahmed S. Bokhari on January 19. They conferred for about an hour and a half. Mr. Hammarskjold gave Secretary Dulles a detailed report of the conversations that he had had in Peiping in pursuance of his mandate from the United Nations to make continuing and unremitting efforts to effect the release of captured personnel of the U.N. Command detained by the Chinese Communist regime in violation of the terms of the Korean Armistice.

The Secretary-General gave a full account of the information and views that had been exchanged at Peiping on the question of the U.N. Command prisoners and expressed the hope that, given restraint on all sides, it would be possible to effect their release. In the meantime he had made inquiries and received assurances regarding the well-being of the prisoners, and he has transmitted this information to the Secretary of State. This will be transmitted in turn to the families by the U.S. Defense Department.

Secretary Dulles expressed, on behalf of the President and himself, their appreciation of the painstaking efforts which had been made and their hope that the United Nations would persist effectively in the course upon which it had embarked pursuant to the U.N. General Assembly resolution of last December. Secretary Dulles pointed out that there was in the United States a strong sentiment in favor of direct action but that it was the policy of the President for the time being to leave the handling of this matter, insofar as it was covered by the U.N. resolution, to the United Nations itself and to abstain

1 On Dec. 30, 1954, the Secretary-General reported that following an exchange of cablegrams and conversations with the Chinese Communist Ambassador at Stockholm, he, the Secretary-General, was proceeding that day to visit Peiping. See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/2911), p. 14.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, pp. 189–190.

• Supra.

from direct intervention which might embarrass the activities and efforts of the United Nations itself. The Secretary did, however, point out that the U.S. Government and indeed the entire American people were strongly aroused by the unlawful imprisonment of U.S. citizens and that they awaited with eagerness and anxiety the further developments in this matter.

105. COMMUNIST DETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL: Statement by the Department of State, January 21, 19551

The Secretary-General of the United Nations was informed during his Peiping discussions that Chinese Communist authorities might permit relatives to visit those United States personnel who had been convicted and those whose cases were under investigation and that they would provide them the necessary entry visas. This morning the Chinese Communists made this announcement.

The United States Government cannot, of course, in good conscience encourage those who may wish to go into an area where the normal protections of an American passport cannot be offered. World public opinion will judge the motives of those who, having it in their power and being under an obligation to end promptly the tragic grief they have caused, now visit upon the families of these imprisoned Americans a harrowing dilemma. It is by releasing those they hold that the Chinese Communists can convincingly show concern for the human sufferings they have caused.

106. NEGOTIATIONS FOR RELEASE OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL DETAINED BY THE COMMUNISTS: Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, September 9, 1955 2

1. The General Assembly, by resolution 906 (IX) of 10 December 1954,3 requested the Secretary-General to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of eleven United Nations Command personnel and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained. It further requested the Secretary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report progress to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 192. For the text of a letter from the Secretary of State to the next of kin of each of the imprisoned personnel, dated Jan. 27, 1955, advising that the Department of State would not issue passports valid for travel to the Chinese mainland, see ibid., Feb. 7, 1955, p. 214. 2 U.N. doc. A/2954, Sept. 9, 1955.

3 Supra, doc. 103.

In the debate on this resolution attention was drawn to four jet pilots, serving under the United Nations Command, who were known to be detained in China. [Footnote in the original document.]

2. On 31 December 1954,1 I submitted a report informing Members that, following an exchange of communications with the Prime Minister of the State Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and a meeting in Stockholm with General Keng Piao, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, arrangements were made for the Secretary-General to visit Peking.

3. As stated in my annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization,2 my visit to Peking was made necessary because of the need to establish a direct contact with the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, since this Government was not represented in any organs of the United Nations. The visit, aimed primarily at clarifying the substantive and legal aspects of the matter, established this direct contact on a personal basis. It thus provided possibilities to pursue the discussion concerning the problem raised by the detention of the United Nations personnel referred to in the General Assembly resolution.

4. After my return from Peking I continued, within the framework of the contact thus established, an exchange of views with Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The contact was maintained mainly through a series of communications transmitted by the Swedish Embassy in Peking. I received valuable assistance also from representatives of the Governments of other Member States.

5. A renewed personal contact with a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Keng Piao, was made by me in Stockholm on 23 April 1955.

6. By a letter to me, given to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking in the early afternoon of 29 May 1955 (New York time), Mr. Chou En-lai announced that an investigation of the cases of four detained fliers had been completed and that it had been decided that they should be deported immediately from the territory of the People's Republic of China. The four men arrived in Hong Kong on 31 May 1955.3

7. By an oral message to me, given to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking at 1 o'clock in the morning, 1 August 1955 (New York time), and transmitted by him, Mr. Chou En-lai announced that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had decided to release as soon as feasible the eleven American fliers who had been detained and imprisoned, and that an announcement to that effect would be made in Peking at 10 a. m. on 1 August 1955 (New York time). The eleven men arrived in Hong Kong on 4 August 1955.4

8. Mr. Chou En-lai has expressed his hope that the contact established will be continued. In reply I have stated that this hope is shared by me.

