2. PROPOSED CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS ADMINISTRATION: Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation_to_the Working Committee of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, June 22, 1950 1

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I. Conventional Armaments Administration (CAA)

Establishment. A United Nations Conventional Armaments Administration should be created at the seat of the United Nations to supervise and administer the general system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. The Administration should derive its powers and status from the treaty or convention setting up the international system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

Composition. In order that the Conventional Armaments Administration will be broadly representative of the States participating in the system, but limited in size in the interest of efficient operations, it should be composed of a representative from each of the States which are members of the Security Council, the non-permanent membership changing in conformity with elections to and retirement from the Security Council.

To facilitate its operations, the Administration should be authorized, in the treaty or convention which creates it, to establish regional branches. Each participating State should be obliged by the treaty or convention to designate a national agency to supervise the execution of its obligations with respect to conventional armaments and to assist the Conventional Armaments Administration in its work.

The Administration should be empowered to employ the personnel requisite to carrying out its functions. This personnel should be recruited on the basis of character and technical competence, due allowance being made for equitable geographical distribution.

Functions. The Conventional Armaments Administration should be responsible for:

(1) Receiving from each participating State the reports specified in the treaty or convention establishing the system;

(2) Verification of this information through investigation and direct inspections;

(3) Review and interpretation of data derived from reports and inspections;

(4) Preparation of periodic and special reports on conventional armaments and armed forces to organs of the United Nations and to the participating States;

(5) Immediate certification to the Security Council and to participating States of violations or evasions.

Procedure. The treaty or convention which establishes the system for the regulation of armaments should stipulate that decisions made by the Administration within its defined functions do not require

1 U.N. doc. S/C.3/SC.3/24, June 22, 1950.

unanimity. Except for this provision and others which may be adopted in the treaty or convention, the Administration should adopt its own rules of procedure. It should also be authorized to issue administrative regulations and to enter into ad hoc agreements necessary to the discharge of its responsibilities.

Inspections. The Conventional Armaments Administration should be required to conduct such inspections as are necessary to the fulfilment of its functions.

The treaty or convention setting up the system should stipulate the objectives to be achieved by the inspections. There should then be stipulated the types of inspections to be conducted as a matter of routine.

It is further considered most desirable that practically all inspections will be scheduled in advance, and that they will be identical in character for Powers of similar strength.

Each individual inspection should be conducted by an inspection team the size and composition of which should be determined by the Conventional Armaments Administration with due regard to the following:

(1) Each member of the Administration should be entitled, but not required, to have a representative on each inspecting team, except where a member of the Administration is itself being inspected. The State being inspected should be obliged to appoint a liaison officer to accompany the inspection team; (2) Each participating State should nominate as many inspectors as the Adminstration may require it to furnish, and these nominees should form a permanent roster from which inspection teams should be selected as needed;

Each inspection team should have at its disposal a staff composed of personnel of the international secretariat of the Conventional Armaments Administration.

II. Relationships of the Conventional Armaments Administration to Organs of the United Nations

To the Security Council. Since every aspect of the regulation and reduction of armaments is associated with the maintenance of international peace and security, every aspect of the work of the Conventional Armaments Administration is to some extent related to the Security Council. However, in order to provide the Security Council with a basis for taking appropriate action, the following specific relationships should be established in the treaty or convention for the regulation and reduction of armaments:

(a) Violations or evasions should be immediately certified to the Security Council by the Conventional Armaments Administration; (b) The Conventional Armaments Administration should submit to the Security Council regular reports at stated intervals and special reports as required.

The relation of the Conventional Armaments Administration to the Military Staff Committee should be defined by the Security Council as circumstances require.

To the General Assembly. Under the Charter (Articles 10-12) the General Assembly has broad authority to consider and make recommendations concerning the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In order to assist the Assembly in the exercise of this function, the treaty or convention for the regulation and reduction of armaments should require the Conventional Armaments Administration to submit to the General Assembly annual reports and such special reports as the Assembly may from time to time request.

To the International Court of Justice. Under the Statute of the Court, cases between States arising out of the treaty or convention for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court when referred to it by the parties or through the operation of a compulsory jurisdiction declaration. In addition, the Conventional Armaments Administration should be empowered, in accordance with the procedure specified in Article 96 of the Charter,2 to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the Administration's activities. Proceedings before the Court should not delay the taking of measures necessary to conserve international peace and security.

