On the same day on which the Congo Government requested United Nations aid, it also requested direct United States military aid.

I do not know what is meant by direct military aid. Did they ask us to send in materiel, or did they ask us to send in troops? But it seems, according to Rusk, it all happened on the same day; the first request went to the United Nations, then the second to our country. What the ultimate facts are, I do not know, and I think we ought to get it in some way.

Mr. BALL. We will be glad to furnish the committee with an exact statement of this.

Senator GORE. Without objection, the State Department is requested to submit an exact statement, with such documentation as is possible to achieve. At this point, and before it is printed in the record, each member of the subcommittee will have a copy thereof. [The document referred to follows:]

CHRONOLOGY OF CONGOLESE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN JULY 1960

Violence broke out in the Congo the evening of July 7, 1960, and spread to Leopoldville on July 8. Belgian soldiers moved to protect their citizens on July 11 and 12. The first Congolese request for outside military assistance came on July 10. Dr. Ralph Bunche, who had arrived in Leopoldville prior to independence, met for four hours with President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba and fifteen cabinet members. This meeting resulted in an official Congolese appeal to the U.N. for technical assistance to help in organizing, strengthening and training of the national forces of the Congo for purposes of defense and the maintenance of law and order. The security situation continued to deteriorate and two days later, on July 12, Ambassador Timberlake at the close of a Congolese Cabinet meeting was given the following letter, dated July 12, which was handed to the Ambassador:

"To His Excellency, The Ambassador of the United States in Leopoldville:

"We have the honor to confirm today's conversation during which we informed you of the decision of the Congolese Government to invite the American Army into the Congo in order to insure the maintenance of order in the Lower Congo and Leopoldville.

"Since the situation is particularly serious in this part of the Congo and since the hope for collaboration between the Congolese Army and the Belgian Army has been compromised by the incidents of Matadi, it is essential that a foreign, neutral army be on the spot in order to assure peace and order in collaboration with the Congolese Army.

"We would be most appreciative if you would intervene immediately with the American Government so that a contingent of 2,000 men be sent in all urgency to Leopoldville. Thanking you for your courtesy, we are,

"Sincerely yours,

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs, J. Bomboko.

"For the Minister of National Defense, in his absence, the Secretary of State for National Defense, A. Nyembo

"For the Prime Minister, in his absence, Vice Prime Minister A. Gizenga." The same afternoon, Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko delivered a radio address which elaborated on the request for American aid. Inter alia Bomboko said:

"For several days a climate somewhat approaching terrorism has existed in our country... We were on the point of achieving success. Unfortunately, serious incidents have jeopardized that success in the lower Congo, particularly at Matadi. Being aware of all these factors, we were compelled to consider restoring order within the framework of United Nations aid. However, for practical reasons, it is impossible to bring together the members of the United Nations on short notice, and since events in the Congo brook no delay, we have been compelled to request American troops, within the framework of that United Nations aid, in order that wherever it is impossible to restore order in cooperation with the Belgians, such troops could nevertheless assist us in restoring the peace.'

Meanwhile President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent the following cable, dated July 12, 1960, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"The Government of the Republic of the Congo request urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed

between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on 29 June 1960. Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request of the Congolese Government. No such request was ever made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo and we therefore regard the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our country.

"The real cause of most of the disturbances can be found in colonialist machinations. We accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. The Government, supported by the Congolese people, refuses to accept a fait accompli resulting from a conspiracy between Belgian imperialists and a small group of Katanga leaders. The overwhelming majority of the Katanga population is opposed to secession, which means the disguised perpetuation of the colonialist regime. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace. We strongly stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo.