1 See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Anneres, Agenda item 72 (A/2891). [Footnote in the original document.]

2 Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/2911). [Footnote in the original document.]

3 See Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, p. 953.

See ibid., Aug. 15, 1955, p. 262.

1. OPERATION OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE MACHINERY, 1953–1955

107. COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES IN KOREA: Letter From the Senior United Nations Representative on the Military Armistice Commission to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, April 15, 1954 2

1

1. For investigation of violations of the Armistice Agreement by the KPA/CPV [Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers] 3 side, during the period 29 November 1953 to 9 February 1954, the following facts are presented for your immediate consideration.

2. On 29 November 1953, after the KPA/CPV in a meeting of the MAC [Military Armistice Commission] refused to submit a joint letter to the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission], the UNC [United Nations Command] unilaterally requested the NNSC to investigate the case of three soldiers apprehended by the UNC on 19 November 1953 in the Joint Security Area. These three soldiers were identified beyond question to be former soldiers of the ROKA [Republic of Korea Army]. The place and date of their capture by the KPA/CPV was firmly established. Although ample evidence was available to verify the fact that these persons were impressed into the KPA/CPV military units, and were retained after 24 September 1953, a clear violation of paragraph 51 of the Armistice Agreement by the KPA/CPV, the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC refused to participate in any proceedings for the consideration of this critical matter as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

3. On 18 December 1953, after the KPA/CPV in another meeting of the MAC again refused to submit a joint letter to the NNSC, the UNC unilaterally, and for the second time, requested the NNSC to investigate the case of two individuals apprehended by the UNC, South of the Southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone on 10 December 1953. These individuals, as in the case of the three ROKA persons previously cited, were also identified beyond question to be former soldiers of the ROKA who had been impressed into the KPA/CPV military units. Their retention after 24 September 1953 constituted a second clear violation of paragraph 51 of the Armistice Agreement by the KPA/CPV. For the second time, the NNSC failed to take any action on a unilateral request from the Senior Member of a side as authorized in paragraphs 28 and 42F of the Armistice Agreement. For the second time, the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC refused to participate in the performance of their solemn obligation under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. 4. On 18 January 1954, and again on 26 January 1954, the UNC submitted separate unilateral requests to the NNŠC to investigate

1 Maj. Gen. J. K. Lacey, USAF.

2 Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, pp. 689-691. 3 All brackets inserted in original Bulletin presentation.

specific military units of the several ROKA persons, who had been impressed into the military service of the KPA/CPV, in order to ascertain whether these and other individuals had also been forcibly detained in the territory under the military control of the KPA/CPV. For the third and fourth time, respectively, the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC again refused to cooperate in the investigation of KPA/CPV violations of the Armistice Agreement. The arguments presented by the members gave every indication of being mere excuses to prevent the NNSC from confirming KPA/CPV violations of the Armistice Agreement in the territory under the military control of the KPA and the CPV. Particularly significant, however, was the fact that the responses of the Polish and Czech members as evidenced by an examination of the minutes of the 89th and 96th meetings of the NNSC, conformed to and appeared to be unduly influenced by the contents of two prior letters of 19 January and 27 January, issued by the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, as his reply to the UNC unilateral requests submitted to the NNSC on 18 January and 26 January, respectively. Substantiation of such influence is found in the following remark made by the Polish member and confirmed by the Czech member, at the 96th meeting of the NNSC:

The Polish Delegation also deems it its duty to declare that for the above stated reasons it will not agree-either now or in the future-to a request of one of the sides to conduct any investigation in connection with the issue of retention of the captured personnel of the other side until settlement or understanding is reached on the matter by the two opposing sides or by the forthcoming political conference.

Such a decision by the Czech and Polish members is considered by the UNC to render the NNSC ineffective for future investigation of any Armistice violations relating to captured ROKA personnel impressed into KPA and CPV military units.

5. Finally, on 9 February, 1954, the UNC unilaterally requested the NNSC to investigate the illegal introduction of combat material into the territory under the military control of the KPA and the CPV, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Names of places and exact locations were included in this request of the UNC. Before the NNSC had officially announced its decision regarding the UNC request, the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, addressed a letter to the Senior Member of the UNC, MAC, denying all the facts presented. Concurrently he forwarded an almost identical letter to the NNSC. The influence that this letter had on the proceedings of the NNSC cannot be discounted.

In

6. In attempting to veil these KPA and CPV violations, the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, charged the UNC with violations of the Armistice Agreement, with no foundation in fact. addition to labeling the UNC charges slanderous fabrication, the Senior Member of the KPA and CPV, MAC, attempted to offset the UNC requests for investigation of violations by submitting unfounded charges against the UNC. In a letter dated 23 Feb. 1954, the NNSC indicated its inability to carry out its pledged obligations with regard to the UNC requests of 9 February 1954. This letter was received