any disarmament agreement, nor on other essential matters set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX),

Noting also that special technical difficulties have arisen in regard to the detection and control of nuclear weapons material,

Recognizing further that inspection and control of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion, 1. Urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:

(a) Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX);

(b) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of:

(i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection,1 and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres; 2

(ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;

3

2. Suggests that account should also be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of France for exchanging and publishing information regarding military expenditures and budgets, of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for seeking practical experience in the problems of inspection and control, and of the Government of India regarding the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an "armaments truce";

4

3. Calls upon the States concerned, and especially those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the proposal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less-developed countries;

4. Recommends further that scientific search should be continued by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament;

5. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub

1 Proposal of July 21, 1955; supra, doc. 30.

2 See Soviet proposal of July 21, 1955; The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 55-56.

3 Proposal of July 21, 1955; ibid., pp. 60–62.

♦ Ibid., p. 59.

5 Ibid., pp. 60-62.

Committee and that both pursue their efforts to attain the above objectives;

6. Decides to transmit to the Disarmament Commission, for its information, the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the disarmament problem was discussed during the tenth session of the General Assembly, and requests the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee to give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents.

H. SHARING OF UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION, 1954–1955

35. REVISION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946: Message From the President to the Congress, February 17, 1954 1

To the Congress of the United States:

1

For the purpose of strengthening the defense and economy of the United States and of the free world, I recommend that the Congress approve a number of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.2 These amendments would accomplish this purpose, with proper security safeguards, through the following means:

First, widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic energy matters;

Second, improved procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic energy information; and,

Third, encouragement of broadened participation in the development of peacetime uses of atomic energy in the United States,

NUCLEAR PROGRESS

In 1946, when the Atomic Energy Act was written, the world was on the threshold of the atomic era. A new and elemental source of tremendous energy had been unlocked by the United States the year before. To harness its power in peaceful and productive service was even then our hope and our goal, but its awesome destructiveness overshadowed its potential for good. In the minds of most people this new energy was equated with the atomic bomb, and the bomb spelled the erasure of cities and the mass death of men, women, and children.

Moreover, this Nation's monopoly of atomic weapons was of crucial importance in international relations. The common defense and world peace required that this monopoly be protected and prolonged by the most stringent security safeguards.

1 H. Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d sess.

2 Act of Aug. 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 755.

Well

In this atmosphere the Atomic Energy Act was written. suited to conditions then existing, the act in the main is still adequate to the Nation's needs.

Since 1946, however, there has been great progress in nuclear science and technology. Generations of normal scientific development have been compressed into less than a decade. Each successive year has seen technological advances in atomic energy exceeding even progressive estimates. The anticipations of 1946, when Government policy was established and the Atomic Energy Act was written, have been far outdistanced.

One popular assumption of 1946-that the United States could maintain its monopoly in atomic weapons for an appreciable timewas quickly proved invalid. That monopoly disappeared in 1949, only 3 years after the Atomic Energy Act was enacted. But to counterbalance that debit on the atomic ledger there have been mighty increases in our assets.

A wide variety of atomic weapons-considered in 1946 to be mere possibilities of a distant future-have today achieved conventional status in the arsenals of our Armed Forces. The thermonuclear weapon, nonexistent 8 years ago, today dwarfs in destructive power all atomic weapons. The practicability of constructing a submarine with atomic propulsion was questionable in 1946; 3 weeks ago the launching of the U. S. S. Nautilus made it certain that the use of atomic energy for ship propulsion will ultimately become widespread. In 1946, too, economic industrial power from atomic energy sources seemed very remote; today, it is clearly in sight-largely a matter of further research and development, and the establishment of conditions in which the spirit of enterprise can flourish.

Obviously, such developments as these within so short a period should have had a profound influence on the Nation's atomic energy policy. But in a number of respects our atomic energy law is still designed to fit the conditions of 1946.

Many statutory restrictions, based on such actual facts of 1946 as the American monopoly of atomic weapons and limited application of atomic energy in civilian and military fields, are inconsistent with the nuclear realities of 1954. Furthermore, these restrictions impede the proper exploitation of nuclear energy for the benefit of the American people and of our friends throughout the free world.

