special espionage provisions, provisions relating to the control, dissemination, and declassification of such data, and by requirements for personnel security clearances.

Personnel security. The provisions of the act relating to security clearances of personnel need improvement in several respects. The act does not recognize degrees of sensitivity of "restricted data." The same clearance requirements apply to any type of "restricted data," whether it be access by the unskilled construction laborer to "restricted data" of only marginal security significance, or access by a scientist to the heart of atomic weapons information. The Atomic Energy Commission lacks sufficient latitude under present law to determine the extent of personnel investigation needed for adequate security. Many costly background investigations required by present law are unnecessary. The Atomic Energy Commission should be permitted to relate the scope of investigation required under the act to the significance of the access to "restricted data" which will be permitted.

This amendment is especially pertinent to the proposed broadening of private participation in the development of atomic power. While such private participants will require access to "restricted data" on reactor technology, full investigations of all their employees who will have such access are not warranted because much of the data involved will not have significant security importance. Moreover, such investigations would impede and discourage the desired participation and would be unnecessarily costly both to Government and to industry. Where access to more sensitive "restricted data" is involved, the Commission must, of course, require full investigations. Another security clearance problem relates to personnel of Department of Defense agencies and to the personnel of contractors with those agencies. The Atomic Energy Commission may now disclose "restricted data" to such of these personnel as have security clearances from the Department of Defense. The "restricted data" so disclosed by the Commission are thereafter protected in accordance with Department of Defense security regulations. And yet, contractors of the Commission are precluded by law from granting the same personnel access to the same "restricted data" until they have had AEC clearances, based on investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service Commission.

As applications of atomic energy become increasingly widespread within the armed services, the necessity increases for communication of "restricted data" between AEC contractors and participants in related Department of Defense programs. The present fact that personnel engaged in military programs who have military clearances must be denied access to "restricted data" by AEC contractor personnel impedes cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in areas of mutual interest and causes unnecessary expense in time and money. I, therefore, recommend that the Atomic Energy Commission be enabled to authorize its contractors and licensees to afford access to "restricted data" to personnel engaged in Department of Defense programs who need such data in

their work and who possess the proper military security clearances. The definition of "restricted data".-(1) A large body of "restricted data" under present law relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons. The responsibility for the control of much of this weapons information logically should rest with the Department of Defense rather than with the Commission. Many administrative difficulties that are produced by a dual system of security would be eliminated by the removal of this weapons information from the "restricted data" category and its subsequent protection by the Department of Defense in the same manner and under the same safeguards as other military secrets.

This method of handling weapons information is not possible under present law. "Restricted data" can be removed from the statutory "restricted data" category only by declassification, upon a determination by the Atomic Energy Commission that the publication of such data would not adversely affect the common defense and security. Declassification obviously is not the remedy. The remedy lies in reliance upon the standard security measures of the user, the Department of Defense. I recommend, therefore, that the statutory definition of "restricted data" be amended to exclude information concerning the utilization of atomic weapons, as distinguished from information on their theory, design, and manufacture.

(2) In addition to information which falls wholly within the utilization category, there is information which concerns primarily the utilization of weapons but which pertains also to their design and manufacture. In order to avoid difficulties in this marginal zone, I recommend legislation which also would authorize removal of such information from the "restricted data" category. This would be done only when the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine that it relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons and that it can be adequately safeguarded as classified defense information under the Espionage Act and other applicable law.1

(3) Consistent with these changes, I recommend that the Department of Defense join with the Atomic Energy Commission in any declassification of "restricted data" which relate primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons and which can be published without endangering the national security. Thus, the Department of Defense will have an appropriate voice in the protection and declassification of such "restricted data" and the responsibilities of the Commission will be clarified with respect to all other "restricted data."

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

What was only a hope and a distant goal in 1946-the beneficent use of atomic energy in human service can soon be a reality. Before our scientists and engineers lie rich possibilities in the harnessing of atomic power. The Federal Government can pioneer in its development. But, in this undertaking, the enterprise, initiative, and competitive spirit of individuals and groups within our free economy are

1 See acts of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 217–219); June 25, 1948 (62 Stat. 736–738); and Oct. 31, 1951 (65 Stat. 719-720).

needed to assure the greatest efficiency and progress at the least cost to the public.

Industry's interest in this field is already evident. In collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission a number of private corporations are now conducting studies, largely at their own expense, of the various reactor types which might be developed to produce economic power. There are indications that they would increase their efforts significantly if the way were open for private investment in such reactors. In amending the law to permit such investment, care must be taken to encourage the development of this new industry in a manner as nearly normal as possible, with careful regulation to protect the national security and the public health and safety. It is essential that this program so proceed that this new industry will develop self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

The creation of opportunities for broadened industrial participation may permit the Government to reduce its own reactor research and development after private industrial activity is well established. For the present, in addition to contributing toward the advancement of power-reactor technology, the Government will continue to speed progress in the related technology of military propulsion reactors. The present complementary efforts of industry and Government will therefore continue, and industry should be encouraged by the enactment of appropriate legislation to assume a substantially more significant role. To this end, I recommend amendments to the Atomic Energy Act which would

1. Relax statutory restrictions against ownership or lease of fissionable material and of facilities capable of producing fissionable material.