"(SIGNED) JOSEPH KASAVUBU PRESIDENT OF THE Republic of the Congo and Supreme CommaNDER OF THE NATIONAL ARMY

"(SIGNED) PATRICE LUMUMBA

Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense”

Based on this telegram the United Nations Security Council, on July 13, adopted the following resolution:

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/ 4382),

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. The Congolese grew more and more insistent in their demands that the Belgian troops depart immediately, and on July 15 Prime Minister Lumumba, in a radio broadcast, declared that the Congo was at war with Belgium. The same day Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a telegram to Soviet Premier Khrushchev. This telegram declared that Belgium and "certain Western countries" are conspiring against the Congo's independence and that "we may have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention, should the Western camp not stop its aggression." They asked Premier Khrushchev "to watch hourly over developments of the situation." Premier Khrushchev in reply said that if Belgium did not withdraw her troops from the Congo, the Soviet Union "will not shrink from resolute measures to curb the aggression' and that the Soviet Government would give the Congo Republic "the necessary help which may be required by the victory of your just cause."

HANDLING SUCH MATTERS ORALLY

Senator GORE. Senator Church, is it agreeable to you to proceed in the regular order?

Senator CAPEHART. May I make one other comment? Are matters as far-reaching as this handled orally so that nobody can remember who did it?

Mr. BALL. I can say this, we will find, I would be amazed if we could not find, a cable record of this sort. But this was a matter where the Embassy at that time was under enormous pressure in Leopoldville, and where, as Mr. Cleveland has said, the code facili

ties were in disarray because they had to burn them, thinking that there might be a takeover. It was not a normal situation.

Senator GORE. Is it agreeable with the subcommittee that the Secretary conclude the summarization of the six points which he wished to make by way of statement?

Then, will you proceed, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OBJECTIVES IN THE CONGO

First of all, to summarize our objectives in the Congo, our immediate objective was to prevent chaos and civil war which could open the field for Communist infiltration.

We were quite as concerned to avoid the kind of situation which would require a major power confrontation or would lead to a major power confrontation and which could create a new Korea. We wished to give support to the development of a stable and effective government under a moderate national leadership, since this seemed to us the only long-range hope for stability.

We wished to maintain the essential unity of the Congo because we believed that this was necessary, not only for its economic viability, but that also the forces and pressures were such that without unity the Congo could not be politically maintained and, consequently, large parts of the Congo would become open for Communist penetration. In other words, what we were seeking to do was to channel the forces of African nationalism, which were the dominant forces in the Congo, into the orderly development of a stable new nation.

THE U.N. AND THE CONGO

To turn to the third question, why the United Nations is in the Congo: We will furnish the information which the committee requires as to the exact circumstances and nature of the request which the Congo Government made both to the U.S. Government and to the United Nations itself.

I may say with regard to this that the Soviet Union has consistently opposed the U.N. operations in the Congo because they saw in the initiative which Mr. Hammarskjold took after the United Nations came into the Congo, a real menace to the possibility of successful Soviet penetration there. This, as you may recall, was the basis for the Soviet vendetta against Mr. Hammarskjold and for their emphasis on the troika proposal.

ADOULA IS A PROMISING MODERATE

The final result-nothing is final in this moving history which we are confronted with-but as a result of the U.N. activity Parliament was reconvened and, as the result of the reconvening of Parliament, Mr. Adoula was elected as the Prime Minister. Mr. Adoula is, in the view of the U.S. representatives on the spot, the most promising moderate nationalist leader in the Congo, and the man on whom we believe a large part of the future of the Congo must necessarily depend if it is to be a stable area.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question. Are you 100 percent sure of Adoula or▬▬

Mr. BALL. Let me say, Senator, it is very difficult to be 100 percent sure of anyone when you are dealing with this kind of a situation. But all of the evidence we have is that Adoula is a man of moderate views. We have hesitated, quite frankly, Senator, to call him publicly an anti-Communist. May I say something off the record?

Senator GORE. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record. Make such a statement as you desire to make for the record.

Mr. BALL. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that in the opinion of the U.S. State Department, based on the very close observation of Mr. Adoula in his working relationship with our representatives in the Congo and in his activities generally, we believe that he is opposed to communism. We believe that he is an effective nationalist leader and an effective anti-Communist leader. Senator GORE. Will you proceed?

