First, why is the Congo so important to us?

Second, what have we been trying to accomplish there?

Third, why is the United Nations in the Congo? Why have we supported the activities of the United Nations there?

Fourth, why does the U.S. Government support a united Congo and oppose the efforts of Mr. Tshombe to bring about an independent Katanga?

Five, what progress have we made in the Congo?

And, sixth, what are the prospects for this area looking toward the next few months and the longer future?

I have some maps here. I apologize for the fact that some of the comments I may make I am sure will not be news at all to you gentlemen who have studied this situation very profoundly. In order to give you an orderly presentation I may be compelled to say some things you already know. But I thought it might be helpful, in order to have clearly in mind the nature of this area, if I brought up some maps, and I can run through them very quickly.

The first map simply shows the area of the Congo. It is about the size of Western Europe, but it is rather sparsely populated, with a population of only 14 million.

It is, however, an area which is singularly blessed with resources compared with other African areas. It has about 7 percent of the free world copper, 60 percent of the cobalt, 72 percent of the industrial diamonds, and a number of other mineral resources. It has major production of palm oil, coffee, cocoa, cotton, and other products that make it a potentially rich area.

Senator DODD. What did you say it has by way of percentage of diamonds?

Mr. BALL. I think, this is the whole of the Congo, something like 72 percent of the world's production of industrial diamonds.

The Congo is, in fact, one of the few African countries which was before independence economically and financially self-sufficient and which, hopefully, can be again when the necessary steps have been taken to restore order and to create a viable economy. The rudiments are there, the basis is there.

THE KEYSTONE OF CENTRAL AFRICA

The real significance of the Congo for U.S. policy, and for the policy of the free world, lies in its geographic location. It is in many ways the keystone of central Africa. The Congo frontier touches on almost all the major regions of central and southern Africa.

In the south it borders on two areas which can be potentially new colonial problems or colonial problems which become acute, which can potentially be new Algerias of the future: Angola, where, as we all know, the potentials for trouble are very great indeed, and Northern Rhodesia, where there is a substantial white population and where the potentials for difficulty, again, are very substantial. So that trouble and disorder and continued difficulty in the Congo can greatly aggravate the problems that exist in those other two areas.

On the east, there is the problem of Ruanda-Urundi, an area which is a very explosive one. It attains its independence later this

year. The prospects for an explosion are there, and I am afraid they are very considerable.

Above that is Uganda, which is an area just coming out from British protection. It is going to have substantial growing pains.

The Sudan on the northeast is an area where there are border difficulties and where there is a concentration of tribes in that section which could become a source of disorder, if there is disorder in the Congo itself.

Then, on the northwest are parts of the former French territories which, while they are presently peaceful and reasonably stable, nevertheless are going to encounter some problem of transition.

IDEAL FOR SOVIET PENETRATION

Senator WILEY. Is that white area with the arrows supposed to be a part of the Congo?

Mr. BALL. That is all of the Congo. That is what the Congo is, the white area. The reason for the arrows is simply to suggest the possibility which this could offer to the Soviet Union if there should be a real Soviet takeover in the Congo.

It is an ideal place for penetration because it is right at the heart of an area which is surrounded by reasonably unstable situations and where, if the Soviet Union should be able to set up business in the Congo, it would be in the heart of Africa. So obviously under these circumstances we have a real objective in trying to prevent the Congo from being an area in which the Soviets can establish themselves.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Ball, do you think it is in the minds of the Soviet that they would like to get into this key position?

Mr. BALL. I have no question whatever, Senator Lausche, that this is something they would profoundly like to do. Actually the history of the Congo up to this point has indicated that they have had ambitions in that direction.

PARALLEL WITH LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any parallel between this position in Africa and the position of Laos in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BALL. I would suppose that this is worth far more to them than Laos could be.

Senator GORE. Both from an economic and political standpoint? Mr. BALL. That is right; yes.

Senator DODD. Would it be fair to say that from an economic standpoint there is not much similarity between the Laotian situation, but from a strategic standpoint, would you say there would be some?

Mr. BALL. I would say there would be some, but I would like to note this exception in the case of Laos, and perhaps this could be off the record.

Senator GORE. Anything you desire to be off the record, say so. [Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record.

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TRIBAL SYSTEM

Mr. BALL. The organization of the Congo society is one which is based primarily upon a tribal system. I would not try to list all the tribes. I would suppose that there must be in the neighborhood of well over 100 in the Congo.

Some of the larger ones are indicated on that map, but you will get from the map a sense of the potential fragmentation if the country were ever to organize itself to revert to the tribal basis of its organization. These tribes do not recognize, or the tribes do not exactly coincide with, the traditional borders of the Congo.

As you will note from this chart, the tribes themselves tend to overlap the national boundaries, and parts of the tribes exist on the other side of the boundaries. This again reinforces the danger of infiltration, the danger of difficulty in case the Congo itself should be taken over by the Communist powers.

I can think of no better base of operations for the Soviet Union really anywhere in the world than this to pursue their purposes of having a whole continent in which they might establish themselves.

Senator GORE. Are you indirectly making the point that the fight for the Congo has really been the fight for Africa south of the Sahara?

Mr. BALL. That is precisely correct, Mr. Chairman. By the loss of the Congo, the creation of conditions under which the Soviet Union would come in, would, of necessity, lead to a situation which we could not accept, and therefore the dangers of a great power confrontation in the Congo is something which has been on our minds from the beginning.

