tive to state clearly his conception of international control. We asked if the Soviet control proposal contemplated national or international ownership of fissionable material, and national or international ownership, operation, and management of facilities producing dangerous quantities of fissionable material. Would the international control organ have the right to station inspectors continuously at any particular installation? Could inspectors be sent wherever and whenever the control organ considered it necessary? Could the control organ "interfere" with the freedom of a state so far as might be necessary to insure that there was no possible evasion or violation?

In reply, the Soviet representative stated it was necessary to agree on principles before replying to our questions. As long as we did not abandon the U.N. plan, there was no point in discussing a system of inspection on a continuing basis. As he said, "This is the fundamental issue, and until we get beyond it there is no point in discussing details of the how, why, and wherefore. . . . Until we clear up this basic question, until we reach agreement on it, there is no point in considering the details."

Similarly, he insisted there must be agreement on a "decision" to prohibit atomic weapons before "discussing details and particular points." (DC/C.1/PV.2, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 30, 31, 35, 36.)

On May 8 the representative of France made one more attempt. He asked for a yes or no answer to the question of whether by "continuing inspection" the Soviet representative actually meant that international inspectors could be stationed day and night in all atomic-energy establishments, at all stages of production, so that we are assured that at no stage of production can any quantity of fissionable material, however small, be diverted for the clandestine manufacture of bombs.

The Soviet representative replied, "When the United States and France... are prepared to withdraw this obsolete, unacceptable and worthless proposal," meaning the U.N. plan, "then I shall be prepared to give a concrete explanation of how we think control and continuing inspection should be carried out. As long as our approach to the question remains so utterly different, there is no need for me to give any details" (DC/C.1/PV.4, pp. 28, 33).

At the meeting on May 14, the representative of the United Kingdom tried again, asking the same questions, hoping, as he said, to convince the Soviet delegation that its position was genuinely obscure. The Soviet representative replied as before. "The details," he said, "can and should only be discussed when we have reached agreement on the system to be adopted." Until such time as the U.N. plan is abandoned, he said, "it is futile to discuss the details of a system of control on a permanent basis. It would be so much idle talk. That is how the matter stands on this question" (DC/C.1/PV.6, pp. 6, 12).

There were other attempts by members of the Commission to elicit some reasoned explanation of the Soviet proposals. They were all met the same way. The vague and unexplained slogans which constitute the Soviet proposals must be accepted before any details could be given.

The Soviet proposals remain, as they have always been, "phantom" proposals, elusive shadows without substance.

CONCLUSION

Despite the lack of progress toward agreement among the Great Powers on disarmament, we must not be discouraged.

The United States and other members of the Disarmament Commission worked hard to secure a better understanding of the problems which must be met if we are to move toward a disarmed world free from the danger and fear of war. The constructive proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission during the past year make a significant contribution to the better understanding of these problems. We do not contend that the constructive proposals thus far presented to the Commission would solve all the problems. They were not intended to be final and definitive in terms or complete and exhaustive in details. They were intended only to provide the basis for discussion and to open up avenues by which we might approach understanding and agreement. To keep the road to understanding and agreement open to new approaches, we sought to avoid freezing our positions or taking inflexible stands.

As the Secretary of State of the United States stated in his opening address in the general debate:

. . . disarmament cannot be achieved unilaterally. It cannot be achieved by denunciation in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved only by international agreements under effective safeguards which will protect law-abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions." 1

The Disarmament Commission cannot force disarmament agreements upon recalcitrant states. It cannot bridge deep and fundamental differences by linguistic sleight of hand. Excessive zeal to obtain agreements which gloss over rather than resolve these differences may even increase the tensions and fears which stand in the way of necessary understanding.

In the interest of world peace it is important to continue, through the Disarmament Commission and in every other way open to us, efforts to develop a better understanding of the problems of armaments, and the significance of disarmament as a means of reducing the danger and fears of war. There is reason to believe that, with the development of better understanding of these problems, the overwhelming common interest of all peoples in peace and the instinct of self-preservation will induce the statesmen of all nations to save their peoples from the horrors of war in the twentieth century. For as new instruments of warfare may be developed which would far surpass previous weapons in terms of sheer destructiveness, it becomes imperative that all nations reexamine their self-interest in these problems. All nations have an equal stake in their solution. For at stake is the survival of our common humanity.

1 Address of Oct. 16, 1952; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952, pp. 639-645.

13. NEW IMPETUS FOR DISARMAMENT: Address by the President of the United States, April 16, 1953 (Excerpt) 1

1

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could then proceed concurrently with the next great work-the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:

1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.

2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons. 4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith-the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

14. ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS: Resolution of the United States Senate, July 29, 1953 2

Whereas the peoples of the earth are plunged into vast armament expenditures which divert much of their effort into the creation of means of mass destruction; and Whereas the American people and the Congress ardently desire peace and the achievement of a system under which armaments, except for the maintenance of domestic and international order, will become unnecessary while at the same time the national security of our own and other nations will be protected; and

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 601-602. For the complete text of this address, see supra, pp. 65-71.

2 S. Res. 150, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

[Unanimously adopted.]

Whereas it is the policy of the Government of the United States to seek the honorable termination of present armed conflicts, and the correction of oppression and injustice and other conditions which breed war; and Whereas progress in these respects would strengthen world trust so that the nations could proceed with the next great work, the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it continues to be the declared purpose of the United States to seek by all peaceful means the conditions for durable peace and concurrently with progress in this respect to seek, within the United Nations, agreements by all nations for enforceable limitation of armament in accordance with the principles set out in the President's address of April 16, 1953,' namely

(1) the limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations;

(2) a commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes;

(3) international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons;

(4) a limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness; and

(5) the enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations;

to the end that a greater proportion of the world's productive capacity may be used for peaceful purposes and for the well-being of mankind; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, and that the President make known the sense of this resolution to the United Nations and to the heads of state of the nations of the world with the request that their people be informed of its contents.2

1 Supra.

2 Transmitted by the U. S. Representative at the U. N. to the SecretaryGeneral of the U. Ñ. on Aug. 8, 1953, for circulation to all U. N. members. Also, the Department of State sent the resolution to all U. S. diplomatic posts directing them to present copies to the Foreign Offices of the Governments to which they were accredited, and to explain that the resolution was demonstrative of the abiding interest of the Congress and the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government in achieving an agreed disarmament program as an inherent part of a durable peace. See also Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1953, pp. 299-300.

15. THIRD REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, AUGUST 20, 19531

1. By General Assembly resolution 704 (VII), the Disarmament Commission was requested to report to the General Assembly and Security Council not later than 1 September 1953.

2. The Disarmament Commission has held no meetings since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution mentioned in the preceding paragraph, except for a meeting on 20 August 1953.

3. It is hoped that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for the reconsideration of the disarmament question, whose capital importance in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace is recognized by all. The Disarmament Commission therefore expects to continue its work and suggests that it present a report to the ninth session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council.

16. REGULATION, LIMITATION, AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: Resolution 715 (VIII) of the United Nations General Assembly, November 28, 1953 3

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need for providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Believing that the continued development of weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament throughout the world, as the existence of civilization itself may be at stake,

Mindful that progress in the settlement of existing international disputes and the resulting re-establishment of confidence are vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament pro

1 U.N. doc. DC/32.

2 See supra, doc. 11.

U.N. General Assembly Official Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), pp. 3-4.