Senator CAPEHART. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Senator, the subcommittee decided to let him conclude and then take our turn.

Senator CAPEHART. I have to leave at 12 o'clock. If you prefer to ask a few questions here or come back this afternoon, I do not care which, I will be just as happy to do so.

Senator GORE. We cannot finish today, but I was hoping that the record would show some chronological development of the Secretary's statement, and then we could take our turn in asking questions. But if the individual members of the subcommittee wish otherwise, I am the servant of the subcommittee.

Senator CAPEHART. I am one who believes you can get more good information and make a better record if you ask pertinent questions as you proceed. Now, maybe I am wrong in that. Senator GORE. The Chair shall not interpose.

CONGOLESE CONSTITUTION

Senator CAPEHART. Just one more question: The Congo constitution has never been approved, has it, by a parliamentary body in the government?

Mr. BALL. The situation is this, Senator: There was prior to independence a round table called in Brussels. This was in January 1960.

As a result of that round table, plans were made for the independence of the Congo. There was appointed in the course of the round table, and Mr. Cleveland can refresh my memory on this, there were appointed various factions in the Congo itself to assist Belgian experts in the creation of a provisional constitution which was known as the Loi Fondamentale. This was the constitution, the organic law, which governed the calling of elections which resulted in the creation of a central government in Leopoldville.

You are quite right in saying that this has not been submitted to the Congo people since independence. This is entirely true.

Let me say, if I may, by way of parentheses here, because I think it is relevant, that it is not our view that the Loi Fondamentale is necessarily an immutable document. In fact, I think there is a general opinion among all groups in the Congo now that some changes are going to be necessary, and that it probably should be loosened up in the direction of

Senator CAPEHART. But at the moment they have no constitution which has been approved by a duly constituted parliamentary body?

Mr. BALL. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator CAPEHART. Thank you.

Mr. BALL. However, let me say that this is probably the only—— Senator CAPEHART. It may not be important.

Mr. BALL [continuing]. This is the only basis for legitimacy that one can find.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CONGO'S LOI FONDAMENTALE The present constitution of the Congo (the Loi Fondamentale) was promulgated by the Belgian Government on May 19, 1960, before Congolese independence. Essentially, it was drafted by Belgian constitutional experts on the basis of the consultations at the Round Table Conference of Congolese leaders held in Brussels in January-February 1960. The Congolese leaders who attended the Round Table Conference represented all of the major political factions in the Congo and included, among many others, Tshombe. Mr. Tshombe expressed his pleasure "at the satisfactory conclusion" of the Round Table Conference. The constitution that emerged from this conference was intended to serve as an interim constitution until such time as the Congolese could draft a constitution for themselves.

As indicated above, the Loi Fondamentale was not adapted as a result of any popular vote in the Congo but was promulgated by the Belgian Government prior to independence and after approval by various Congolese leaders. Rapid adoption of a new, permanent constitution was envisioned by the Belgians and the Congolese leaders who participated in the Round Table Conference. The Loi Fondamentale provides that this new constitution must be approved by the first Congolese parliament by a two-thirds vote and by all of the provincial assemblies. There are complicated provisions relating to the ratification procedure in the provincial assemblies which indicate that the assemblies, if they failed to approve the constitution as a whole, must propose amendments to cover the points with which they are in disagreement. These amendments are then re-submitted to the parliament and subsequently to the provincial assemblies.

Since the Loi Fondamentale was promulgated by Belgium, the legal power then administering the Congo, with the consent of the Congolese leaders, since it is clearly provisional and specifies the procedure for adopting a permanent constitution, and since the Congolese government and leaders have, by their actions (including the Kitona agreement), implicitly expressed their acceptance of its validity, we regard it as legally valid until Parliament and the provincial assemblies take the necessary steps to replace it.