2. Permit private manufacture, ownership, and operation of atomic reactors and related activities, subject to necessary safeguards and under licensing systems administered by the Atomic Energy Commission.

3. Authorize the Commission to establish minimum safety and security regulations to govern the use and possession of fissionable material.

4. Permit the Commission to supply licensees special materials and services needed in the initial stages of the new industry at prices estimated to compensate the Government adequately for the value of the materials and services and the expense to the Government in making them available.

5. Liberalize the patent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, principally by expanding the area in which private patents can be obtained to include the production as well as utilization of fissionable material, while continuing for a limited period the authority to require a patent owner to license others to use an invention essential to the peacetime applications of atomic energy.

Until industrial participation in the utilization of atomic energy acquires a broader base, considerations of fairness require some

mechanism to assure that the limited number of companies which, as Government contractors now have access to the program, cannot build a patent monopoly which would exclude others desiring to enter the field. I hope that participation in the development of atomic power will have broadened sufficiently in the next 5 years to remove the need for such provisions.

In order to encourage the greatest possible progress in domestic application of atomic energy, flexibility is necessary in licensing and regulatory provisions of the legislation. Until further experience with this new industry has been gained, it would be unwise to try to anticipate by law all of the many problems that are certain to arise. Just as the basic Atomic Energy Act recognized by its own terms that it was experimental in a number of respects, so these amendments will be subject to continuing future change and refinement.

The destiny of all nations during the 20th century will turn in large measure upon the nature and the pace of atomic energy development here and abroad. The revisions to the Atomic Energy Act herein recommended will help make it possible for American atomic energy development, public and private, to play a full and effective part in leading mankind into a new era of progress and peace.

36. STABLE ISOTOPES AVAILABLE FOR FOREIGN DISTRIBUTION: Statement Issued to the Press by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, July 1, 19541

Stable isotopes produced in facilities of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission will be available for foreign distribution under a program announced today by the Commission.2

Radioisotopes have been sold to foreign users by the Commission since 1947,3 but stable isotopes generally have been available only to users within the United States. About 175 stable isotopes of nearly 50 elements are produced by the AEC. Stable isotopes, like radioisotopes, are valuable tools for basic research in various scientific fields.

A total of 48 foreign countries has been authorized to receive radioisotopes produced in the United States, and approximately 2,500 foreign shipments of radioisotopes have been made. Foreign requests for stable isotopes will be forwarded to the Commission through the official representatives of foreign nations for radioisotope procurement.

1 Atomic Energy Commission press release 547, July 1, 1954.

2 Most elements have several forms, similar in chemical behavior but differing in atomic weight. These are the isotopes of the element. More than 1,000 isotopes occur naturally or have been artifically produced. Some are radioactive. These usually are called radioisotopes. Others are non-radioactive, or stable. Since the isotopes of an element are similar in chemical behavior, their separation from each other requires special processes. [Footnote in original.]

3 An enlargement of the "export program" was announced by the Atomic Energy Commission on July 15, 1951; Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 181-182.

The terms and conditions for obtaining stable isotopes will be the same as those which now apply to foreign requests for radioisotopes. The applicant must agree to use the isotope only for the purpose stated in the application, and also must agree to report research results to the AEC. Foreign countries may obtain isotopes for scientific research, medical research, industrial isotopes for scientific research, medical research, industrial research, medical therapy and industrial utilization.

Stable isotopes will be sold at prices which will recover full costs of production. The quantity of a stable isotope approved for export will be limited to the amount generally provided to a domestic user for a similar purpose.

Although some stable isotopes have been produced since the 1930's, pre-World War II techniques for the concentration and separation of stable isotopes were impracticable for most elements, and only very minute quantities of pure separated isotopes could be obtained. Electromagnetic separation was one of the methods used during World War II to separate the uranium-235 isotope, needed for atomic weapons, from the more common uranium-238 isotope. This method no longer is used for uranium separation. However, part of the electromagnetic separation plant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has been utilized for the production of stable isotopes for research, in quantities much greater than were available before. Most stable isotopes now are produced by electromagnetic separation.

Stable isotopes have various research uses. Some elements do not have radioisotopes with half-lives long enough to make their use feasible in experiments. Stable isotopes of these elements can be used in tracer experiments. Boron-10 is useful as a neutron detector. Deuterium, the stable heavy isotope of hydrogen, has been utilized in biological and chemical studies. Helium 3 is important in lowtemperature studies.

37. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954: Public Law 703 (83d Congress, 2d Session), August 30, 1954 (Excerpts)1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,2 as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSE "SECTION 1. DECLARATION.-Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the policy of the United States that

"a. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the

1 68 Stat. 919. For statement of the President on signing the act, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, pp. 365–366.

2 Act of Aug. 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 755.