ALTERNATIVE TO GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION

The final and, I think, the most important, justification for the United Nations being in the Congo, and for our supporting its being there, is the fact that this was the alternative to a great power confrontation.

This is a matter which has been deep in our minds. The last thing in the world we wanted to see come about was another Korea or possibly the establishment of Soviet power there, and the necessity then for the non-Communist countries to come in, with the real danger of creating a brushfire conflict which could be escalated.

So that we frankly do not know of another alternative to the United Nations that could have been utilized for this purpose and under those circumstances.

SUPPORT FOR A UNITED CONGO

To come to the question which has been widely discussed in this country as to why we have supported a United Congo and why we have opposed the efforts to create an independent Katanga, Congolese unity is the principal issue in Congo politics. No Congo politician outside of South Katanga could exist without being committed to the creation of Congolese unity, and the political leadership outside of South Katanga is unanimous on this point.

If we are to have a moderate government which meets the requirements of our policy in Leopoldville, then it can only exist if it can be shown to be capable of dealing with the problem of Katanga's secession. This is not a situation which we invented. This is a situation which exists.

We think that history has, to an extent, demonstrated this rather vividly within the last few weeks, because the progress which has been made since the Kitona meeting on the solution of the problem of Katanga secession, has been very largely responsible for Mr. Adoula's ability to begin to cope with the Gizenga problem. The fact that Mr. Gizenga is now under arrest in Stanleyville and that his personal power has been very largely dissipated by the initiative of the Adoula government, is a demonstration of the fact that in the proper sequence of events the Katanga problem had to be dealt with first. This was the postulate on which our policy was based. I think that events have so far tended to justify this.

The only historic basis for a government in the Congo are the boundaries which were established under the Belgian Congo system, and while I agree with Senator Capehart-he is quite right in his observation that there has been no constitution formally adopted by the Congolese people-there is no other document than the Loi Fondamentale at the moment that is available to serve for this purpose.

Now, if the principle of self-determination were applied, which is the principle which has been implicit in what Mr. Tshombe has been-in the position that he has taken-if this were applied generally throughout the Congo, the result could be a kind of fragmentation which is roughly illustrated on that map, which is a fragmentation based on the dominance in individual areas of the large tribes which have formed, to some extent, and might coagulate for

some political purposes. I think no one has said this better, sir, than the chairman himself in the report which you, Senator [Maurine] Neuberger, and Senator [Phillip] Hart did on this, where you pointed out, I think, very clearly indeed, the situation that would result if there were a Balkanization of the Congo along tribal lines. I think that, at the same time, as I suggested to Senator Capehart a moment ago, while there cannot be fragmentation and a stable situation, and there cannot be Balkanization, there is a reasonable need for some loosening in the Loi Fondamentale. I assume this is something which would be undertaken in the course of working out the problems with Mr. Tshombe.

STOPPING A CIVIL WAR

Let me raise the fifth question, as to what progress have we made in the Congo. First, we have-when I say "we," I refer to U.S. policy in this case, carried out through support of the United Nations-has resulted in a stopping of total chaos, in stopping a civil war which could have resulted in a more sanguinary and hopeless kind of struggle. It has prevented great power intervention which could result in great power confrontation.

There has been a broad coalition under moderate nationalist leadership created. Peaceful reintegration of the Congo is now underway through the initiative of President Kennedy, following a telegram from Mr. Tshombe, which brought about the Kitona meeting. While one cannot be assured of the ultimate result of the present discussions, certainly we can see the spectacle today of the representatives of Katanga in Leopoldville discussing the constitutional revision while, at the same time, the patrols that are undertaken at Elizabethville are joint forces of the Katanga forces and the United Nations, which is in sharp contrast to what prevailed a while ago.

Most important, the Gizenga problem is now being dealt with, and we hope it will be dealt with effectively.

CALCULATED RISK

This policy which we have followed was a policy of calculated risk. We recognized all along that there was no assurance that it would succeed. We cannot assure this

Senator LAUSCHE. Which was the most important factor in that calculated risk, if you will identify it?

Mr. BALL. I would say, Senator Lausche, it was the risk of supporting the United Nations throughout, and in supporting the United Nations in what amounted to its efforts to bring about a reintegrated and stable Congo, which meant

Senator LAUSCHE. Were personalities of the incumbent government in the calculated risk?

Mr. BALL. The incumbent government

Senator LAUSCHE. Was Adoula a calculated risk?

Mr. BALL [continuing]. Adoula is a calculated risk. We think this is a risk which is one where the odds are very much on our side, because we are impressed with Adoula as the most promising moderate leader in the Congo.

Now, as to the problems for or the prospects for the future, the first problem is really twofold: First, to continue to press for a complete reintegration of the Katanga with a very active participation in the government by Mr. Tshombe or his representatives in the central government. We think Mr. Tshombe is a very important political figure in the Congo. We think that he can play an extremely constructive role in a reintegrated Congo. We have never questioned this point.

Second, it is to bring about in the course of this constitutional revision a constitution which will perhaps be better adapted to the needs of the Congo itself.

Third, there is the problem of finishing up the elimination of the Gizenga influence in the Congo, and bringing Stanleyville clearly under the control of the central government.

But, again, all of these things are only the beginning of a process which is going to take a lot of time and a lot of effort before we realize our long-range objectives.

