3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of States. Obviously some over-all limitations on the size of the armed forces of States are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper is not intended to exclude, but to facilitate the development of other essential components which must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly resolution refers to as "comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" including "safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all . . . nations [whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system]". Proposals have already been submitted on certain other essential components, i. e., the control of atomic energy and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. By submitting this working paper and focusing attention on another component we hope to facilitate progress toward an agreed comprehensive programme. B. Standards for determining numerical limitations of all armed forces 4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. 5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion: (a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America which should be worked out with a view of avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000. (b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circumstances. C. Significance of over-all numerical limitations 6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be considered in any comprehensive programme for the balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any such programme for the following reasons: (a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces. (b) A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression. (c) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces, minimizing the likelihood and fear of successful aggression, should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces. D. Implementation of proposals for numerical limitations of all armed forces 7. In determining the numbers in the armed forces, all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, must be included. 8. Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police. 9. This system must be accepted by all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. 10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected. 11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related to progress in connexion with other phases of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification. 12. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement. 13. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings would be subject to review at stated intervals. 14. The proposed limitations including their relationship to other components of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction-should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952. 8. FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, MAY 29, 19521 1. The General Assembly, by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952,2 established the Disarmament Commission. In addition, the General Assembly, by resolution 504 (VI) of 19 January 1952,3 referred to the Commission certain proposals of the USSR, as contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive, of document A/C.1/698 [DC/2]. 2. The Members of the Disarmament Commission for 1952 are: Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. 3. The Commission has held twelve meetings to date, of which the first was held in Paris on 4 February 1952, and the subsequent ones have been held at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 4. At the 2nd meeting of the Commission on 14 March 1952, the representative of the United States submitted a "Proposal for a Plan of work for the Disarmament Commission" [DC/3]. 5. At the 3rd meeting of the Commission on 19 March 1952, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a "Proposal for a plan of work for the Disarmament Commission" [DC/4 and DC/4/Corr.1]. 6. At the 7th meeting of the Commission on 26 March 1952, the representative of France submitted a "Proposed program of work for the Disarmament Commission" [DC/5]. This proposed programme was adopted by the Commission at its 8th meeting on 28 March 1952. 7. At the 9th meeting of the Commission on 2 April 1952, at the suggestion of the Chairman, the representative of Chile, the Commission established two working committees, each consisting of all the members of the Commission [DC/8]. Committee 1 was authorized to consider paragraph B of the programme of work, to wit, "Regulation of all armaments and armed forces". Committee 2 was authorized to consider paragraph A of the programme of work, to wit, "Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces". 1 U.N. doc. DC/11. 2 See supra, doc. 4. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119), p. 4. 8. At the first meeting of Committee 2, on 5 April 1952, the representative of the United States submitted a working paper entitled "Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments" [DC/C.2/1].1 9. At the 3rd meeting of Committee 1 on 24 April 1952, the representative of the United States submitted a proposal entitled "Essential principles for a disarmament programme" [DC/C.1/1].2 10. At the 12th meeting of the Commission on 28 May 1952, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a "Working paper setting forth proposals for fixing numerical limitations of all armed forces" [DC/10].3 11. The Commission decided at its 12th meeting on 28 May 1952 to submit this first report, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 502 (VI), to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations, and to transmit with this report the two resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above, and the records of the proceedings of the Commission and its Committees to date. 12. The discussions in the Commission and its two Committees are continuing and the Commission will, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 502 (VI), submit further reports on its work. 13. The list of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and of the records of the proceedings of the Commission and its Committees is annexed hereto." 9. NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ARMED FORCES: Supplementary Working Paper Submitted by the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, August 12, 1952 1. It is contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limitation of armed forces would necessarily comprehend: (a) Provisions to ensure that production of armaments and quantities of armaments bear a direct relation to the amounts needed for permitted armed forces; (b) Provisions for composition of permitted armed forces and armaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might prejudice a balanced reduction; (c) Procedures in conformity with the directive contained in paragraph 6 (b) of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, for the negotiation within over-all limitations of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments with a view to obtaining early agreement on these matters among States with substantial military resources. 1 See supra, doc. 5. See supra, doc. 6. Not reprinted here. U.N. Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for July, August and September 1952 (DC/12), pp. 1-3. • Supra, doc. 4. Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development, under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission, of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments to be comprehended within the treaty or treaties referred to in General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952. 2. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating discussions, might be: (a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper DC/101 with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, arrangements might be made for a conference between China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to reaching tentative agreement among themselves, by negotiation, on: (1) The distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces; (2) The types and quantities of armaments which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings; (3) The elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the types and volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic, even for States with substantially equal aggregate military strength, inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreements would be to reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. Such agreements would necessarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of further tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the following paragraph. (b) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred to in paragraph 2 (a), regional conferences might be held, to be attended by all governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions, for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on: (1) The over-all numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of the tripartite working paper on numerical limitations, (2) The distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated categories, 1 Supra, doc. 7. |