Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations. (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations. (a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in stage I. Disclose STAGE IV (a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons. (b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons. Verify (a) By cross checks with stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed. (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations. (a) and (b): By aerial survey as set forth in stage I. Disclose STAGE V (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types. Verify (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross checked with information disclosed in stages I, II, III and IV. ANNEX II Proposed stages of disclosure and verification of Atomic armaments STAGE I Disclose (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.) (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance. Verify (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installation. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared.) (b) Uses and functions in so far as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.) (a) and (b): By aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic armaments. (See annex I.) Disclose STAGE II (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material. Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stage I. Disclose STAGE III (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities. (b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process. (c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced. Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stages I and II. (b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records. (c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves. Disclose STAGE IV (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials. Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stages I, II and III. Disclose STAGE V (a) Location, numbers and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites. Verify (a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with stages I, II and III and (a) above. 6. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF A DISARMAMENT PROGRAM: Proposal Submitted by the United States Delegation to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, April 24, 19521 The Disarmament Commission accepts as a guide for its future work the following principles as the essentials of a disarmament programme: 1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations. 2. To achieve this goal, all States must co-operate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world: (a) In which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no State will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and (b) In which no State will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other States having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending State could start a war. 3. To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all States would reduce their armed forces to 1 U.N. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for April, May and June 1952 (DC/C.1/1), pp. 8-9. levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities, necessary for: (a) The maintenance of internal security, (6) Fulfillment of obligations of States to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 4. Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme both: (a) The progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to fixed maximum levels, radically less than present levels and balanced throughout the process of reduction, thereby eliminating mass armies and preventing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to peace, and (b) The elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruction. 5. Such international agreements must provide effective safeguards to ensure that all phases of the disarmament programme are carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only. 6. Such international agreements must provide an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament. 7. NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ARMED FORCES: Working Paper Submitted by the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, May 28, 19521 The delegations of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which sponsored the resolution of the General Assembly establishing the Disarmament Commission, 2 are today submitting the attached working proposals for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on all armed forces. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. 1 U.N. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for April, May and June 1952 (DC/10) pp. 1-5. 2 Supra, doc. 4. The proposals suggest that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million is suggested for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 is suggested for the United Kingdom and France. The proposals call for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States. having substantial armed forces to be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the five powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world, thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population and should be less than current levels, except in very special circumstances. The proposals envisage substantial and balanced reductions in armed forces. Agreement on such reductions should greatly lessen the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament programme, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. PROPOSALS FOR FIXING NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS OF ALL ARMED FORCES A. Introduction 1. Paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952: "Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only". 2. Paragraph 6 of the resolution: "Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: "(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed; "(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments". |