DISCIPLINE OF THE CONGO ARMY

At the moment we must face the fact that with the elimination of the Belgian command, the Congo army is not under the discipline of the Congo Government, and if the United Nations were to leave the Congo tomorrow, the kind of incidents which we have already seen occurring around the Congo would be multiplied many times over.

I think the danger of chaos, with an army running wild, without being under the effective control of the state, is very great. So that I think perhaps the first thing that has to be done in order to bring about a stable Congo is to retrain the army, and this means disarming units of the army progressively, retraining them, bringing them under the discipline of Congolese officers so that they, in the long run, can become an element of stability in the state, rather than an element of chaos which they are today.

Let me say, this is something which probably only the United Nations can do, because to have too large or too active military missions for many of the outside powers involved, is to create opportunities for real difficulty.

TRAINING OF CIVIL SERVANTS

At the same time, we have a very serious problem of re-establishing the elements of effective administration in the Congo, and this means the training of civil servants.

Under the Belgian system there were, as I recall, seven classes in the civil service. There were almost no native Congolese in the upper four classes.

The assumption of a possible future for the Congo after independence was a viable assumption only if the Belgian top administrative group was to continue. After the troubles really started, a large part of that group left. I think it consisted of around 8,000, didn't it?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Eight or nine thousand.

Mr. BALL. Eight or nine thousand, but I think, hopefully for the future, many of them have come back and are accepted by the cen

tral government and have been accepted as individuals working in the machinery of the central government.

There must now be about 1,500 or 2,000 in the Leopoldville government. I think that the restoration of individual Belgians in the system of civil government can be a useful element for the future. At the same time, the Ford Foundation, for example, has a school in Leopoldville where they hope to train as many as 1,000 a year to work in the civil service.

It is going to be a long, slow process of training enough people to be able to take over the responsibilities of this very big country. We have to get the Congo finances in order. The situation right now is that a very large part of the revenues of the Congo are derived from the operations of a handful of Belgian companies in the Congo, in Katanga and the Kasai, largely. At the moment, these revenues are, to a considerable extent, being paid to the Katanga government rather than to the central government.

The old apparatus for collecting taxes in Belgium itself, which used to be the system, has been dismantled, and something has to be set up to substitute for that. But we must find a way of having the tax revenues flow into the treasury of the central government in order to give it the means to carry on.

Not only the tax revenues, but the income from the securities which were set aside for the benefit of the Congolese people are now being held, I think, in Brussels in escrow, and the apparatus must be worked out so that this can be accomplished.

At the moment, I think that the position of the Belgian Government is one of reluctance to make these revenues available until the central government assumes the obligation to pay the debts of the Congo itself. This must be negotiated and worked out.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE CONGO

Then we will have the problem of providing enough economic assistance to get the development progress going throughout the Congo in a way which will satisfy some of the needs, some of the felt needs, of the Congolese people.

In this connection, let me say that while the requirements for the immediate future may be substantial, the financial requirements, the promise of the Congo is very great. The national income, gross national product, of the Congo is in the neighborhood of $1,100,000,000. This is something which provides a per capita income of something over $70 per head, and while this is not large, it is large by some Asian standards. The resources of the Congo are such that with careful development it should become an area which can, to a very large extent, sustain itself.

A stable Congo, a Congo which is able to sustain itself in the heart of Africa, could become a great monument to the efforts of the free world and make a very real contribution to a stable Africa as a totality. I think this is something that is going to take work; it is going to take time; it is going to take effort, but I would hope that we are on the way to at least seeing the beginning of this process.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very rough and not particularly coherent sketch of what we have been trying to do, and is some appraisal of the results to date.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

I will be very happy to answer any of the questions that the committee may have. Mr. Vance and Mr. Cleveland are very familiar with the history and background of this, and Secretary Williams is here and is going to testify later, so that if I cannot answer the questions, perhaps I can find someone who can.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, it is now 7 minutes past 12. Senator Capehart had to leave for a program and he says he cannot be here Monday, but he can be here tomorrow. I have a number of questions. I am sure that all members have questions. Could you return tomorrow to continue this session?

Mr. BALL. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I am leaving for Panama tonight. I will be back Sunday morning, and I would be available on Monday, but I cannot be here tomorrow. However, you will be here, won't you?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will be here if you want to intersperse that.

Senator GORE. I think some members of the committee will want to submit questions directly to you, in view of the statements you have made.

Senator DODD. I have a number of questions.

Senator GORE. I thought so, and I have some. When will you return from Panama?

Mr. BALL. I will be back Sunday morning, so I will be available any time next week.

Senator GORE. Senator Capehart, as I understood him, said he could not be here until 11 o'clock on Monday, so perhaps it would be 11 o'clock before we reached him anyway. Would it be satisfactory with you to return on Monday?

Mr. BALL. I am at the convenience of the committee, Mr. Chair

man.

Senator GORE. Without objection, the committee will recon

vene

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, could I check my schedule? I do not think it will make that much difference, but I am very anxious to ask some questions and to get some information.

Senator GORE [continuing]. The committee will excuse you, Mr. Secretary, and the other State Department witnesses for the moment, and we will advise you whether to return Monday.

Will you check your schedule, Senator? In the event, I dare say, that the subcommittee may not be able to finish the questions of you Monday morning, what is your schedule Mr. Secretary, on Tuesday?

Mr. BALL. I shall be in Washington all week, Mr. Chairman, I am available to the committee.

Senator GORE. Any time next week is satisfactory to you?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator GORE. You understand that your testimony here is entirely in executive session?

Mr. BALL. Right.