If we come into the Congo bilaterally, then we invite the Soviet Union to come in. If they come in, they make it necessary for us to come in. This is the essential basis for the United Nations being in the Congo, because the situation has developed in a way where the Congo by itself cannot resolve its problems without some outside assistance, and that outside assistance, if it is not to come from one of the great powers and therefore, invite a great power confrontation, can come only from the United Nations.

COMMUNIST LEADERS IN THE CONGO

Senator CAPEHART. Who are the Communist leaders in the Congo at the moment, and who have they been in the recent past? Mr. BALL. The man who has been the kind of chosen instrument of the Soviet Union is Mr. Gizenga, as you know.

Senator CAPEHART. He is still there?

Mr. BALL. He is still there. He is under house arrest in Stanleyville at the moment.

Senator CAPEHART. He is the only one?

Mr. BALL. No; there is a group of extreme nationalists who have been subverted to the Communist cause.

One always finds in a situation of this kind that the ideological motivation of these people is not very clear because of the fact that they are not sophisticated in the ideology with which we and the rest of the world are acquainted, and where extreme nationalism

and a commitment to some kind of Soviet or Communist doctrine becomes very fuzzy.

U.N. INTERVENED AT REQUEST OF CONGO GOVERNMENT

Senator CAPEHART. Might I ask this question, which has never been quite clear to me: What was the one direct reason why the United Nations intervened in the Congo situation?

Mr. BALL. They intervened at the request of the Congo Government when it was apparent that if they did not intervene, the Congo Government was going to bring in the help of the great

powers.

Senator CAPEHART. Isn't it a fact that they intervened when Belgium moved the troops

Mr. BALL. Well, they intervened-

Senator CAPEHART. To stop the Belgian troops?

Mr. BALL. What happened, Senator Capehart, was that after the independence of Katanga, within about 5 days afterward, the army revolted. It was in the chaos that followed that the Congo began to fall apart. There were secession movements springing up all over, based, to some extent, on old tribal considerations.

A WRITTEN OR ORAL REQUEST

Senator DODD. What Congo government was it, Mr. Secretary, that asked the United Nations to come in?

Mr. BALL. That was the government of Lumumba, which was the constitutionally elected government, although Mr. Lumumba himself was, as we all know, not the kind of leader we would have wanted to see in the Congo.

Senator DODD. He was certainly oriented toward the Soviet, wasn't he?

Mr. BALL. I think there is no doubt about it.

Senator DODD. And he was the one who invited the United Nations in?

Mr. BALL. He and President Kasavubu invited the United Nations in, but actually the situation at that time was that they had asked for help from the great powers, and that the United States and the Soviet Union were both on the verge of sending assistance in.

We had, as I recall, at the time refused to send in-is that true? We had refused to send in forces under purely U.S. auspices.

Senator GORE. Senator Church, I have a number of questions, as all of us have; I wonder if it would be agreeable for the Secretary to summarize these six points which he wished to make—

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator GORE [continuing]. And then take our turn, or do you wish to submit one now?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, it will be agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman. But just to clear this point up, since we are on it, is it true that prior to the time that Lumumba requested the United Nations to enter the Congo he had, in fact, requested the United States to enter the Congo?

Mr. BALL. My recollection is that he had requested the United States to enter the Congo; that we had said we did not wish to do

so because we did not wish to create an opportunity for the Soviet Union to come in. Our position was that we would do all we could to help within the framework of the United Nations.

Senator DODD. That is a matter that is disputed, Mr. Secretary. Can you tell us if he did make such a request, to whom and

Mr. BALL. Perhaps my colleague, who is more familiar with the details, can furnish that. Can you do that?

Mr. VANCE. The Congo Government-I believe Mr. Gizenga, the Vice Premier, countersigned by Mr. [Justin] Bomboko, the Foreign Minister-conveyed a formal request to the United States for United States troops.

Mr. BALL. Do you have the date of that?

Senator CAPEHART. Was that a written physical document? Do you have that? May we see it?

Mr. VANCE. I will have to refresh my memory on that, but it was conveyed orally-I believe it was conveyed in writing to our Ambassador.

DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS IN THE CONGO

Senator GORE. Let us just hold up the proceedings until we can clear it up. This is an important point. Was it written? Was it oral? Who made it?

Senator DODD. I want to make it clear that when I was in the Congo I asked about this, and I was told in one case that there is no record, and no one ever heard of it, and that is why I said I wondered about it.

Mr. CLEVELAND. My name is Stanley Cleveland, and I am assistant to Mr. Ball.

The situation as it existed-it must have been around the 7th or 8th of July, or about 3 or 4 days after the insurrection began in Leopoldville-was such that our Embassy, I believe, had by that time destroyed all of its code facilities. In fact, communications from Leopoldville to the outside world were on a very peculiar basis. There was, however, a request from Mr. Gizenga to our Ambassador at the time in Leopoldville.

Senator DODD. Mr. Timberlake.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Timberlake. The request was conveyed by our Embassy in Leopoldville, probably over the telex machine, to Brussels. Then it was made into a telegram in Brussels and sent back to Washington. But I know, having been in the middle of this communications chain myself, that there was such a request made and transmitted.

Mr. BALL. For the information of the committee, Mr. Cleveland at that time was the political officer in our Embassy in Brussels. Mr. CLEVELAND. That is right.

DIRECT MILITARY AID

Senator LAUSCHE. May I read what Secretary Rusk said on this because it is pertinent? He said:

The new Congolese Government reacted violently to the return of Belgian forces. On July 12 that government requested urgent dispatch of United Nations forces to the Congo to protect the national territory of the country and avoid a threat to international peace.