COOPERATIVE V. COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. Bourke, I said that I think the opportunity to develop the final disposition can be preserved if we proceed along this line.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was not disagreeing with what you said, just talking about details.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may make just one comment. This man Kaplan, who first brought it to me, had it in his mind as his idea as a precedent, as he did with Welch Grape Juice, which now belongs to 3,000 farmers. He considered himself a great private enterprise man. He did own it. He sold it to them; they did own it.

It is not a government, nor is it a collective in that sense with the government having anything to do with it. It is owned entirely by the participants in it. They own their own land. It is a co-op, as a matter of fact.

Go ahead.

Senator MORSE. I was going to say that the Kaplan cooperative arrangement is a private set-up.

BASIS OF FREEDOM; DEAL WITH WHOLE ISLAND

I want to say if we are to keep political freedom anywhere in Latin America, you have to have individual and economic freedom. Here is a sort of in-between where we get these properties into private ownership of a large number of people.

I have one other point and then I will quit. You have to deal with the whole island. You cannot stop in the Dominican Republic. If you can get this problem solved, which gets Haiti involved, and the terrible condition of Haiti brought under the influence of the kind of program we are talking about, then we have a showcase. But you cannot separate the Dominican Republic from Haiti. You have to take this whole thing.

Mr. Chairman, what I wanted to say was this: It is after 1 o'clock. The Secretary of State has been with us since 10:30. I think we have gone into almost every point, and we certainly ought to close the hearing now.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I have a luncheon engagement at 1 o'clock. I did not want this opportunity to pass, because from what I have been reading, I was afraid this was moving so rapidly that we were going to give up our leverage, and we would lose the opportunity. That is why I did not want to let this pass without raising the question.

ANGOLA; SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the Angolans capable of running their sovereign and independent state?

Secretary RUSK. Not today.

Senator LAUSCHE. They are not.

No. 2, I read this document discussing the disintegration of the relationship between China and Russia, and the difference, according to that document, is that Khrushchev believes in co-existence, the non-inevitability of war, and a peaceful transition from existing

types of governments into socialism. The Chinese insist that war is inevitable, and obviously they want war.

Now, my query is, why does China want war? What motivates it in taking that position? Does it believe that, if war comes, the annihilation will be of the West and Russia and the sparing of China? Secretary RUSK. I think it is possible, Senator, that they have some such thoughts in mind.

I think what is just as much on their minds is they do not want to see the Soviet Union become less daring, less risk-taking, less aggressive, because the state interests of Russia might point toward caution. In other words, I think there is no difference between them about wanting to get on with the Communist world revolution. The question is the methods and the procedures.

I would suppose that-

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, it resolves itself into two things: China is thinking of itself first and wants the West and Russia in war, or it is truly thinking of communication of the world.

Now, I cannot resolve in my own mind that I have a belief that if I were Chou En-lai I would want Russia and the United States in war. I would urge it because I know that they would destroy each other, and China would be left to run the world.

Secretary RUSK. So far as we can tell, Senator, Peiping is pressing upon Moscow the kinds of policies which would lead just in that direction, for example, in Berlin or Southeast Asia or wherever it might be.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for keeping you so long. I think this has been a very good meeting.

Senator MORSE. Wonderful.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN Affairs,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 11:30 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Gore (subcommittee chairman), and Senator Dodd.

The subcommittee discussed procedures for future hearings on the situation in the Congo.

No record or transcript was made of the meeting.

(110)

BRIEFING ON THE CONGO SITUATION

[Editor's Note.-On June 30, 1960, the Congo became independent of Belgium. Five days later Congolese troops mutinied and civil disorders broke out. Belgium sent 800 paratroopers to protect Belgian civilians fleeing from the Congo. Soon afterwards, the mineral-rich province of Katanga seceded from the new republic.

On July 14, the U.N. Security Council approved a request by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to send a U.N. Force to the Congo, to replace Belgian troops there and to end the civil war with Katanga. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba denounced Hammarskjold for "connivance" with Katanga President Moise Tshombe, and demanded that the U.N. Force withdraw. In September, however, the army led a coup against Lumumba, who was killed in February 1961. The Soviet Union, long critical of Hammarskjold's handling of the Congo, held him responsible and demanded his dismissal as Secretary General. The United States threw its support behind Hammarskjold and the government of President Joseph Kasavubu. In September, Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash while en route to a meeting with Tshombe.

On December 20, 1961, Tshombe and Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula signed a unity agreement, but Tshombe quickly reneged. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga led a brief secession of Oriental Province. By January 14, 1962, most of Gizenga's forces had surrendered, and Gizenga was returned to the Congolese capital in the custody of U.N. Forces on January 20.

In August 1962, U.N. Secretary General U Thant submitted a national reconciliation plan to reunite Katanga with the Congo. Tshombe rejected this proposal, but after renewed fighting with U.N. troops he capitulated in January 1963. U.N. Forces then withdrew, and Kasavubu named Tshombe Prime Minister of the United Republic of Congo (later renamed Zaire).]

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Wiley, and Capehart.

Also present: Senators Morse, Mansfield, Symington, Wiley, and Aiken.

Mr. Marcy and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff. Frederick Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Samuel Parelman, Operations Center, Office of the Secretary. Senator GORE. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, this subcommittee welcomes you and Secretary Ball and Secretary Williams.

This commences a review of the United States' action, program, and policy with respect to the Congo. The committee will be privileged to hear your statement, and then we will have some questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear with my colleagues before this subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to discuss U.S. policy with regard to the Congo and our support of United Nations operations there.

U.S. policy with regard to the Congo is consistent with our general foreign policy and our attitude toward Africa as a whole. Briefly stated, that attitude is (a) to help the African peoples form societies and governments that will be truly independent and consonant with their own consciences and cultures; (b) to maintain and promote the strong ties of culture, friendship, and economic life that already exist between the new nations of Africa and the nations of Europe and America; and (c) to cooperate in every way acceptable to both the Africans and ourselves as these new countries strive to produce the political stability, economic progress, and level of education that are essential to a free society.

In pursuit of these broad objectives, the United States has strongly supported efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo. Like almost every country in the world, the United States has firmly opposed efforts by Kasia, Katanga, Orientale, or any other province to secede. This is our policy because there is no legal, moral, or practical basis for the secession of any of these provinces; nor is there reasonable evidence that secession is the will of the majority of the population of any province involved.

HOW THE U.N. BECAME INVOLVED IN THE CONGO

Just how did the United Nations become involved in the Congo? Memories tend to fade, even after only 18 months.

You will recall that tribal fighting and mutiny in the Congolese army occurred in the first week of July 1960, immediately after the Congo became independent. During the night of July 8, many Europeans fled from Leopoldville, and Belgium announced the return of Belgian troops to protect life and property.

The new Congolese Government reacted violently to the return of Belgian forces. On July 12, that government requested urgent dispatch of U.N. forces to the Congo to protect the national territory of the country and avoid a threat to international peace.

On the same day on which the Congo Government requested United Nations aid, it also requested direct U.S. military aid. Three days later the Congolese President and Prime Minister cabled Chairman Khrushchev, "We have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention, should the Western camp not stop its aggression.'

The urgent problem was to restore public order and to permit the withdrawal of the Belgian troops without leading to internal collapse in the Congo.

President Eisenhower rejected from the start any direct intervention by the major powers. In reply to the Congo Government's request for U.S. forces, the United States stated that "any assistance to the Government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included."