An objective assessment of these varied factors leads clearly to these conclusions: In respect to defense considerations, our atomic effectiveness will be increased if certain limited information on the use of atomic weapons can be imparted more readily to nations allied with us in common defense. In respect to peaceful applications of atomic energy, these can be developed more rapidly and their benefits more widely realized through broadened cooperation with friendly nations and through greater participation by American industry. By enhancing our military effectiveness, we strengthen our efforts to deter aggression; by enlarging opportunities for peacetime development, we accelerate our own progress and strengthen the free world.

Section 1 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 wisely recognizes the

need for future revisions of the law. In its spirit, and in consideration of matters of the utmost importance to the Nation's defense and welfare, I recommend that the Congress approve a number of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS

In this atomic era the growth of international cooperation for the defense of the free world is the most heartening development on the world political scene. The United States is allied with many friends in measures to deter aggression and, where necessary, to defeat the aggressor. The agreements binding ourselves and our friends in common defense constitute a warning to any potential aggressor that his punishment will be swift and his defeat inevitable. These powerful influences for peace must be made as strong and convincing as possible.

Most of our friends among the nations have had little opportunity to inform themselves on the employment of atomic weapons. Under present law we cannot give them tactical information essential to their effective participation with us in combined military operations and planning, and to their own defense against atomic attack.

Our own security will increase as our allies gain information concerning the use of and the defense against atomic weapons. Some of our allies, in fact, are now producing fissionable materials or weapons, supporting effective atomic energy research and developing peacetime uses for atomic power. But all of them should become better informed in the problems of atomic warfare and, therefore, better prepared to meet the contingency of such warfare. In order for the free world to be an effective defense unit, it must be geared to the atomic facts of this era.

I urge, therefore, that authority be provided to exchange with nations participating in defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is essential to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic warfare. Amendments to the definition of "restricted data" recommended later in this message will also contribute to needed administrative flexibility in the exchange of information with such nations concerning the use of atomic weapons.

To meet a specific defense need existing in 1951, the Congress approved a carefully limited procedure for the communication of information on the processing of atomic raw materials, reactor development, production of fissionable materials, and related research and development.' These limitations should now be modified so that the authority to communicate information, adjusted to present conditions, may be better used to our national advantage.

In the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy, additional amendments are required for effective United States cooperation with friendly nations. Such cooperation requires the exchange of certain "restricted data" on the industrial applications of atomic energy and also the release of fissionable materials in amounts adequate for indus

1 Act of Oct. 30, 1951; 65 Stat. 692.

trial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Act be amended to authorize such cooperation. Such amendments should prescribe that before the conclusion of any arrangements for the transfer of fissionable material to a foreign nation, assurances must be provided against its use by the recipient nation for military purposes. Sharing certain information with other nations involves risks that must be weighed, in each instance, against the net advantages to the United States. In each case we must be guided by such considerations as: The sensitivity and importance of the data, the specific uses to which the information will be put, the security standards of the cooperating nation, its role in the common defense of the free world, and the contributions it has made and can make to the mutual security effort. Such considerations apply to the exchange or communication of information on general-defense planning and the employment of conventional weapons as well as to the information that could be exchanged pursuant to these recommendations.

These recommendations are apart from my proposal to seek a new basis for international cooperation in the field of atomic energy as outlined in my address before the General Assembly of the United Nations last December. Consideration of additional legislation which may be needed to implement that proposal should await the development of areas of agreement as a result of our discussions with other nations.

In a related area, present law prevents United States citizens or corporations from engaging directly or indirectly in the production of fissionable material outside the United States, except upon determination by the President that the proposed activity will not adversely affect the common defense and security. Matters that have arisen under this provision have been ordinary business or commercial activities which nevertheless fall within the broad statutory prohibition because they might contribute in some degree, however minor, to foreign atomic-energy programs. The President should be enabled to authorize the Atomic Energy Commission to make future determinations of this nature. This amendment is related also to the above amendment concerning the exchange of information with other countries, as arrangements for authorized exchanges of information with friendly foreign governments may involve participation by American citizens or firms in work in foreign countries. The proposed amendment would permit the Atomic Energy Commission also to authorize such participation.

All of these proposed amendments should make it clear that the authority granted must be exercised only in accordance with conditions prescribed by the President to protect the common defense and security.

PROTECTION OF ATOMIC-ENERGY INFORMATION

A special category of "restricted data," so defined as to include virtually all atomic-energy data of security significance, is now established by law. "Restricted data" are protected in the law by 1 Supra, pp. 2798-2805.