To the Secretariat. The Conventional Armaments Administration might have an independent secretariat separate from the United Nations Secretariat. It might, however, utilize the services of the United Nations Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon. Reports and other communications from the Administration to organs of the United Nations should be transmitted through the SecretaryGeneral.

To the Economic and Social Council. Such relationships as may be necessary should be established between the Conventional Armaments Administration and the Economic and Social Council, its commissions and sub-commissions, and related specialized agencies.

To the Trusteeship Council. Such relationships as may be necessary should be established between the Conventional Armaments Administration and the Trusteeship Council.

With Individual States. The question of the relationship of the Conventional Armaments Administration to each participating State will require careful treaty definition, particularly as regards the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded to the Administration will exempt it from the operation of national laws and the means by which individual rights and liberties will be protected against possible infringement stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges and immunities to the Administration should be based on the principle of minimum interference with the national laws of a State consistent with adequate supervision of the regulation and reduction of arma

ments.

1 Article 36 of the Statute; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 147. 2 Supra, p. 157.

The Administration should have no authority to issue directions or instructions to any State. The Administration should, however, be authorized to negotiate with each participating State such administrative agreements as may be necessary to carry out the treaty or convention affecting such State's regulation and reduction of arma

ments.

The privileges and immunities of the Administration should include: (1) The possession of legal personality similar to that enjoyed by the United Nations;

(2) The right of its accredited representatives to the privileges and facilities of ingress, egress and access into and from the territory of participating States, including rights of transit for persons and equipment across or through such territory;

(3) The right to the use of communication facilities adequate to the discharge of its responsibilities;

(4) Such exemption from customs and immigration regulations as may be necessary to effective operations;

(5) Inviolability of premises, property and archives.

B. CONSOLIDATION OF THE APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT, 1951–1952

[PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF THE TWO DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONS: Address by the President of the United States Before the United Nations General Assembly, October 24, 1950] 1

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3. PROPOSED COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF ALL ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES: Working Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations Committee of Twelve, May 17, 19512

Introduction

The United States believes that comprehensive plans to include the international control of all armaments and armed forces should be developed by the United Nations, and, accordingly, that present United Nations efforts should be directed towards the preparation of 1 Supra, pp. 345-350.

2 U.N. doc. A/AC.50/1. The Committee of Twelve was established under General Assembly Res. 496(V), Dec. 13, 1950 (U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), p. 80), to report "on ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments may be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission."

co-ordinated plans of control which would make possible with appropriate safeguards the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces. United Nations efforts in the field of armaments and armed forces have to date been assigned to two separate bodies, namely the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Much useful work has been accomplished by the two Commissions and, in the view of the United States, the appropriate time has now arrived for bringing the respective efforts of the two Commissions into closer co-ordination through the establishment of a single commission. In taking over the functions of the two present Commissions, the new commission would build upon the work already done by them. In particular, the United States believes that the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy' must continue to serve as the basis for the work of the new commission in the atomic energy phases of its work. Nevertheless, the commission should be empowered to consider any other proposals that would be no less effective than the existing United Nations plan.

A. Organization

The United States believes that a new commission whose primary task would be the development of plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces-to be called the Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces-should be established in place of the existing two Commissions in accordance with the following terms and provisions:

1. Status. The new commission should be established under and
report to the Security Council, which in turn should submit peri-
odic progress reports to the General Assembly.

2. Composition. Membership on the new commission should
correspond to the membership of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and hence
would consist of the members of the Security Council, plus
Canada when Canada is not a member of the Security Council.
3. Sub-committees. The new commission should be expressly
authorized to establish such sub-committees as may be needed
in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, recognizing that the
differences in the nature of atomic and non-atomic weapons, as
well as in the nature of biological and other instrumentalities of
warfare, require the development of varying, but co-ordinated,

1 The "United Nations plan" here referred to consisted of the "General Findings and Recommendations" incorporated in the First Report of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, Dec. 31, 1946 (A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1107-1110) and Part II of the Commission's Second Report, Sept. 11, 1947 (ibid., pp. 1111-1118).